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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the antecedents to the selection of CEOs with higher
levels of narcissism, as well as their impact on the CEO succession process. The first
study predicts how and when boards select CEOs with higher levels of narcissism. I
predict when firm performance is low, environmental dynamism is high, and when
environmental munificence is high, the board is more likely to select a CEO with higher
levels of narcissism. I further predict that environmental conditions (i.e., dynamism and
munificence) have a moderating effect on the relationship between firm performance and
the level of narcissism of the newly-selected CEO. I find no statistically significant
evidence that a board will select a CEO with higher levels of narcissism based solely on
firm performance or environmental conditions, or a combination of the two.
The second study predicts CEOs with higher levels of narcissism are less involved
in the CEO succession process, encourage a more competitive CEO succession process,
and have fewer than average ready-now successors while having greater than average
numbers of successors who are not-ready-now. It also predicts that when the CEO is
highly narcissistic, the board will be less involved in the CEO succession process. I find
evidence that CEOs with higher levels of narcissism have lower levels of involvement in
the CEO succession process, and that boards are less involved in the CEO succession
process when the CEO has higher levels of narcissism. However, I find no statistically
significant evidence that CEOs with higher levels of narcissism are related to a more
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competitive CEO succession processes or number of successors, regardless of successor
readiness.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
A highly narcissistic chief executive officer (CEO) can bring unexpected
outcomes to an organization, since the CEO’s behavior and decision-making rationale
can be purely driven by this self-serving personality trait (Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1996). Narcissism is a multifaceted personality trait that combines grandiosity, attentionseeking, an unrealistically inflated self-view, a need for that self-view to be continuously
reinforced through self-regulation, and a general lack of regard for others (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Prior research shows that individuals with higher levels
of narcissism can be visionaries who excel at innovation (Deutschman, 2005; Galvin,
Waldman, & Balthazard, 2010), are more likely to emerge as leaders (Grijalva, Harms,
Newman, Gaddis, & Fraley, 2015), and can inspire followers (Grijalva & Harms, 2014).
CEOs with higher levels of narcissism have been linked to increased acquisition size
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), risk-taking, and relentless pursuit of self-goals
(Maccoby, 2000; Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). Yet those
with higher levels of narcissism also damage close relationships, demonstrate self-serving
behavior (Grijalva et al., 2015), increase auditing costs (Judd, Olsen, & Stekelberg,
2015), and cause performance volatility (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).
Since the CEO holds the most influential position in the company, the CEO’s
characteristics, behavior, and decisions have a substantive impact throughout the
1

organization and can determine long-term strategic consequences (Hambrick, 2007;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In particular, a CEO’s personality is a major factor in
determining his or her behavior (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Indeed, there is growing
evidence that the characteristics of top executives, especially CEOs, affect organizational
decisions and behaviors (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996;
Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Sanders, 2001).
Psychologists have studied narcissism for over 100 years (Furnham, Richards, &
Paulhus, 2013; Levy, Ellison, & Reynoso, 2011; Raskin & Terry, 1988); however,
management scholars have only started studying the relationship between narcissism and
leadership within the last 25 years (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). Until Chatterjee and
Hambrick (2007), the study of narcissism at the CEO level was largely descriptive
(Chatterjee, 2009). Nevertheless, limited research is now available regarding how boards
decide which characteristics, especially personality traits, are needed for the CEO role
(Davidson, Nemec, & Worrell, 2006; Karaevli, 2007; Karaevli & Zajac, 2013; Westphal
& Fredrickson, 2001; Zhang, 2008).
If a highly narcissistic CEO is hired, the CEO’s personality would subsequently
impact important strategic decisions with regards to identifying and developing the next
CEO (i.e., the CEO successor; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Finkelstein et al., 2009).
Although some evidence suggests that narcissists select followers who reinforce their
self-esteem needs (Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007), we still know little about how
narcissists influence the selection of their successors, particularly at the executive level
(Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017). How a narcissist influences the selection of their successor
is an important question to address because CEO succession—preparing for and
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implementation of a change in CEO—plays a crucial role in the future strategic direction
of a company (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz,
2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994).
How the CEO’s level of narcissism influences the process of selecting a successor
is of particular interest because of the inherently personality-driven motives that may
conflict with the firm’s best interest and the best practices of CEO selection. Also, the
shared responsibility with the board to develop and select successors (Friedman & Singh,
1989; Zajac, 1990; Zajac & Westphal, 1996) adds another level of complexity. In the
context of CEO selection and succession, the lack of research on CEOs with narcissistic
personality traits and the board’s selection processes raises two interesting research
questions. (1) What would motivate a board to hire a CEO with higher levels of
narcissism? Moreover, (2) how does a CEO with higher levels of narcissism influence the
CEO succession process? To answer these questions, I conduct both a literature review
and two empirical studies.
1.2 Literature Review on CEO Succession and CEO Narcissism
To understand the existing theoretical and empirical literature regarding the
selection of CEOs with higher levels of narcissism and how CEOs with higher levels of
narcissism affect the CEO succession process, I conduct a literature review. The literature
review takes a two-pronged approach. First, I review the CEO succession literature to
understand the overall CEO succession process, as well as how individual personality
traits affect CEO selection. Second, I review the narcissism literature to better understand
the foundation of the construct, how the narcissism construct has changed over time, and
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the underlying motivations of individuals with higher levels of narcissism. I also
specifically search for and review studies that focus on the CEO’s level of narcissism.
To gather articles on CEO succession, I conducted a keyword search and consult
reviews on the subject to ensure completeness. The literature review covers 74 additional
articles since the last comprehensive review (Cragun, Nyberg, & Wright, 2016). To
gather articles on narcissism, I conducted a keyword search and consult reviews on the
subject to ensure completeness. Due to the vast amount of literature on narcissism, I limit
my literature review to studies that focus on narcissism within the business context (e.g.,
narcissism in the workplace, narcissism and leadership, CEO narcissism).
I find that the study of narcissism has a long history, dating back to the turn of the
20th century, and that our understanding of narcissism has greatly increased over that
time. We have learned about both the positive traits (e.g., self-esteem, confidence) and
negative traits (e.g., selfishness, entitlement) of narcissists. In the last 25 years, we have
learned that narcissists are attracted to leadership positions, and although research has
shown that narcissistic leaders can be innovative and visionary, they can also take
excessive risks and can be manipulative. The research on the CEO’s level of narcissism
tells us that a CEO’s level of narcissism is related to negative outcomes, such as
performance volatility (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), increased fraud (Rijsenbilt &
Commandeur, 2013), and increased risk-taking behavior (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011),
as well as positive outcomes, such as increased corporate social responsibility spending
(Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill, 2015), innovation (Galvin et al., 2010), and earnings per
share (Olsen, Dworkis, & Young, 2014).
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What neither literature identifies is what leads to the selection of a CEO with
higher levels of narcissism or how a highly narcissistic CEO will affect the CEO
selection process. Due to the importance of CEO selection (Karaevli, 2007), there are
broad implications for both the selection of highly narcissistic CEOs and how a
narcissistic CEO affects the CEO succession process after taking office.
1.3 Study One: Antecedents to the Selection of CEOs With Higher Levels of
Narcissism
Understanding what leads to a board’s selection of a CEO with higher levels of
narcissism would help us understand when and if the selection of a CEO with higher
levels of narcissism leads to desirable organizational outcomes. Current firm
performance, the level of turbulence and uncertainty in the market (i.e., environmental
dynamism; Dess & Beard, 1984), and the scarcity or abundance of resources in the
environment (i.e., environmental munificence; Castrogiovanni, 1991) are of primary
consideration when determining CEO trait requirements (e.g., Jenter & Kanaan, 2015).
Nevertheless, despite effective identification of strategic needs, selected CEOs can
operate in an self-serving manner, thereby undermining the desires of the board (Dalton,
Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007). One method of avoiding this is selecting CEOs whose
interests are aligned with the strategic intent of the board (Jensen & Meckling, 1976),
thus reducing the probability of opportunism. Therefore, I investigate the firm
performance and environmental conditions that precede the selection of a CEO with
higher levels of narcissism, under the premise that boards select CEOs with higher levels
of narcissism when they value the behaviors and outcomes associated with leaders with
higher levels of narcissism.
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To do this, I build a theoretical framework that connects firm performance,
environmental munificence, and environmental dynamism to the selection of CEOs with
higher levels of narcissism. I develop the underlying arguments by considering both the
extant theoretical and empirical outcomes of research on CEOs with higher levels of
narcissism (e.g., bold vision, innovation, performance volatility; Deutschman, 2005;
Galvin et al., 2010; Olsen et al., 2014), together with how firm performance,
environmental munificence, and environmental dynamism influence CEO selection.
Further, I predict low firm performance will result in boards selecting CEOs with higher
levels of narcissism and that the relationship will be attenuated when either
environmental dynamism or environmental munificence are low.
The research on CEOs with higher levels of narcissism focuses solely on the
consequences of CEOs with higher levels of narcissism, neglecting any antecedents. The
CEO selection literature primarily looks at insider status, education, or function
background to describe a CEO’s characteristics, without considering a CEO’s level of
narcissism. Further, limited research is available regarding how boards decide which
characteristics, especially personality traits, are needed for the CEO role (Davidson et al.,
2006; Goel & Thakor, 2008; Karaevli & Zajac, 2013; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001;
Zhang, 2008). The primary contribution of this study is to provide a theoretical
framework that identifies the circumstances when boards select CEOs with higher levels
of narcissism. This extends the research on CEO narcissism and CEO selection literatures
by looking at the relationships between firm performance, the environment, and the level
of narcissism of CEO candidates as antecedents to CEO selection.
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This contribution has both theoretical and practical implications. A deeper
understanding of the circumstances that result in the selection of a CEO with higher
levels of narcissism will help us understand a board’s decision and when it results in an
optimal outcome. Also, understanding the factors associated with the selection of a CEO
with higher levels of narcissism helps identify ways boards can mitigate the negative
consequences of narcissism and capitalize on the positives ones.
1.4 Study Two: How CEOs With Higher Levels of Narcissism Affect the CEO
Succession Process
Understanding how a CEO with higher levels of narcissism affects the CEO
succession candidate pool and processes would help us understand when and if a CEO
with higher levels of narcissism leads to desirable CEO succession outcomes. The careful
management of the CEO succession process, the competitiveness of the CEO succession
process, the identification of CEO successor candidates, as well as the level of board
involvement, all affect the quality of the CEO succession pool and process. If a CEO
behaves in a narcissistic manner while leading the succession process, the CEO could
undermine the desires of the board (Dalton et al., 2007). Therefore, I investigate how
CEOs with higher levels of narcissism behave while leading the CEO succession process,
with the assumption that the sitting CEO plays a large leadership role in the development
of the internal CEO successor pipeline and pool.
To do this, I build a theoretical framework that connects narcissism with the level
of CEO involvement in the internal CEO successor development processes, the
competitiveness of the CEO succession process, the number of internal CEO successor
candidates, and the level of board involvement in the development of the CEO successor
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pool and CEO succession process. I develop the underlying arguments by considering
both the extant theoretical and empirical outcomes of research on CEOs with higher
levels of narcissism (e.g., bold vision, innovation, performance volatility; Deutschman,
2005; Galvin et al., 2010; Olsen et al., 2014), together with how CEO personality affects
the CEO succession process. Further, I predict CEOs with higher levels of narcissism will
be less involved in the CEO succession process, encourage a more competitive CEO
succession process, have fewer ready-now candidates, and more not-ready-now
candidates. Finally, I predict that the board will be less involved in the CEO succession
process when the CEO has higher levels of narcissism.
This study contributes to both the narcissism and CEO succession literatures in
the following four ways. First, although some evidence suggests that narcissists select
followers who reinforce their self-esteem needs (Padilla et al., 2007), we know little
about how narcissists select their followers, particularly at the executive level. Because
the CEO has influence on the internal succession process and the CEO succession
pipeline, how a narcissist fills the succession pipeline is an important question to address
because CEO succession plays a crucial role in the future strategic direction of the
company (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994).
How a CEO's level of narcissism influences the process of selecting and grooming a
successor is of particular interest because of the inherently personality-driven motives
that may conflict with the firm’s best interest and the best practices of CEO selection.
Second, my model offers theoretical insight into what influences the implementation or
avoidance of certain succession practices in the CEO succession process. Most of what is
known about the CEO succession process is a description of best practices (Finkelstein et
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al., 2009). What is not known is why some practices are implemented, while others are
not (Nyberg, Schepker, Wright, & Cragun, 2017).
Third, this study examines narcissism’s consequences on the succession process.
Scholars have discussed how narcissists can inspire followers (e.g., Grijalva & Harms,
2014), but they have not examined how narcissists may directly influence their follower
pool through succession planning. Managing the succession process is one mechanism
for controlling who follows the CEO and for meeting the highly narcissistic CEO’s need
for adoration. Finally, a deeper understanding of CEOs who have higher levels of
narcissism would help us learn how to capitalize on the strengths of narcissists while
mitigating their negative traits.
1.5 Summary
This dissertation contributes to the CEO succession literature and the study of the
CEO's level of narcissism in the following four ways. First, my model offers theoretical
insight into what influences the implementation or avoidance of certain succession
practices in the CEO succession process. Specifically, I propose that the CEO's level of
narcissism impacts the implementation of certain succession practices in the CEO
succession process. Most of what is known about the CEO succession process is a
description of best practices (Finkelstein et al., 2009). What is not known is why some
practices are implemented, while others are not. Understanding the CEO succession
process is necessary to advance our understanding of what contributes to a successful
CEO transition.
Second, this dissertation identifies what processes boards adopt or avoid that
might ultimately result in the selection of a highly narcissistic CEO. The CEO succession
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literature, as well as the CEO narcissism literature, has thus far examined personality
traits, specifically narcissism, as an independent variable (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick,
2007). As a result, we know little about what contributes to the selection of a highly
narcissistic CEO. Understanding why CEOs with higher levels of narcissism are selected
will provide insight into how to avoid hiring a highly narcissistic CEO or how to mitigate
the consequences of such a selection decision.
Third, this study examines the consequences of narcissism on the succession
process. Scholars have discussed how narcissists can inspire followers (e.g., Grijalva &
Harms, 2014) but have not examined how narcissists may directly influence their
follower pool through succession planning. Managing the succession process is one
mechanism for controlling the CEO’s subordinates and for meeting the highly narcissistic
CEO’s need for adoration. Together, these three contributions extend our understanding
of how executive personality affects strategic decisions, how the succession processes
contribute to the selection of highly narcissistic CEOs, and how highly narcissistic CEOs
affect the succession process.
Finally, from a practical perspective, there are several high-profile cases of highly
narcissistic CEOs and their extremely positive or negative impacts on business and
societal outcomes (Drucker, 1994; Foster & Brennan, 2011; Isaacson, 2013). Due to the
outcome of these cases, some have hailed narcissism as an essential part of executive
leadership and innovation (Maccoby, 2000, 2003), while others have labeled narcissism
an evil to be avoided (Ronson, 2011). Certainly, a deeper understanding of CEO
narcissism would help us learn how to capitalize on the strengths of narcissists while
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mitigating their negative traits, or how to avoid the selection and rise to power of a highly
narcissistic CEO altogether.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND OBJECTIVE
2.1 Introduction
A highly narcissistic chief executive officer (CEO) can bring unexpected
outcomes to an organization, since the CEO’s behavior and decision-making rationale
can be purely driven by this self-serving personality trait (Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1996). Narcissism is a multifaceted personality trait that combines grandiosity, attentionseeking, an unrealistically inflated self-view, a need for that self-view to be continuously
reinforced through self-regulation, and a general lack of regard for others (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Prior research shows that narcissists can not only become
visionaries who excel at innovation (Deutschman, 2005; Galvin et al., 2010), but they are
more likely to emerge as leaders (Grijalva et al., 2015) and inspire followers (Grijalva &
Harms, 2014). The CEO’s level of narcissism has been linked to increased acquisition
size (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), risk-taking, and relentless pursuit of self-goals
(Maccoby, 2000; Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). Yet
narcissists also damage close relationships, demonstrate self-serving behavior (Grijalva et
al., 2015), increase the costs of auditing (Judd et al., 2015), and cause performance
volatility (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).
Since the CEO holds the most influential position in the company, the CEO’s
characteristics, behavior, and decisions have a substantive impact throughout the
organization and can determine long-term strategic consequences (Hambrick, 2007;
12

Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In particular, a CEO’s personality is a major factor in
determining behavior (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Indeed, there is growing evidence
that the characteristics of top executives, especially CEOs, affect organizational decisions
and behaviors (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick,
2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Sanders, 2001).
Psychologists have studied narcissism for over 100 years (Furnham et al., 2013;
Levy et al., 2011; Raskin & Terry, 1988); however, management scholars have only
started studying the relationship between narcissism and leadership within the past 25
years (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). Until Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), the study of
narcissism at the CEO level was largely descriptive (Chatterjee, 2009). The negative
consequences associated with narcissism suggest boards may want to avoid hiring highly
narcissistic CEOs. However, research suggests positive first impressions can influence a
board’s decision (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010), and because narcissists can come across
as charismatic, confident, and visionary (Deutschman, 2005; Grijalva & Harms, 2014),
they consistently do well during the interview processes (Paulhus, Westlake, Calvez, &
Harms, 2013). Thus, it is understandable that boards would hire a highly narcissistic
CEO. Nevertheless, limited research is available on how boards decide which
characteristics, especially personality traits, are needed for the CEO role (Davidson et al.,
2006; Karaevli, 2007; Karaevli & Zajac, 2013; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001; Zhang,
2008).
If a highly narcissistic CEO is hired, the CEO’s personality would subsequently
impact important strategic decisions about identifying and developing the next CEO (i.e.,
the CEO successor; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Finkelstein et al., 2009). Although some
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evidence suggests that narcissists select followers who reinforce their self-esteem needs
(Padilla et al., 2007), we still know little about how narcissists select their followers,
particularly at the executive level. Yet how a narcissist selects their followers is an
important question to address because CEO succession—the preparation for and
implementation of a change in CEO—plays a crucial role in the future strategic direction
of the company (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora,
1994). How the CEO's level of narcissism influences the process of selecting a successor
is of particular interest because of the inherently personality-driven motives that may
conflict with the firm’s best interest and the “best practices” of CEO selection. Also, the
shared responsibility with the board to develop and select successors (Friedman & Singh,
1989; Zajac, 1990; Zajac & Westphal, 1996) adds another level of complexity. In the
context of CEO succession, the lack of research regarding both the CEO’s narcissistic
personality trait and the board’s selection processes raises two interesting research
questions. (1) What circumstances leads a board to select a CEO with higher levels of
narcissism?; and (2), how does a CEO with higher levels of narcissism influence the CEO
succession process? To begin the process of finding answers to these questions, I conduct
a literature review of CEO succession and narcissism.
2.2 CEO Succession Literature Review
Since CEO succession is inevitable and poses a profound potential disruption to
organizational performance, it has fascinated scholars since the 1950s (Dale, 1957;
Grusky, 1960). Cragun, Nyberg, and Wright (2016) define CEO succession as both
voluntary and involuntary turnover. They further clarify that “voluntary turnover refers to
CEO departure due to promotion, resignation, or retirement. Involuntary turnover refers
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to the departure of the CEO due to death, sickness, or dismissal. CEO succession is also
used to describe the selection process” (Cragun et al., 2016: 6). Going forward, I will
follow this definition. However, describing CEO succession as voluntary or involuntary
can be misleading, as it is often difficult to determine whether a CEO’s resignation was
voluntary or involuntary (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Giambatista et al., 2005).
Since its inception, the study of CEO succession has coalesced around addressing
four main research questions: (1) Will CEO succession occur? (2) How will CEO
succession occur (and by what process)? (3) Who will be selected CEO? Also, (4) What
are the consequences of CEO succession? (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Despite high levels
of interest from scholars, CEO succession remains a largely phenomenologically-driven
research agenda and lacks a unifying theory (Cragun et al., 2016).
Over time, the following five major reviews and one meta-analysis have captured
the progress of research on CEO succession: Kesner and Sebora (1994), which was the
first review of CEO succession; Giambatista et al. (2005) and Finkelstein et al. (2009),
which cover the time frames between Kesner and Sebora to their respective publication
date, but do not comprehensively review the literature; Berns and Klarner (2017), which
does not comprehensively cover the literature; Cragun et al. (2016), which
comprehensively covers the 20 years (1994-2014) since Kesner and Sebora’s (1994)
review; and the meta-analysis by Schepker et al. (2017a), which covers 1972-2013. The
reviews cited leave a small but important gap from 2015 until today; thus, even one study
can significantly move the field forward. In addition to summarizing the findings of
studies up through 2014, I conducted a comprehensive search of the published studies
from 2014 through 2018 and provide a review.
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Kesner and Sebora (1994) noted the importance of CEO succession by
articulating the following: (1) organizations often reflect their senior managers; (2) CEOs
have the ultimate decision-making authority; (3) CEOs are often the most visible face to
external constituents; and (4) every successful firm goes through the CEO succession
process. The study of this important event can be grouped around the following four
primary questions suggested by Finkelstein et al. (2009): will CEO succession occur;
how will CEO succession occur; who will be selected CEO; and what are the
consequences of CEO succession? Cragun et al. (2016) built upon the framework
suggested by Finkelstein et al. (2009) and analyzed the CEO succession literature from
1994 to 2014. In addition to the four primary dimensions identified by Finkelstein et al.
(2009), Cragun et al. (2016) identified ten secondary factors and thirty tertiary
components. Approximately 30% of the new tertiary components were novel since 1994
(see APPENDIX A).
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to provide a comprehensive review of
CEO succession. Instead, I highlight the major findings discovered over the past 20 years
following the framework of Cragun et al. (2016) and then conduct a review following the
method of Cragun et al. (2016) addressing the articles published from 2015 to 2018. For a
comprehensive review of the CEO succession literature from 1994 to 2014, see Cragun et
al. (2016).
2.2.1 Will CEO succession occur?
Determining whether CEO succession will occur involves: investigating presuccession firm factors, such as performance, strategy, structure, and the firm lifecycle;
investigating pre-succession CEO factors, such as CEO performance, the CEO’s
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knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics, as well as the CEO’s power,
position, and compensation; and investigating pre-succession stakeholder factors, such as
the board, investors, constituents, and the environmental context (see Appendix A). The
most heavily-researched topic focuses on how poor performance leads to CEO succession
(Osborn, Jauch, Martin, & Glueck, 1981). Finally, numerous moderators shape the
impact of pre-succession firm performance.
Certain strategies, such as mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures, can lead to
increased succession (Buchholtz, Ribbens, & Houle, 2003; Lehn & Zhao, 2006; Osborn
et al., 1981). Structural components, such as diversification, COO and President positions
separate from the CEO, and a state-owned status, reduce the likelihood of succession in
times of poor performance (Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2006; Kato & Long,
2006; Zhang, 2006). Business life cycle also affects CEO succession. New firms,
especially founder firms, are less likely than larger firms to dismiss their CEO in times of
poor performance (Wasserman, 2003); furthermore, the longer a CEO is in power, the
more likely it is that they will lose their power and spur the succession process (Ocasio,
1994; Ocasio & Kim, 1999).
Even though it is difficult to differentiate the CEO’s performance from the firm’s
performance, evidence shows that when the CEO does not meet the board’s expectations,
CEO dismissal is more likely. Also, boards rely on analysis forecasts to inform their
performance expectations (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011; Wowak, Hambrick, & Henderson,
2011). A powerful CEO, or a CEO with connections to the board, results in a lower
likelihood of CEO succession (Boeker, 1992; Ocasio & Kim, 1999). Investor activists
and other stakeholders can pressure the board to dismiss the CEO (Helwege, Intintoli, &
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Zhang, 2012; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). The environment within which the business is
operating affects CEO succession, the availability of more suitable candidates, country
culture and business expectations, and new legislation, all of which can impact CEO
succession (Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Mobbs & Raheja, 2012;
Sakano & Lewin, 1999).
2.2.2 How will CEO succession occur (and by what process)?
Determining how CEO succession will occur is the least studied aspect of CEO
succession. Since CEO succession is process-driven, the lack of available data on how
succession occurs is surprising. For example, selecting a CEO follows a staffing process
flow. After the need for a new CEO is identified, the requirements must be identified, a
candidate pool identified, a CEO selected, an offer extended and accepted, until finally,
onboarding occurs. Each of these steps has potentially long-term effects. For instance,
making the offer sets the stage for the number of incentives the CEO receives, which is
central to CEO behavior after the CEO has taken office.
How CEO succession occurs is determined by who makes the decision, the board
or the CEO, and the reason for the decision. How succession occurs is also determined
by the type of process used and how the process is implemented (see Appendix A). When
the CEO makes the CEO succession decision, it is usually in times of good performance
or as part of a planned transition. When the board makes the CEO succession decision, it
is usually in times of poor performance that causes the dismissal of a CEO, or due to
other unexpected circumstances, such as death or illness (Friedman & Singh, 1989;
Zajac, 1990; Zajac & Westphal, 1996).
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Research on the type of process is limited to three very high-level categories: a
horse race, a relay race, or a marathon race. A horse race is a competition of equal
competitors, a relay race is the process of designating one heir apparent, and a marathon
race is the process of using an interim CEO while the CEO search process takes place
(Ballinger & Marcel, 2010; Intintoli, 2013; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Unfortunately, there
is little comparison as to why a method is selected or what the varying effects between
methods are (Cragun et al., 2016; Zajac, 1990).
The scant research that exists on the implementation of CEO succession processes
focuses on the announcement itself and suggests that the market reacts to the
announcement, while firms mask the announcement in order to improve the reaction to
the announcement (Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011). One final key to how the CEO
succession process occurs involves third-party consultants, which can provide a variety of
services, from candidate identification to candidate screening. Unfortunately, there is no
empirical evidence on the involvement of third parties in the CEO succession process. It
has been suggested that third parties can bias the CEO succession process by encouraging
clients to hire more charismatic candidates (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010). If so, it is
possible the use of third-party services would increase the likelihood of selecting a highly
narcissistic CEO, as narcissists are often very charismatic (Brunell et al., 2008). On the
other hand, third-party services could use screening tools that screen out more narcissistic
candidates. Therefore, an understanding of how third-party services could affect CEO
succession would be valuable.
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2.2.3 Who will be selected CEO?
Determining which candidate will be selected CEO is an important part of CEO
succession, but it is also understudied. Factors that impact which candidate is selected
CEO are centered around the candidate’s characteristics, including the candidate pool,
their KSAOs, their power and position, and the candidate’s fit with the board and the
firm (see Appendix A). The candidate pool does, indeed, affect which candidate is
selected CEO; therefore, a better internal or external candidate pool can predict the hiring
of an insider or outsider CEO (Mobbs & Raheja, 2012; Parrino, 1997; Pissaris,
Weinstein, & Stephan, 2010). Unfortunately, there is little research on the antecedents to
candidate pools (Cragun et al., 2016). Under positive performance, boards hire CEOs that
have similar characteristics to themselves (Zhang, 2008).
In contrast, during periods of poor performance or environmental uncertainty,
boards hire CEOs with different characteristics than the previous CEO, or they hire
outsiders to shift strategy or improve performance (Karaevli, 2007; Karaevli & Zajac,
2012; Zhang, 2008). The vast majority of CEO characteristics examined include tenure
and functional background or industry experience (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Chen &
Hambrick, 2012; Martinson, 2012; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). With this in mind, it
can be seen that personality, a key component of leadership style, has been understudied.
The lack of research on this component is of particular concern when it comes to
narcissism. Since narcissists make positive first impressions (Back, Schmukle, & Egloff,
2010) and often cause performance volatility (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), it is
possible a board could inadvertently hire a narcissist, only to discover that the narcissist
CEO creates instability.
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2.2.4 What are the consequences of CEO succession?
The consequences of CEO succession are studied widely, creating a research base
second only to what causes CEO succession. The consequences of CEO succession are
studied in the context of how the characteristics of the CEO, the succession process, and
environmental factors affect post-succession performance, analyst coverage, board
changes, and the incoming and departing CEO (see Appendix A).
Markets react more positively to unanticipated CEO succession announcements
than anticipated announcements (Rhim, Peluchette, & Song, 2006). Following CEO
dismissal, new CEOs increase investments in research, development, and advertising (Du
& Lin, 2011), and they relay succession leads to better post-succession performance
(Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004).
When a new CEO takes office, they receive an influx of power (Miller, 1993).
This new power allows the CEO to take independent action and results in numerous
changes, though outsiders are associated with more change than insiders (Barron,
Chulkov, & Waddell, 2011; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992). Changes upon new CEO
arrival include: strategic reorientation (Lant et al., 1992), executive turnover (Barron et
al., 2011), general turnover (Khaliq, Thompson, & Walston, 2006), climate changes
(Friedman & Saul, 1991), accounting changes (Geiger & North, 2011), divestitures
(Weisbach, 1995), discontinued operations (Barron et al., 2011), internationalization
(Liang, Liu, Wu, & Zhang, 2012), and investment allocation changes (Du & Lin, 2011).
The more varied the new CEO’s background, the greater the likelihood of the firm
changing strategy (Crossland, Zyung, Hiller, & Hambrick, 2014). Few studies are
available on the long-term impact of CEO succession (Denis & Denis, 1995). Rather,
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most studies examine short-term performance changes in profitability (Fong, Misangyi,
& Tosi, 2010), return on assets, return on equity (Ang, Lauterbach, & Vu, 2003), cost
efficiency, revenue efficiency (He & Sommer, 2011), the achievement of firm goals
(Khaliq et al., 2006), growth (Jalal & Prezas, 2012), and firm market valuation (Adams &
Mansi, 2009).
New CEOs can also make changes to the board, including personnel changes, new
committee assignments, compensation changes, and changes in the percentage of insider
versus outsider board members (Cragun et al., 2016; Marcel, Cowen, & Ballinger, 2013).
Cragun et al. (2016) found no research on how a new CEO changes or administers the
CEO succession process after taking office. The lack of CEO succession process research
is of particular concern when it comes to highly narcissistic CEOs, because narcissists
require constant admiration from their followers (Campbell & Foster, 2007). Due to a
CEO’s need for constant admiration, the CEO could become biased in the selection of
successor candidates, which could, in turn, have a detrimental long-term impact on the
organization.
2.2.5 Debates in CEO succession
The primary debate in the CEO succession literature revolves around the impact
of an outsider versus insider CEO on post-succession outcomes (Karaevli, 2007; Karaevli
& Zajac, 2013). Scholars agree that organizations that want strategic change bring in
outsiders (e.g., Bailey & Helfat, 2003; Boeker, 1997a; Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Datta
& Guthrie, 1994; Helmich & Brown, 1972; Kosnik, 1987; Tushman, Virany, &
Romanelli, 1985; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010). However, the results of bringing in an
outsider are not always clear (Karaevli, 2007; Zhang, 2008). Further, the definition used
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for an outsider is not consistent across studies. An outsider may be defined as someone
newly hired from the outside, hired from the outside less than three years ago, or
someone hired from a completely different industry (Karaevli, 2007). Ultimately, the
study of outsiderness misses a major factor that impacts executive decision-making: the
CEO’s personality.
Although upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) suggests personality
as a major filter for how executive decisions are made, very few studies have acquired the
direct psychometric data required to validate any statistical hypothesis. Even if a clear
definition of insider versus outsider could be established, the approach still misses the
point. Outsider designation is a proxy for the construct of outsiderness, which refers to
the extent to which individuals have varying thinking patterns and behaviors, when
compared to the patterns and behaviors of the individuals currently in office. Therefore, if
individual psychometric data on personality (e.g., narcissism) were gathered, it would be
superior at distinguishing differences between CEOs.
2.2.6 Theoretical basis of CEO succession
Primarily, CEO succession research has followed the tradition of the upper
echelons theory (Finkelstein et al., 2009). However, there has recently been an increasing
proliferation of relevant research from additional academic disciplines, such as finance
(e.g., Parrino, Sias, & Starks, 2003) and accounting (e.g., Laux, 2008). This research has
broadened the scope of the theory and empirical evidence. A handful of theories that
focus solely on CEO succession exist, but these theories are isolated to a small set of
articles and are not used across CEO succession research. For example, the scapegoat
theory suggests that the CEO is dismissed in times of poor performance, even if they are
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not directly responsible for the poor performance (Boeker, 1992). Another example is the
circulation of power theory that posits a CEO’s rise to power and eventual fall follows a
natural cycle over time (Ocasio, 1994).
The two directions that make the most sense for future theoretical research are 1)
expanding outward for a more strategic perspective (going macro), and 2) taking a closer
look at the actual CEO (going micro). The Macro approach could move toward the
stakeholder theory, which theory pushes the research to consider examining the effect of
CEO succession on a wider swath of outcomes, rather than focusing almost exclusively
on firm performance. On the other hand, the Micro approach would examine the CEO as
a human capital resource (Ployhart, Nyberg, Reilly, & Maltarich, 2014) and would focus
on the agency and individual decision-making of the CEO (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Personality attributes have been shown to affect both decision-making and agency-related
constructs, such as risk-taking. Therefore, examining CEO succession through an agency
perspective provides an entry point to better integrate how personality affects succession
decisions (at least when driven by the CEO).
2.2.7 CEO succession literature 2014 to present
The last major review of the CEO succession literature was that of Cragun et al.
(2016) and covered all the literature from 1994 to 2014. This leaves a small gap of
research from 2014 to the present. To investigate the literature in this small window, I
followed the search protocol of Cragun et al. (2016). I searched “Google Scholar” using
the terms CEO and turnover*, CEO and succession*, CEO and dismissal*. To ensure
comprehensiveness, I also searched the terms heir apparent*, CEO and turnover*, CEO
and succession*, CEO and dismissal*. To ensure comprehensiveness, I also searched the
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terms CEO and appointment*, CEO and replacement*, CEO and labor market*, CEO
and selection*. Using these parameters, I also queried specifically for articles in the
following publications: Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management
Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Applied Psychology,
Organizational Science, and Strategic Management Journal. The results of the search
identified 161 peer-reviewed articles, conference papers, and unpublished articles. After
eliminating conference papers and unpublished articles, I was left with 74 published
articles. A review of the 74 published articles provides insights in the following eight
areas: compensation; performance as antecedent; performance or change as consequence;
international; candidate pool and labor market; ethics, misconduct, or SOX; process; and
individual differences.
2.2.7.1 Compensation
CEO compensation is an emerging trend in CEO succession research (17 of 74
articles). In addition to the association of CEO dismissal with poor performance,
decreased tenure has affected the structure of CEO pay (Homroy, 2015). Also, CEOs
with high levels of stock options are more likely to be terminated for poor performance
than those with low levels of stock options, unless the CEO is influential or the firm has
poor governance (Chakraborty & Sheikh, 2015). Also, overpaid CEOs are more likely to
be dismissed in periods of poor performance (He & Fang, 2016).
New CEOs have less stock than their predecessors; therefore, the new CEO takes
more risks because they have less to lose, and boards are limited in the amount of control
they have over this risk-taking behavior (Alderson, Bansal, & Betker, 2014). Similarly,
Graefe-Anderson (2014: 1) found that “(1) incoming CEOs are paid as much as or more
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than those they replace, (2) outsider replacements are paid more than their predecessors,
even after controlling for education and skills, and (3) CEOs who are forced out are not
paid differently from those who replace them, while CEOs who leave voluntarily are paid
significantly less than their replacements.” This analysis is important, because GraefeAnderson’s (2014) study revealed that proxies for managerial power, including CEO
tenure, CEO centrality, founder status, and high CEO ownership, could not explain their
results. Overall, these findings are difficult to reconcile with the view that managerial
power is the primary determinant of CEO compensation.
Interestingly, separation pay remains highly variable and is on average 242% as
much as the CEO’s annual salary. CEOs who leave voluntarily and under weak
governance structures receive higher severance pay than those who are forced out
(Goldman & Huang, 2014). Perhaps one of the more interesting theoretical articles links
CEO succession to non-top management team compensation, and suggests long-term
incentives are essential to CEO succession, in order to entice executives to stay during
such an ambiguous time (Reda & Kyle, 2015).
2.2.7.2 Performance as an antecedent
Pre-succession performance continues to be a widely-studied antecedent to CEO
succession (33 of 74 articles). The vast majority of the literature continues to confirm that
poor performance leads to turnover, with several moderators, such as CEO power and
celebrity (e.g., Park, Kim, & Sung, 2014), culture (Fiordelisi & Ricci, 2014), functioning
internal governance (Burkart & Raff, 2014), and performance sensitivity (e.g., Conyon &
He, 2014; Dah, Frye, & Hurst, 2014). Several studies advance our understanding of the
performance to CEO turnover relationship by extending our knowledge of its
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generalizability in the international context (Conyon & He, 2014; He & Fang, 2016; He,
Wan, & Zhou, 2014). Interestingly, there is some new evidence that points to CEOs being
held responsible for performance even when the circumstances are out of the CEO’s
control. For example, a decline in industry performance from the 90th to the 10th
percentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015).
2.2.7.3 Performance/change as a consequence of CEO succession
The consequences of CEO succession continue to be of major interest to scholars
researching CEO succession (32 of 74 articles). Perhaps the most notable of this work is
recent evidence that the impact of the CEO on performance has increased over time (i.e.,
the CEO effect; Hambrick & Quigley, 2014; Quigley & Hambrick, 2015).
2.2.7.4 International
The diversity of international sampling is slowly increasing to capture the
generalizability of the vast majority of what we know about CEO succession (for a
notable exception between the way US and Japanese firms approach CEO succession, see
Sakano & Lewin, 1999). Since the Cragun et al. (2016) analysis up to 2014, the overall
percentage of articles with international samples has increased. However, the countries
represented continue to be primarily from Asia, with the majority represented coming
from China. The countries represented since 2010 include China (n=8), continental
Europe (n=1), South Korea (n=2), and the United Kingdom (n=2). This sampling leaves
large areas of the world understudied. Therefore, while the overall percentage of
published articles with international samples has increased since the Cragun et al. (2016)
review, there is still a need for more international samples.
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2.2.7.5 Candidate pool and labor market
With only 4 of 74 published articles focusing on the candidate pool and the labor
market, this is a small but critical toehold into the impact of the candidate pool on
processes. Through 2014, the only articles in this area were theoretical (e.g., Pissaris et
al., 2010). Since 2014, some empirical evidence has emerged to show that larger internal
talent pools result in greater levels of CEO turnover. Presumably, the reason for greater
levels of CEO turnover is because organizations have more high-quality successors (Gao,
Harford, & Li, 2017), and the larger the CEO’s network with other directors, the higher
the likelihood of the CEO taking a new CEO position (Liu, 2014). The findings on a
CEO’s network position are interesting, because they provide some evidence that the
opposite is also true: the larger the network of board members, the larger the pool of
potential CEOs they can attract.
2.2.7.6 Ethics or misconduct including legislation like SOX
With 10 of 74 published articles focused on ethics, misconduct, or the passing of
legislation, there seems to be a small interest in the ethical components of CEO
succession and a recognition that the pre- and post-SOX environments are distinctly
different. For example, new legislation can encourage insider directors to stop supporting
unethical CEOs. Such was the case after SOX (Gomulya & Boeker, 2014), providing
evidence that SOX had its desired effect. Echoing the effects of SOX for firms that
decreased director independence, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity significantly
decreased following SOX (Dah et al., 2014). Finally, performance can decrease when the
CEO is dismissed as a scapegoat following a breach of ethics (Gangloff, Connelly, &
Shook, 2014).
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2.2.7.7 CEO succession process
With 15 of 74 published articles focused on the CEO succession process, there
seems to be a growing interest in the actual process. This increase in research is perhaps
the most interesting of recent research, as it is one of the most under-researched areas of
CEO succession. The recent research identified that there is an increase in the use of
interim CEOs, presumably because boards are being more careful about CEO succession
decisions (Mooney, Semadeni, & Kesner, 2014). Laux (2014) recognizes the difficulty of
assessing CEO performance and created an analytical model that examines several
governance mechanisms (e.g., long-term incentive pay and severance pay). With regards
to the type of succession (horse, relay, or outside hire), in the family firm context, there is
initial evidence that situational factors determine whether a family firm will use a relay
race, a horse race, or hire externally (Minichilli, Nordqvist, Corbetta, & Amore, 2014).
For example, if there are multiple strong candidates available, the firm will likely use a
horse race rather than a relay race.
Perhaps the most promising research in regards to the CEO succession process
was performed by Schepker, Nyberg, Ulrich, and Wright (2017b). In their article,
Schepker et al. (2017b) use a combination of board member interviews and survey work
to build and test a theoretical model that focuses on the decision-making and information
flow within the CEO succession process. They find that procedural rationality is related
to formal processes meant to collect information about CEO succession candidates, and
that these formal processes lead to larger quantity and quality of CEO succession
candidates.
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2.2.7.8 Individual differences
With 8 of 74 published articles focused on CEO characteristics, there is small but
continued interest in how the individual characteristics of the CEO impact CEO
succession. A review of these articles indicates that the individual characteristics
examined include charisma, overconfidence, and gender. One study of outside succession
found that outside succession resulted in higher performance when the new CEO
resembled the socio-demographics of the previous CEO (Georgakakis & Ruigrok, 2017).
In addition, recent studies show that the appointment of an overconfident CEO results in
lower performance (Yilmaz & Mazzeo, 2014), and a CEO change that results in a gender
change, either male to female or female to male, amplifies the disruption effect of the
change (Zhang & Qu, 2015). Despite these advances, there is still little research on
personality and leadership style, leaving these characteristics elusive variables yet to be
studied.
2.2.8 CEO succession summary
Despite 55 years of research in CEO succession since Grusky (1960), some very
important questions remain unanswered. From Cragun et al. (2016) and my gap review
from 2014 to present, we know that the vast majority of available CEO succession
research focuses on the antecedents and consequences of the succession process; in other
words, what causes CEO succession and what are the consequences of CEO succession.
The succession process is valuable to investigate because the current level of
analysis regarding insider and outsider status does not provide sufficient consistent
evidence about the impact of CEOs on CEO succession outcomes. Also, to fully predict
who will be selected, we need to know the process of how a CEO is selected. Although
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we know that CEO characteristics do influence who is selected (e.g., tenure, functional
background, industry experience), we know little about a broader set of characteristics
that drive selection and dismissal (i.e., personality). In particular, we know little about
how personality affects CEO succession decisions.
We also know little about the CEO successor candidate pool. Pissaris et al. (2010)
suggested that a larger candidate pool would lead to more effective CEO selection.
However, we know little about how pools are formed, especially for outsider CEOs. One
step in the candidate pool development process is the development of insider CEOs.
Although there are several articles published suggesting how to develop talent (e.g.,
Cappelli & Keller, 2014), few studies explore how the CEO develops a successor or what
process is followed (Crossland et al., 2014; Mobbs & Raheja, 2012; Zajac, 1990; Zhang,
2006). Finally, many theories explore CEO succession; however, there is neither one
unifying theory, nor has the CEO succession research significantly advanced any
particular theory.
2.3 Narcissism
In the next three sections, I cover the history and current construct of narcissism
(section 2.3), narcissism as it relates to leadership (section 2.4), and narcissism research
specifically targeted at the CEO (section 2.5). The construct of narcissism has evolved
over time, and understanding narcissism’s current conceptualization can provide needed
clarity to the construct, as many researchers rely on outdated or summarized
conceptualizations of narcissism. As research moves forward, the most current construct
of narcissism should be followed. Moreover, the extended agency model of narcissism
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(Campbell & Foster, 2007) provides a useful examination of narcissism through the lens
of one overall model.
The study of narcissism and leadership together is a relatively recent effort. In
general, we know that narcissists find leadership positions particularly attractive (Grijalva
et al., 2015). Many similarities exist between narcissistic traits and positive leadership
traits (e.g., innovation; Galvin et al., 2010); nevertheless, despite this positive overlap,
narcissistic leaders have also been linked to numerous negative traits (e.g., selfishness;
Emmons, 1987). This perpetuates the debate discussing whether narcissism is necessary
and/or beneficial for successful leaders (Maccoby, 2003). I adopt the approach of
Campbell and Foster (2007) and refrain from labeling narcissism as universally good or
bad. Instead, I consider narcissism within the specific context of CEO selection and the
CEO’s leadership in the succession process.
The study of narcissism, specifically associated with reference to the CEO, has
barely begun. With a new unobtrusive measure of the CEO's level of narcissism,
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) initiated a growing wave of CEO narcissism research.
This research links the CEO's level of narcissism to risk-taking (Chatterjee & Hambrick,
2011), performance volatility (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), and fraud (Rijsenbilt &
Commandeur, 2013). Since the unobtrusive measure of narcissism remains a proxy for
self-report or third-party behavioral observation of a highly narcissistic CEO’s behavior,
there is a notable lack of self-report and direct third-party behavioral observations used as
measures in studies of narcissistic CEO behavior. Also, the findings on the CEO's level
of narcissism are focused on strategic outcomes. The findings neither consider the
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antecedents to highly narcissistic CEO selection, nor do they consider any intermediary
outcomes, such as CEO succession.
2.3.1 Narcissism construct
The construct of narcissism has undergone significant changes since its original
conception in Greek mythology. The amount of change illustrates some fluidity.
Although narcissism has gone through relatively fewer changes recently, it is important
to understand what changed to ensure its appropriate use in this study. In this study, I
follow the DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) definition (provided below)
and define narcissism as a multifaceted personality trait that combines grandiosity,
attention-seeking, an unrealistically inflated self-view, a need for that self-view to be
continuously reinforced through self-regulation, and a general lack of regard for others.
Ellis (1898) introduced narcissism into the foundations of psychological inquiry
and psychoanalysis by connecting the classical Greek myth of Narcissus to a clinical
condition "whereby a person treats his or her body as a sexual object” (Raskin & Terry,
1988: 890). Ellis (1898) used the phrase, Narcissus-like to refer to "a tendency for the
sexual emotions to be lost and almost entirely absorbed in self-admiration" (Raskin &
Terry, 1980: 890).
Freud later developed narcissism from a solely sexual connotation to a distinct
psychological process (1914). Later, Freud (1931) suggested a specific narcissistic
personality type "characterized by outwardly unflappable strength, confidence, and
sometimes arrogance" (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006: 618). Horney (1939) further
developed the construct by suggesting that narcissists exhibit unfounded self-inflation,
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self-admiration, and the expectation of admiration from others based on qualities that the
narcissist does not actually possess.
Kernberg (1967) and Kohut (1966) are considered the founders of the
contemporary study of narcissism and established narcissism in modern psychology by
arguing that narcissism is a personality disorder, and that the development of narcissistic
tendencies has its own psychosexual development pathway. Kernberg (1967) also
advanced the study of narcissism by assigning the term to patients who "presented an
unusual degree of self-reference in their interactions, a seeming contradiction between an
inflated self-concept and inordinate need for tribute from others, shallow emotional lives,
lack of empathy, envy, vacillating extremes of idealization and devaluation of others,
exploitativeness, and a charming and engaging presence that conceals an underlying
coldness and ruthlessness, and a lack of empathy" (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006: 618).
In 1980, the American Psychological Association (APA) adopted narcissism as a
personality disorder, largely following the work of Kernberg (1967). Since its adoption,
the APA’s definition of narcissism was updated in both 2000 and in 2013. The reasons
for these updates were to incorporate newly accumulated empirical evidence and clinical
experience of experts. The current full APA definition is contained in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders—the DSM-V (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013).
According to the DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), narcissistic
personality disorder (NPD) is defined by symptoms that include: (A) significant
impairments in personality functioning manifested by impairments in self-functioning and
impairments in interpersonal functioning; (B) pathological personality traits in the
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antagonism domain; (C) impairments in personality functioning and the individual's
personality trait expression that are relatively stable across time and consistent across
situations; (D) impairments in personality functioning and the individual's personality
trait expression that are not better understood as normative for the individual's
developmental stage or socio-cultural environment; and (E) impairments in personality
functioning and the individual's personality trait expression which are not solely due to
the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, medication) or a
general medical condition (e.g., severe head trauma). Whereas self-functioning
impairments can include identity impairment or self-direction impairment, interpersonal
functioning impairments can include empathy impairment or intimacy impairment, and
antagonism includes grandiosity and attention-seeking.
I will now further explain each of the self-functioning impairments. Firstly, selffunctioning impairments can include either identity impairment or self-direction
impairment. Identity impairment refers to excessive reference to others for self-definition
and self-esteem regulation; exaggerated self-appraisal may be inflated or deflated or
vacillate between extremes, and emotional regulation mirrors fluctuations in self-esteem.
Self-direction impairment refers to when goal-setting is based on gaining approval from
others; when personal standards are set unreasonably high in order to see oneself as
exceptional, or when such standards are set too low, based on a sense of entitlement. In
many cases, the individual is often unaware of her motivations.
Secondly, interpersonal functioning impairments include either empathy
impairment or intimacy impairment. Empathy impairment refers to an impaired ability to
recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others; an excessive attunement to the
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reactions of others, but only if perceived as relevant to self; or an over- or
underestimation of their own effect on others. Intimacy impairment refers to relationships
largely superficial and exists to serve self-esteem regulation; it includes mutuality
constrained by little genuine interest in others' experiences and the predominance of a
need for personal gain.
Finally, antagonism includes grandiosity and attention-seeking. Grandiosity
refers to feelings of entitlement, either overt or covert, and self-centeredness. Further,
grandiosity refers to firmly holding to the belief that one is better than others and thereby
acting condescendingly toward them. Attention-seeking refers to excessive attempts to
attract and retain the focus of the attention of others, as well as admiration-seeking.
Despite its clinical roots, the DSM-V’s (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)
definition of narcissism can also be used to describe much milder displays of narcissistic
behavior (Judge, LePine, & Rich, 2006; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Rhodewalt & Peterson,
2009; Watson & Biderman, 1993) and is considered to be on a continuum (Foster &
Campbell, 2007). Indeed, the difference between pathological and sub-clinical narcissism
is the severity of the behavior (Rhodewalt & Peterson, 2009).
Presumably in response to the length of the DSM-V (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013) definition and in an attempt to distinguish their definition of
narcissism from the pathological definition of narcissism, many scholars have created
abbreviated definitions, yet each of these lose some of the core specificity of the DSM-V.
For example, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007: 351) define narcissists as "those who have
very inflated self-views and who are preoccupied with having those self-views
continuously reinforced,” and Ames, Rose, and Anderson define narcissism as a
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"complex of personality traits and processes that involve[s] a grandiose, yet fragile sense
of self as well as a preoccupation with success and demands for admiration" (2006: 441).
One more complete definition used in the personality literature reads, “Narcissism is a
quality of the self that has significant implications for thinking, feeling, and behaving.
Individuals with narcissistic personality possess highly inflated, unrealistically positive
views of the self. Oftentimes, this includes strong self-focus, feelings of entitlement, and
lack of regard for others. Narcissists focus on what benefits them personally, with less
regard for how their actions may benefit (or harm) others” (Campbell & Foster, 2007:
115). Therefore, across narcissism studies, the definition of narcissism used is neither
consistent and current, nor is it complete (see Table 2.1).
The implication is that management scholars should not adopt previous
definitions of narcissism provided by other scholars without considering the current
definition of the APA and how it applies to their study and measurement. I follow the
DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) definition of narcissism and use the
term narcissism to refer to a milder manifestation, rather than pathological narcissism.
Following the DSM-V, I define narcissism as a multifaceted personality trait that
combines grandiosity, attention-seeking, an unrealistic inflated self-view, a need for that
self-view to be continuously reinforced through self-regulation, and a general lack of
regard for others.
2.3.2 Grandiose trait narcissism assumption
Narcissism is a specific personality trait which results in unique, observable
behaviors (Paulhus, 2001). Trait theorists believe people are born with personality traits
which result in foreseeable behaviors and motivations (Miller & Campbell, 2008). Trait
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narcissism is the non-pathological view of narcissistic behaviors (Widiger, 2010).
Specifically, the focus of this paper is on the trait of grandiose narcissism (i.e., narcissism
focused on grandiosity, aggression, and dominance), as opposed to vulnerable narcissism
(a defensive and insecure grandiosity that obscures feelings of inadequacy, incompetence,
and negative affect; Cain, Pincus, & Ansell, 2008).
2.3.3 Underlying theory of narcissistic behavior: The Extended Agency Model
The narcissist’s need for maintaining a positive self-image, validation, and
admiration, can be a strong motivational force (Pincus et al., 2009); narcissism is about
looking or feeling good about oneself, and the narcissist acts and thinks in ways that keep
these self-views viable. Several theories exist and describe why narcissists behave the
way they do.
To help understand the motives of individuals with higher levels of narcissism, I
adopt Campbell and Foster’s (2007) extended agency model. The extended agency model
is a composite model of the most accepted theoretical thinking and empirical evidence
within the then-current narcissism literature (Campbell & Foster, 2007). The extended
agency model posits that individuals with higher levels of narcissism have a strong need
to maintain a positive self-image, and that the narcissist thinks and acts in ways to keep
these self-views viable. Since agency theory assumes self-interested motives from the
agent, including the extended agency model as the underlying explanation for the selfinterested behavior of individuals with higher levels of narcissism explains specific
motivations and behaviors from which we can examine and predict narcissistic behavior
beyond merely the assumption of self-interest.
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The extended agency model adopts the premise that behavior is motivated by a
dynamic self-regulatory process (Campbell et al., 2006). Dynamic self-regulatory
processing encompasses the efforts a person uses to construct, maintain, defend, and
enhance their desired self-views (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Vazire & Funder, 2006). In
this context, the self is seen as a network of cognitive-affective processes that is in
constant transaction with the social environment (Mischel & Morf, 2003; Morf &
Horvath, 2007). The primary output of the dynamic self-regulatory processes is
narcissistic esteem, or a sense of self-esteem linked primarily to dominance, rather than
closeness or acceptance, and related to the emotion of pride (Campbell & Foster, 2007).
The dynamic self-regulatory process (see Figure 4.1) which feeds a narcissist’s
narcissistic esteem is comprised of four mutually-reinforcing elements, the fourth of
which is comprised of five sub-elements. The first of the four mutually-reinforcing
elements is a narcissist’s interpersonal skills (e.g., social confidence, charm), which can
be used to garner attention or influence. The second of the four mutually-reinforcing
elements is a narcissist’s intrapsychic self-regulation strategies (e.g., fantasies of power,
self-serving bias), which can be used to justify self-serving behavior or outcomes. The
third of the four mutually-reinforcing elements is a narcissist’s interpersonal strategies
(e.g., self-promotion, game-playing), which can be used to achieve goals or control
others. The fourth of the four mutually-reinforcing elements is a narcissist’s fundamental
qualities, those qualities which describe a narcissist’s underlying motivations (Campbell,
Brunell, & Finkel, 2006; Campbell & Foster, 2007; Campbell & Green, 2008). These
four elements work together to create a narcissist’s self-regulatory system.

39

The fourth element of a narcissists self-regulation process, a narcissist’s
fundamental qualities, can be further broken down into five sub-elements. These subelements work independently or together to create behavioral outcomes (Campbell &
Foster, 2007). The first of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is an
emphasis on agentic over communal concerns, which states that narcissists seek
abnormally high levels of status, success, power, and dominance (Bradlee & Emmons,
1992); for example, narcissists place more value on getting ahead than getting along
socially. As a result, one outcome of this sub-trait is that narcissists often rise to the
highest levels of society (Deluga, 1997; Nevicka, Ten Velden, De Hoogh, & Van Vianen,
2011), including the position of CEO (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).
The second of five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is approach
versus avoidance orientation, which means that an individual is motivated more by
reward than punishment, or in other words, an orientation toward success (Elliot, 2008;
Lewin, 1935; Rose & Campbell, 2004). Therefore, narcissists focus on the positives,
rather than the negatives, of their own decisions because of a heightened sensitivity to
rewards, coupled with a muted sensitivity to punishment (Foster & Trimm, 2008). It is
suggested that narcissists seek out a public stage to showcase their capabilities (Wallace
& Baumeister, 2002), and in that public setting, at least at first, they shine and are
recognized by team members and experts as the best leaders (Back et al., 2010; Nevicka,
Ten Velden, et al., 2011; Schnure, 2010). At the CEO level, this can manifest in strategic
sensationalism (e.g., impulsive, attention-grabbing acquisitions) versus strategic
conservatism (e.g., incremental improvements; Ouimet, 2010).
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The third of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is a general
desire for self-esteem. A general desire for self-esteem results in the narcissist desiring to
receive positive attention. When people meet narcissists, they often have very positive
interactions. Upon first acquaintance, narcissists are agreeable, entertaining, and
competent (Paulhus, 1998), as well as attractive and likeable (Oltmanns, Friedman,
Fiedler, & Turkheimer, 2004). They are often well-dressed, and they tend to use
charming facial expressions, self-confident body movement, and humor, all of which help
the narcissist make a positive first impression (Back et al., 2010). Further, narcissists are
usually seen in a positive light by their peers and superiors (Brunell et al., 2008; Judge et
al., 2006). The positive attention they receive benefits the narcissist. Narcissism is linked
to high self-esteem, greater happiness, and good psychological health (Rose, 2002;
Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). In fact, it has been suggested
that it feels good to be a narcissist (Rose & Campbell, 2004).
The fourth of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is a sense of
entitlement. A sense of entitlement results in aggressive, exploitative, and superior
behaviors (Reidy, Zeichner, Foster, & Martinez, 2008). That being said, aggressiveness
can be perceived as assertiveness and is valued in leaders. Likewise, exploitativeness can
be perceived as resourcefulness or cunning in strategic leaders (Reidy et al., 2008).
Finally, superiority behaviors are linked to dominance behaviors, which can also be
effective in a business environment. Each of these behaviors can lead to leadership
emergence (Judge et al., 2006; Ouimet, 2010; Paunonen, Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, Leikas, &
Nissinen, 2006). Kernberg (1979) was one of the first scholars to broach the topic of
narcissism and leadership by theorizing that narcissists are more likely to seek and obtain
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leadership positions. Since his studies, it has been observed that narcissists share a
number of traits (e.g., self-confidence) with successful leaders (Hogan & Fico, 2011).
The fifth of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is an inflated
self-view. An inflated self-view can also result in leadership emergence (Ouimet, 2010).
Smith and Foti (1998) conducted a study which found that the leadership attributes of
dominance, self-efficacy, and general intelligence were associated with a general
leadership impression. Narcissists tend to be dominant, have high self-efficacy, and can
be extroverted (Ensari, Riggio, Christian, & Carslaw, 2011; Judge, Bono, Ilies, &
Gerhardt, 2002), which personality trait is often perceived by others as intelligent
(Christopher & Schlenker, 2000; Roberts, 2002). Further, given the relationship of
narcissism with dominance, self-efficacy, and extraversion, it is understandable that
individuals or groups would perceive narcissists as leaders. Additionally, Maccoby
(2003) lists visioning, risk-taking, passion, charisma, learning, perseverance, and a sense
of humor as traits of narcissists that are consistent with positive attributes of leadership.
A narcissist draws on these five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements to
build skills and develop strategies. If a narcissist has the skills and is using the right
strategies for the social environment, he or she achieves a level of narcissistic esteem and
feels good (Campbell & Foster, 2007; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Vazire & Funder, 2006).
Thus, the five narcissistic fundamental quality sub-elements drive narcissistic behaviors
in order to achieve narcissistic esteem. These sub-elements are a narcissist’s underlying
motivational engine, and each sub-element can be a desirable CEO motivation.
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2.3.4 Positive consequences of narcissism
Narcissism can, at least on the surface, result in what is considered positive
behavior and individual characteristics. At the individual level, studies show that
narcissism is linked to high self-esteem, greater happiness, and good psychological health
(Rose, 2002; Sedikides et al., 2004). In fact, it has been suggested, it feels good to be a
narcissist (Rose & Campbell, 2004). When people meet narcissists, they often have very
positive interactions. Upon first acquaintance, narcissists are agreeable, entertaining, and
competent (Paulhus, 1998), as well as attractive and likeable (Oltmanns et al., 2004).
Being well-dressed, and using charming facial expressions, self-confident body
movement, and humor all help the narcissist make a positive first impression (Back et al.,
2010). Thus, all of these traits together can make the narcissist, at least on the surface,
very attractive.
2.3.5 Negative consequences of narcissism
Narcissistic behavior can result in the inability to maintain relationships and often
results in poor decision quality. At first, the positive impressions that narcissists create
encourage others to accept the narcissist’s self-perceived superiority. However, these
favorable impressions disappear as one gets to know the narcissist. Sometimes, after a
few personal encounters, the narcissist can be judged as arrogant, hostile, and identified
as a braggart (Paulhus, 1998). From a supervisory perspective, once the supervisor gets to
know the narcissist, they often describe the narcissist’s behavior as counterproductive and
deviant (Judge et al., 2006).
In the long run, the interpersonal deficits of narcissists make it hard for them to
maintain relationships (Grijalva & Harms, 2014: 111). Kernberg stated that narcissists are
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“clearly exploitative and sometimes parasitic. It is as if they feel they have the right to
control and possess others and to exploit them without guilt feelings—and, behind a
surface which very often is charming and engaging, one senses coldness and
ruthlessness.” (1967: 227–228) Narcissists typically have low intimacy striving, are
generally blind to others’ perspectives, and lack empathy (Carroll, 1987; Watson,
Grisham, Trotter, & Biderman, 1984). Indeed, high levels of narcissism are negatively
correlated with consideration for others (Resick, Whitman, Weingarden, & Hiller, 2009).
Narcissists can escalate from being obnoxious to aggressive if they feel
threatened. In response to negative feedback, they will derogate others to help maintain
their self-esteem and will respond to insults with “exceptionally high levels of aggression
toward the source of the insult” (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998:219; Kernis & Sun, 1994;
Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993). Narcissistic individuals are attuned to perceived threats and
predisposed to interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening (Bushman & Baumeister, 2002;
Judge et al., 2006). Ultimately, the combination of lack of intimacy paired with
aggression in the workplace results in counterproductive workplace behaviors (O’Boyle,
Forsyth, Banks, & McDaniel, 2012; Penney & Spector, 2002).
Finally, narcissists are prone to making poor quality decisions. First, narcissists
are impulsive because they are aggressive and lack the ability to delay gratification
(Vazire & Funder, 2006). Second, narcissists often do not forgive others (Eaton,
Struthers, & Santelli, 2006; Strelan, 2007) and can seek revenge (Brown, 2004). Third,
narcissists have inflated self-views, tend to think they are better at making decisions than
others, and do not learn from their mistakes (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004;
Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, & Elliot, 2000). Therefore, narcissists believe that they are
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more capable of making the correct decisions. Finally, narcissists focus on the positives,
rather than the negatives of decisions because they have a heightened sensitivity to
rewards, coupled with a muted sensitivity to punishment (Foster & Trimm, 2008). Thus,
the narcissist is often characterized as making risky decisions while focusing on the
potential positive outcomes, without considering the possibility of a negative result.
2.3.6 Narcissism summary
The construct of narcissism has evolved over the last 100 years. The current
conceptualization of narcissism is a synthesis of the best empirical research and clinical
experience. We have learned that narcissists can be very charming and driven individuals,
yet they are also manipulative and self-serving, often resulting in damaged relationships.
The theoretical underpinnings of narcissism, built on the foundation of dynamic selfregulation, is a system that adjusts to maintain a level of self-esteem. I adopt the extended
agency model (Campbell & Foster, 2007), which suggests narcissists use both
intrapersonal and intrapsychic skills and strategies to get what they want. The notion that
narcissists manipulate their own thinking and their relationships with others to get what
they want has broad implications for leaders and CEOs; therefore, these drives have the
potential to create a self-serving leader, which can cause damage to the people the leader
leads. Potentially, a highly narcissistic CEO could do significant damage to a company,
due to the power of the CEO’s position.
2.4 Narcissism and Leadership
Narcissists share a number of traits (e.g., self-confidence) with successful leaders
(Hogan & Fico, 2011). Kernberg (1979), one of the first scholars to broach the topic of
narcissism and leadership, theorized that narcissists are more likely to seek and obtain
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leadership positions. Then Kets de Vries (1985), in what is considered the seminal work
on leadership and narcissism, theorized that there are three types of narcissistic leaders:
reactive, self-deceptive, and constructive. In addition, “narcissists are attracted to
leadership roles and tend to emerge as leaders” (Grijalva & Harms, 2014: 116). With
such a close association between narcissism and leadership, the topic raises the question
of whether narcissism is a prerequisite for an individual to rise to the highest ranks of an
organization (Maccoby, 2003). Since Kets de Vries (1985), there are now over 50 articles
available on the topic of leadership and narcissism. Also, several major reviews and
books are available on the topic, as well as one meta-analysis (e.g., Grijalva et al., 2015;
Hogan & Fico, 2011; Maccoby, 2000, 2003; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). The study of
narcissism and leadership is particularly important because of the impact a narcissistic
executive can have on the stakeholders of a company (Finkelstein et al., 2009).
2.4.1 Attributes of narcissism are aligned with leadership
Maccoby (2003) lists visioning, risk-taking, passion, charisma, learning,
perseverance, and a sense of humor as traits of narcissists that are consistent with positive
attributes of leadership. Smith and Foti (1998) conducted a study which also found that
the leadership attributes of dominance, self-efficacy, and general intelligence were
associated with a general leadership impression. Narcissists tend to be dominant, have
high self-efficacy, and can be extroverted (Ensari et al., 2011; Judge et al., 2002), and
extroverts are often perceived as intelligent (Christopher & Schlenker, 2000; Roberts,
2002). Further, given the relationship of narcissism with dominance, self-efficacy, and
extraversion, it is understandable that individuals or groups would perceive narcissists as
leaders. Finally, narcissism is also positively correlated with implementing change,
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managing performance, presentation skills, and work skills, all traits associated with
leadership (Hogan & Fico, 2011).
2.4.2 Narcissists want to be leaders and are often selected as leaders
Narcissists seek out leadership positions; therefore, narcissism is related to
leadership emergence (Grijalva et al., 2015). The cycle begins with narcissists’ internal
drive for status and power (Carroll, 1987; Raskin & Novacek, 1991). To obtain status and
power, they will self-nominate for available leadership positions more often than nonnarcissists (Hogan, Raskin, & Fazzini, 1990). It is also suggested that narcissists seek out
a public stage to showcase their capabilities (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). In the public
setting, at least at first, they shine and are recognized by team members and experts as the
best leaders (Nevicka, Ten Velden, et al., 2011).
Narcissists do well in the job interview process because they appear to be good
leaders. They often create a positive first impression because they are usually welldressed, have charming facial expressions, express self-confidence, and use verbal humor
(Back et al., 2010). They are also good at marketing their ideas (Goncalo, Flynn, & Kim,
2010). Narcissists come across as enthusiastic and personable, overstate their
performance, and when pressed for details, defend their answers and assertions
confidently (Back et al., 2010; Brunell et al., 2008; Nevicka, Ten Velden, et al., 2011;
Paulhus et al., 2013). Thus, they are often selected as leaders.
2.4.3 Outcomes of narcissistic leadership
Narcissism is linked to both positive and negative leadership outcomes. On the
one hand, narcissists can be seen as a positive leadership trait because narcissistic leaders
can have a positive impact (Kets de Vries, 1994; Lubit, 2002). Narcissists can be bold
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visionaries, which often makes them excel at innovation (Deutschman, 2005; Galvin et
al., 2010). Narcissists also take bold risks and are relentless in pursuit of their goals
(Maccoby, 2000; Penney & Spector, 2002; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). Nonpathological narcissism is related to higher levels of self-esteem (Judge et al., 2006;
Sedikides et al., 2004). Judge et al. (2006) found a significant positive relationship
between narcissism and supervisor-related effectiveness. However, the results were not
consistent with a second sample which found negative, albeit not statistically significant,
results. In line with this second sample, narcissists can manipulate followers and damage
relationships over time, thereby contributing to a poor working environment and
unethical behavior.
Evidence suggests three patterns of narcissists’ interactions with others,
particularly with those who follow them. A link exists between narcissism and a
propensity for aggression toward others when being critiqued (Barry, Pickard, & Ansel,
2009; Reidy et al., 2008), and narcissists are likely to meet their own needs before they
meet the needs of others. In other words, narcissists think of themselves first, without
concern for the well-being of their followers. Additionally, narcissists are hypersensitive
to criticism; therefore, they tend to intellectually inhibit their subordinates (Glad, 2002;
Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). Finally, the attitude of narcissistic leaders toward those in
their entourage is one of simulated consideration, which takes the form of manipulation
and exploitation of employees (Glad, 2002).
Narcissistic leaders have difficulty maintaining relationships over time (Campbell
et al., 2006; Campbell & Foster, 2002; Paulhus, 1998). A narcissist’s interpersonal
relationship problems interfere with leader-member exchange (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995)
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and relationship theory (Uhl-Bien, 2006). These interpersonal and selfish behaviors
impact how subordinates view a narcissist’s leadership style. Peterson et al. (2012) found
that narcissism is negatively related to servant leadership. Servant leadership is a form of
leadership that focuses on followers’ needs and personal integrity (van Dierendonck,
2011). Overall, narcissistic leaders receive poor ratings from subordinates with respect to
both interpersonal performance and integrity (Blair, Hoffman, & Helland, 2008), as well
as dealing with feedback (Campbell & Campbell, 2009).
Several studies found evidence to suggest that narcissism negatively affects the
working climate in several ways, including the following: infliction of damage on others
through bullying, coercion and damage to the psychological well-being of subordinates
(Aasland, Skogstad, Notelaers, Nielsen, & Einarsen, 2010), destruction of subordinates’
trust and degradation of organizational effectiveness (Benson & Hogan, 2008), and
creation of a toxic work atmosphere, due to a lack of empathy and coldness toward
colleagues and staff (Goldman, 2006). Consequently, the workplace lacks the climate
necessary to achieve sustainable performance (Higgs, 2009).
Narcissism is a central concept in understanding unethical and counterproductive
work behaviors, since narcissism is associated with selfish and exploitative behaviors
(Campbell, 2005; Emmons, 1987; Raskin & Terry, 1988). Narcissists are rated as having
negative interpersonal and ethical components of leadership (Blair et al., 2008).
Additionally, narcissism is associated with cheating, lack of workplace integrity, and
white-collar crime (Blair et al., 2008; Blickle, Schlegel, Fassbender, & Klein, 2006;
Brunell, Staats, Barden, & Hupp, 2011; Ouimet, 2010).
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2.4.4 Optimal conditions for a narcissistic leader
Some have suggested that there are times when narcissistic leaders can be very
effective (Glad & Whitmore, 1991; Robins & Paulhus, 2001). In times of crisis and
instability, displays of self-confidence and reassuring rhetoric can calm anxious
organizational members and create a path for the emergence of a narcissistic leader. The
narcissistic leader feeds off the uncertainty, drawing followers with the promise of
deliverance from a crisis (Padilla et al., 2007; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). Some
authors have gone so far as to suggest that in times of extreme crisis, given no better
alternative, any leadership that can provide motivation and direction for the organization
(society) can be more beneficial than the potential harm caused by a narcissist. These
profound times of crisis include war, national unity crises, and economic depression.
Narcissists can provide a key unit-building and hope-building role (Maccoby, 2007; Post
& George, 2004). Unfortunately, the situational advantages that give rise to the narcissist
leader can fade quickly, both during and after the crisis, potentially leaving the narcissist
incapable of handling the situation (King III, 2007). At the root of the narcissist’s
downfall is the motivation to meet their own egotistical needs for power and admiration
(Kets de Vries & Miller, 1985). In the process, they seek to make the world the way they
desire it to be (Glad, 2002), rather than trying to meet the needs of their constituents
(Conger, 1999).
Similarly, narcissists may emerge and flourish when new order needs to be
established. When new order needs to be established, narcissists are more likely to assert
their opinions in group discussions and are confident in their ability to acquire and
exercise power (Brunell et al., 2008). They are also quick to make decisions, are willing
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to take risks, have a vision, care little about negative consequences, and have a desire to
be in charge (Maccoby, 2000). However, narcissists may be unable to maintain the
necessary stability once the organization establishes new order. While narcissistic leaders
may thrive in chaotic times, they may also seem out of place during more tranquil times
(Maccoby, 2000).
Narcissists are likely to be better leaders when their personal goals are aligned
with their followers’ goals and the organization’s goals (Hogan & Fico, 2011). When
goals converge, the efforts of the narcissist and the organization are likely to converge in
productive combinations of tasks, effort, and objectives. However, when the goals of the
narcissist need to be achieved at the expense of those around them, it will cause
discontent, lack of trust, and likely damage long-term relationships.
It has also been suggested that narcissists are more successful when they are
young (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). As narcissistic leaders fail to make their visions
come true over time, the realities of human weakness and their failings may become more
apparent. At this point, they begin to recede into submission and despair. In desperation,
they then use their social power to fend off the negative emotions, becoming more
grandiose and tyrannical over time (McIntyre, 1983; Post, 1993).
2.4.4 Narcissism and leadership summary
Narcissists are attracted to leadership positions and are often selected as leaders
because they make good first impressions and are seen as visionary (Deutschman, 2005;
Grijalva et al., 2015; Hogan & Fico, 2011). That being said, narcissism can interfere with
leader-member exchange and result in risky decision-making. Thus, despite their initial
appeal, narcissists often cause unintended negative consequences. Additionally,
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narcissists have little incentive to change, since narcissism feels good (Campbell &
Foster, 2007). Whom a narcissist selects as followers is an important contributor to
maintaining narcissistic esteem (Grijalva & Harms, 2014). This is an important
implication for CEO selection and CEO succession planning, since the strong first
impressions narcissists make are likely to affect the selection process. Also, the need for
narcissistic esteem is likely to affect how the CEO gets involved with CEO succession.
Ultimately, a board who selects a CEO with higher levels of narcissism may realize it too
late to prevent it.
2.5 CEO Narcissism
Narcissists rise to the highest levels of society (Deluga, 1997; Nevicka, de Hoogh,
Van Vianen, Beersma, & McIlwain, 2011), including the position of CEO (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007). Research suggests that when an individual is placed in a job that aligns
with their personality traits, the person performs better (Hogan & Holland, 2003). For
example, extraversion is more strongly related to job performance in sales and
managerial jobs (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Mount, Barrick, & Stewart, 1998). At the CEO
level, if charisma, extraversion, self-absorption, or self-importance are important traits to
possess, narcissists may thrive (Robins & Paulhus, 2001). Therefore, it is important to
understand the relationship between narcissism and the CEO in order to identify whether
narcissism helps or hinders the CEO’s performance. Although the study of narcissism in
leadership has been studied since Ketz de Vries (1985), the empirical study of narcissistic
CEOs has increased since Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) introduced an unobtrusive
measure of the CEO's level of narcissism. I found 14 published studies on the CEO's
level of narcissism and now review the empirical evidence.
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2.5.1 Positive impact of narcissistic CEO behaviors
So far, there is only a small amount evidence that narcissists create positive
outcomes. Some evidence suggests that the highly narcissistic CEO would be valuable to
entrepreneurial endeavors or companies that require innovation (Galvin et al., 2010).
Additionally, some studies provide evidence that highly narcissistic CEOs have larger
entrepreneurial orientations and are more likely to have and relentlessly pursue a bold
vision (Galvin et al., 2010). At a personal level, narcissists enjoy higher levels of
compensation (O’Reilly, Doerr, & Chatman, 2017), and at a societal level, although
motivated by impression management, narcissists spend more on corporate social
responsibility (Petrenko et al., 2015).
2.5.2 CEO narcissism and financial performance
The investigation into the impact of the CEO's level of narcissism on performance
is just beginning. A key article that has received little attention links CEOs with higher
levels of narcissism to increased earnings per share (Olsen et al., 2014). However, the
article that receives the most attention with regards to performance is Chatterjee and
Hambrick’s (2007) study. According to Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), narcissism
predicts not only the size of acquisitions, but also the volatility of return on assets and
total shareholder returns. While no direct evidence of a positive or negative relationship
with performance was found, volatility can still be considered undesirable (Amit &
Wernerfelt, 1990). Volatility in a firm’s income over time is sometimes referred to as
income stream uncertainty (Miller & Bromiley, 1990) or organizational risk (Palmer &
Wiseman, 1999). Volatility can decrease earnings predictability and firm value (Imhoff
Jr, 1992). It can also increase the stock’s risk premium, which can result in decreased
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share price (Barth, Landsman, & Wahlen, 1995; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu, 2004).
Thus, the result of volatility is greater income stream uncertainty, which makes it more
difficult for the firm to satisfy the needs of stakeholders (Bowman, 1980; Fiegenbaum &
Thomas, 1988; Miller & Chen, 2004). However, these assertions could be misleading
because of the relationship between CEO narcissism and earnings per share found by
Olsen et al. (2014).
At the CEO level, narcissism has been linked to risky and unilateral decisionmaking. “Narcissistic CEOs will always favor strategic sensationalism (such as the
impulsive acquisition of companies which are grandiose and guaranteed attention-getters)
over strategic conservatism (such as incremental improvements of product quality that
relegate the CEO to total obscurity)” (Ouimet, 2010: 716). See Table 2.2 for a summary
of findings on studies that look at CEOs with higher levels of narcissism
2.6 Summary
The study of narcissism has a long history, dating back to the turn of the 20th
century. Our understanding of narcissism has greatly increased in that time. We have
learned about both the positive traits (e.g., self-esteem, confidence) and negative traits
(e.g., selfishness, entitlement) of narcissists. In the last 25 years, we have also learned
that narcissists are attracted to leadership positions. Although research has shown that
narcissistic leaders can be innovative and visionary, they may also take excessive risks
and can be manipulative. The research on the CEO's level of narcissism tells us that the
CEO's level of narcissism is related to positive outcomes, such as earnings per share
(Olsen et al., 2014), as well as negative outcomes, such as performance volatility
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), increased fraud (Rijsenbilt & Commandeur, 2013), and
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increased risk-taking behavior (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). What the literature does
not tell us is what leads to highly narcissistic CEO selection or what a highly narcissistic
CEO will do within the CEO selection process. Due to the importance of CEO selection
(Karaevli, 2007), there are broad implications for both the inadvertent selection of highly
narcissistic CEOs and how the CEO fills the leadership pipeline after taking office.
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TABLE 2.1
Summary of Narcissism Definitions Used in CEO Narcissism Research
Citation

Narcissism Definition

Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007;
2011); Gerstner, Konig, Enders, &
Hambrick (2013)

Narcissism is the degree to which an individual has an inflated sense
of self and is preoccupied by having that self-view continually
reinforced (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004; Morf &
Rhodewalt, 2001).

Engelen, Neumann, & Schmidt
(2013)

Narcissism is a multifaceted personality trait that is reflected in
Emmons’s (1987) four factors, which together describe the
personality trait of narcissism: exploitativeness/entitlement,
leadership/authority, superiority/arrogance, and self-absorption/
self-admiration. Emmons (1987) and others point out that these
factors cohere as a unitary personality construct (Campbell,
Hoffman, Campbell, & Marchisio, 2011); superiority, entitlement,
and the constant need for attention and admiration have been
reported as major manifestations of narcissism (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2011).

O'Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell, &
Chatman (2014)

Research has suggested that narcissistic leaders—typically
characterized by dominance, self-confidence, a sense of
entitlement, grandiosity, and low empathy—can both positively
and negatively influence organizations.
Narcissism is a stable, multifaceted personality trait consisting of
grandiosity, self-importance, and inflated self-views (Campbell,
2005; Campbell et al., 2011).

Olsen & Stekelberg (2015)

Olsen, Dworkis, & Young (2014)

The subclinical, personality construct of narcissism is a unitary
personality construct with multiple dimensions (Emmons, 1987;
Raskin & Terry, 1988; Foster and Campbell, 2007). This form of
narcissism is combination of personality traits such as a grandiose
sense of self-importance and uniqueness, authority, entitlement,
self-absorption, self-admiration, superiority, arrogance,
exhibitionism, exploitativeness, self-sufficiency, and vanity
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Emmons, 1987; Resick,
Whitman, Weingarden, & Hiller, 2009).

Patel & Cooper (2013)

Narcissism is a multidimensional, multifaceted, and multicontextual concept that is sometimes identified as a personality
disorder in psychiatry, but is examined as a personality
characteristic that varies across individuals in much of the social
psychology and organizational behavior literature (Campbell et
al., 2011). Narcissists possess an extreme need for selfenhancement, which manifests in grandiose self-promotion,
unrealistic optimism, and self-entitlement (Tamborski, Brown, &
Chowning, 2012).

Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill
(2015)

Narcissistic CEOs — defined as CEOs who have inflated views of
themselves and who seek to have those positive self-views
continuously reinforced (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004;
Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).

56

TABLE 2.1 CONTINUED
Summary of Narcissism Definitions Used in CEO Narcissism Research
Citation

Narcissism Definition

Reina, Zhang, & Peterson (2014)

Narcissism is a personality trait referring to the degree to which an
individual has an elevated level of self-admiration, lack of
empathy, and hostility (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006) and is
preoccupied by continually reinforcing his/her positive self-view
(Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001).

Resick, Whitman, Weingarden, &
Hiller (2009)

Narcissism is one dark-side personality characteristic that is
particularly germane to the study of CEO leadership (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007; Judge, LePine, & Rich, 2006; Kets de Vries &
Miller, 1997; Lubit, 2002; Maccoby, 2003). The roots of
narcissism can be traced to the Greek mythological tale of
Narcissus (a man who fell in love with his own reflection) and to
Freud’s (1914/1957) description of narcissism as a personality
disorder. Individuals with a narcissistic personality disorder
demonstrate a “pervasive pattern of grandiosity” coupled with a
“need for admiration and lack of empathy” (American
Psychological Association, 2000: 717). Narcissism has also been
viewed as a set of traits associated with “normal” personality
(e.g., Lasch, 1991; R. Raskin & Hall, 1981). Narcissists have an
inflated self-concept that is enacted through a desire for
recognition and a high degree of self-reference when interacting
with others (Kernberg, 1989). Patterns of behavior that have been
associated with narcissistic personality traits involve a grandiose
sense of self-importance, a tendency to exaggerate achievements,
a preoccupation with fantasies of power and success, excessive
self-admiration, hostility toward criticism, and intolerance toward
compromise (Deluga, 1997; Judge et al., 2006; Lubit, 2002;
Raskin & Hall, 1981). Arrogance is a core disposition of
narcissists and the characteristic that is usually most apparent to
others (American Psychological Association, 2000; Rosenthal &
Pittinsky, 2006).

Wales, Patel, & Lumpkin (2013)

Narcissism is broadly defined as an exaggerated, yet fragile selfconcept of one’s importance and influence (Resick et al., 2009).

Zhu & Chen (2014)

Narcissism—the degree to which an individual has an inflated selfview and craves affirmation of that self-view (Raskin & Terry,
1988; Campbell, 1999)
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TABLE 2.2
Summary of CEO Narcissism Findings
Citation

Findings

Measure Root
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Chatterjee & Hambrick
(2011)

Social praise increases narcissistic CEO risk-taking. Objective performance has little effect on narcissistic
CEO risk-taking.

Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007)

Chatterjee & Hambrick
(2007)
Engelen, Neumann, &
Schmidt (2013)

CEO narcissism predicts the size of acquisitions and the volatility of performance.

Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007)

Narcissistic CEOs weaken the CEO-performance relationship, except in highly concentrated and dynamic
markets.

Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007)

Gerstner, Konig, Enders, &
Hambrick (2013)

Narcissistic CEOs are aggressive in adopting technological discontinuities. Perceptions of how provocative
the technological discontinuity is moderates the CEO narcissism to organizational outcome relationship.

Modified Chatterjee &
Hambrick (2007)

O'Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell, &
Chatman (2014)

Narcissistic CEO tenure is related to higher levels of compensation and greater differences from the next
highest paid executive.

Modified Resick et al. (2009)

Olsen & Stekelberg (2015)

CEO narcissism increases the likelihood that the CEO’s firm engages in corporate tax shelters.

Olsen et al. (2014)

Olsen, Dworkis, & Young
(2014)

CEO narcissism is related to higher earnings-per-share and share price. Narcissistic CEOs increase reported
earnings per share through real and operational activities rather than accrual-based manipulations.

Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007)

Patel & Cooper (2014)
Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, &
Hill (2016)

Narcissistic CEOs increase firm performance in the post crisis period.
Narcissistic CEOs spend more on corporate social responsibility. CEO narcissism reduces the effect of
corporate social responsibility on performance.

Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007)
Histometric (video) NPI

Reina, Zhang, & Peterson
(2014)

Organizational identification modifies both the CEO narcissism to TMT behavioral integration and CEO
narcissism to Performance relationship.

Histometric (written) NPI-16

Resick, Whitman,
Weingarden, & Hiller (2009)

Dark-side personality characteristics (narcissism) of CEOs are negatively related to contingent reward
leadership.

Histometric (written) based on
8 narcissistic adjectives

Rijsenbilt & Commandeur
(2013)
Wales, Patel, & Lumpkin
(2013)

CEO narcissism is related to fraud.

Composite of nine measures

Narcissism is positively associated with entrepreneurial orientation. Entrepreneurial orientation mediates
the relationship between narcissism and performance.

NPI-16

Zhu & Chen (2014)

Narcissistic CEOs prefer directors who have worked with narcissistic CEOs.

Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007)

Interpersonal Skills
(e.g., social confidence
and charm)

Fundamental Narcissistic Qualities
1) Agentic vs communal concerns
2) Approach orientation
3) Desire for self-esteem
4) Entitlement
5) Inflated self-views

Intrapsychic Skills
(e.g., fantasies of power
and self-serving bias)

Narcissism

Interpersonal
Strategies
(e.g., self-promotion and
game-playing)

FIGURE 2.1
Extended Agency Model
Recreated from Campbell and Foster (2007)
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Narcissistic Esteem

CHAPTER 3
ANTECEDENTS TO THE SELECTION OF CEOS WITH HIGHER LEVELS OF NARCISSISM
3.1 Introduction
The selection of the CEO is the board’s most important responsibility because the
CEO’s personality, behavior, and decisions have a substantive impact throughout the firm
and can determine long-term strategic consequences (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996;
Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Recently, narcissism—a multifaceted
personality trait that combines grandiosity, attention-seeking, an unrealistically inflated
self-view, a need for that self-view to be continuously reinforced through self-regulation,
and a general lack of regard for others (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)—has
been of increasing interest to scholars and the public at large (e.g., Chamorro-Premuzic,
2016; Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017). Much of this interest stems from the fact that this
self-serving personality trait has been associated with several high-profile CEOs (e.g.,
Steve Jobs, Kenneth Lay) and has been linked to both positive organizational outcomes,
such as increased earnings per share, and negative organizational outcomes, such as
performance volatility (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Drucker, 1994; Foster & Brennan,
2011; Isaacson, 2013; Olsen et al., 2014). Due to these contrasting outcomes, some have
hailed narcissism as an essential part of executive leadership and innovation (Maccoby,
2000; 2003), while others have labeled narcissism as an evil to be avoided (Ronson,
2011). Yet there is no research to help us understand which circumstances result in a
board’s selection of a CEO with higher levels of narcissism.
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Understanding what leads to the selection of a CEO with higher levels of
narcissism would help us understand when and if the selection of a CEO with higher
levels of narcissism leads to desirable organizational outcomes, given that boards strive
to select CEOs that meet their strategic needs (Guthrie & Datta, 1997). Current firm
performance, the level of turbulence and uncertainty in the market (i.e., dynamism; Dess
& Beard, 1984), and the scarcity or abundance of resources in the environment (i.e.,
environmental munificence; Castrogiovanni, 1991) are of primary consideration when
determining CEO trait requirements (e.g., Jenter & Kanaan, 2015). Nevertheless, despite
effective identification of strategic needs, selected CEOs can operate in a self-serving
manner, thereby undermining the desires of the board (Dalton et al., 2007). One method
of avoiding this is by selecting CEOs whose interests are aligned with the strategic intent
of the board (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), thus reducing the probability of opportunism.
Therefore, I investigate the firm performance and environmental conditions that precede
the selection of a CEO with higher levels of narcissism.
To do this, I build a theoretical framework that connects firm performance,
environmental munificence, and environmental dynamism to the selection of CEOs with
higher levels of narcissism. I develop the underlying arguments by considering the extant
theoretical and empirical outcomes of research on attributes of CEOs with higher levels
of narcissism (e.g., bold vision, innovation, performance volatility; Deutschman, 2005;
Galvin et al., 2010; Olsen et al., 2014), together with how firm performance,
environmental munificence, and environmental dynamism influence CEO selection.
Further, I predict that low firm performance will result in boards selecting CEOs with
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higher levels of narcissism, and that this relationship will be attenuated when either
environmental dynamism or environmental munificence is low.
Prior research on CEOs with higher levels of narcissism focuses on the
consequences of CEOs with higher levels of narcissism, neglecting its antecedents. The
CEO selection literature primarily examines insider status, education, or functional
background to describe a CEO’s characteristics, without considering a CEO’s level of
narcissism. Further, limited research is available regarding how boards decide which
characteristics, especially personality traits, are needed for the CEO role (Davidson et al.,
2006; Goel & Thakor, 2008; Karaevli & Zajac, 2013; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001;
Zhang, 2008). Investigating narcissism in CEO selection goes beyond focusing on insider
status, education, or functional background and brings into focus the CEO’s personality
traits as a selection criteria. Thus, the primary contribution of this study is to provide a
theoretical framework that identifies the circumstances which determine board selection
of CEOs with higher levels of narcissism. This extends the research on CEOs with higher
levels of narcissism and CEO selection literatures by studying the relationships between
firm performance, the environment, and the level of narcissism of CEO candidates as
antecedents to CEO selection.
This contribution has both theoretical and practical implications. A deeper
understanding of the circumstances that result in the selection of a CEO with higher
levels of narcissism will help us understand a board’s decision and when the selection of
a CEO with higher levels of narcissism results in the optimal outcome. Also, as our
understanding of how higher levels of narcissism affect firm performance outcomes
increases due to this growing body of research, understanding the factors associated with
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the selection of a CEO with higher levels of narcissism could identify ways in which
boards can mitigate the negative consequences of higher levels of narcissism while
capitalizing on the positives outcomes.
3.2 Theoretical Background
3.2.1 Agency Theory
Agency theory is a foundational theory through which to consider CEO selection
because the CEO is selected by a board that represents the principals, a contract is put in
place, and monitoring costs are real. Agency theory arises from the observation that
separation of ownership from control is a central part of modern corporations. It is
concerned with the delegation of decision authority from principals (e.g., owners) to
agents (e.g., managers). Agency theory posits the circumstances when it will be most
effective to use subjective evaluations (i.e., monitoring) to motivate and reward
individual performance, versus formula-driven evaluations based on pre-specified
financial or operational targets. The separation of principal and agent allows the principal
more time to pursue other activities; however, it removes the principal from knowledge
of day-to-day firm operations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Key assumptions of agency theory are that agents are bounded rationally, selfinterested, opportunistic, and risk-averse. Additional assumptions include goal
incongruence, the efficiency criterion (i.e., that principals and agents will choose the most
efficient contract), and asymmetric information between principals and agents. These
assumptions result in tension between the agent’s motivations and behavior versus how
the principal desires the agent to behave. There are three sources of principal-agent
problems. The first is moral hazard, where the agent does not do what is desired by the
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principal. The second is adverse selection, or the misrepresentation of the agent’s
abilities. The third is asymmetric information, where the agent has more information than
the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989).
One method of mitigating moral hazard, adverse selection, and information
asymmetry is selecting individuals that have predictable behavior that matches the
behavior desired for the position (Beckert, 1996). Moral hazard is reduced because when
behavior is predictable, principals are not caught unaware by the agent’s behaviors and
can therefore act to prevent undesired behavior before it happens. Adverse selection is
reduced because when an agent’s behavior is predictable, it is more difficult for the agent
to misrepresent their abilities and motives. The implications of asymmetric information
are also reduced, particularly in times of uncertainty. To be unexpected, self-serving
behavior requires asymmetric information; however, in times of uncertainty, there is an
equal lack of information. Therefore, as clarified by Beckert (1996: 827), “The notion of
habitual behavior can be seen as one of the most central concepts for the explanation of
actor behavior in complex situations.” Indeed, predictability of behavior has been a
foundational perspective of understanding behavior under uncertainty (Camic, 1986).
Individuals with higher levels of narcissism behave predictably, particularly once their
underlying motivations are understood (Morf, Horvath, & Torchetti, 2011; Morf &
Rhodewalt, 2001), and therefore may be a good fit to address agency issues in times of
uncertainty. Finally, when the board selects a CEO with higher levels of narcissism, they
can predict and therefore become more aware of the CEO’s expected behaviors.
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3.2.2 Narcissistic motivations
To help understand the motives of individuals with higher levels of narcissism, I
adopt Campbell and Foster’s (2007) extended agency model. The extended agency model
is a composite model composed from the most accepted theoretical thinking and
empirical evidence within the narcissism literature (Campbell & Foster, 2007). The
extended agency model advocates that individuals with higher levels of narcissism have a
strong need to maintain a positive self-image, so the narcissist thinks and acts in ways
that keep these self-views viable. Since agency theory assumes self-interested motives
from the agent, using the extended agency model as the underlying theoretical rationale
of individuals with higher levels of narcissism provides a specific set of motivations and
behaviors which explain narcissistic behavior beyond merely the assumption of selfinterest.
The extended agency model adopts the premise that behavior is motivated
through a dynamic self-regulatory process (Campbell et al., 2006). Dynamic selfregulatory processing encompasses the efforts a person uses to construct, maintain,
defend, and enhance their desired self-views (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Vazire &
Funder, 2006). In this context, the self is seen as a network of cognitive-affective
processes that is in constant transaction with the social environment (Mischel & Morf,
2003; Morf & Horvath, 2007). In other words, the individual receives information from
the social environment, processes that information through a self-regulatory process and
thereby adjusts their behavior. The resulting behavior has an effect on the social
environment. These changes in the social environment become new information for the
individual, thus creating a cycle of information between the social environment and the
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self-regulation and behavior of the individual. The primary internal output of the dynamic
self-regulatory processes is narcissistic esteem. Narcissistic esteem is a sense of selfesteem that is linked primarily to dominance, rather than closeness or acceptance, and is
related to the emotion of pride (Campbell & Foster, 2007).
The dynamic self-regulating system (see Figure 3.1) which feeds a narcissist’s
narcissistic esteem is comprised of four mutually-reinforcing elements, wherein the
fourth element is comprised of five sub-elements. The first of the four mutuallyreinforcing elements is a narcissist’s interpersonal skills (e.g., social confidence, charm),
which can be used to garner attention or influence. The second of the four mutuallyreinforcing elements is a narcissist’s intrapsychic self-regulation strategies (e.g.,
fantasies of power, self-serving bias), which can be used to justify self-serving behavior
or outcomes. The third of the four mutually-reinforcing elements is a narcissist’s
interpersonal strategies (e.g., self-promotion, game-playing), which can be used to
achieve goals or control others. The fourth of the four mutually-reinforcing elements are
a narcissist’s fundamental qualities, which describe a narcissist’s underlying motivations
(Campbell et al., 2006; Campbell & Foster, 2007; Campbell & Green, 2008). These four
elements work together to create a narcissist’s self-regulatory system.
The fourth element of a narcissist’s self-regulation process, a narcissist’s
fundamental qualities, can be further broken down into five sub-elements. These subelements work independently or together to create behavioral outcomes (Campbell &
Foster, 2007). The first of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is an
emphasis on agentic over communal concerns, which states that narcissists seek
abnormally high levels of status, success, power, and dominance (Bradlee & Emmons,
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1992); for example, narcissists place more value on getting ahead than getting along
socially. One outcome of this sub-trait is that narcissists often rise to the highest levels of
society (Deluga, 1997; Nevicka, Ten Velden, et al., 2011), including the position of CEO
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).
The second of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is approach
versus avoidance orientation, or being motivated more strongly by reward than
punishment or an orientation toward success (Elliot, 2008; Lewin, 1935; Rose &
Campbell, 2004). Therefore, narcissists focus on the positives, rather than the negatives
of their own decisions, because they have a heightened sensitivity to rewards, coupled
with a muted sensitivity to punishment (Foster & Trimm, 2008). It is suggested that
narcissists seek out a public stage to showcase their capabilities (Wallace & Baumeister,
2002), and in that public setting, at least at first, they shine and are recognized by team
members and experts as the best leaders (Back et al., 2010; Nevicka, Ten Velden, et al.,
2011; Schnure, 2010). At the CEO level, this sub-element can manifest in strategic
sensationalism (e.g., impulsive, attention-grabbing acquisitions) versus strategic
conservatism (i.e., incremental improvements; Ouimet, 2010).
The third of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is a general
desire for self-esteem. A general desire for self-esteem results in the narcissist desiring to
receive positive attention. When people meet narcissists, they often have very positive
interactions. Upon first acquaintance, narcissists are agreeable, entertaining, and
competent (Paulhus, 1998), as well as attractive and likeable (Oltmanns et al., 2004).
Dressing well and using charming facial expressions, self-confident body movement, and
humor all help the narcissist make a positive first impression (Back et al., 2010). Further,
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narcissists are usually seen in a positive light by their peers and superiors (Brunell et al.,
2008; Judge et al., 2006). They are good at marketing their ideas (Goncalo et al., 2010).
For these reasons, narcissism is linked to high self-esteem, greater happiness, and good
psychological health (Rose, 2002; Sedikides et al., 2004). In fact, it has been suggested
that it feels good to be a narcissist (Rose & Campbell, 2004).
The fourth of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is a sense of
entitlement. A sense of entitlement results in aggressive, exploitative, and superiority
behaviors; aggressiveness, however, can be perceived as assertiveness and is valued in
leaders (Reidy et al., 2008). Exploitativeness can be perceived as resourcefulness or
cunning in strategic leaders. Finally, superiority behaviors are linked to dominance
behaviors. Any one of these behaviors can lead to leadership emergence (Judge et al.,
2006; Ouimet, 2010; Paunonen et al., 2006). Kernberg (1979), one of the first scholars to
broach the topic of narcissism and leadership, theorized that narcissists are more likely to
seek and obtain leadership positions. Since his studies, it has been observed that
narcissists share a number of traits with successful leaders (Hogan & Fico, 2011).
The fifth of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is an inflated
self-view. An inflated self-view can also result in leadership emergence (Ouimet, 2010).
As has been discussed, narcissists share a number of traits (e.g., self-confidence) with
successful leaders (Hogan & Fico, 2011). In addition, Smith and Foti (1998) conducted a
study which found that the leadership attributes of dominance, self-efficacy, and general
intelligence were associated with a general leadership impression. Narcissists tend to be
dominant, have high self-efficacy, and can be extroverted (Ensari et al., 2011; Judge et
al., 2002). Extroverts are often perceived as intelligent (Christopher & Schlenker, 2000;
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Roberts, 2002). Further, given the relationship of narcissism with dominance, selfefficacy, and extraversion, it is understandable that individuals or groups would perceive
narcissists as leaders. Additionally, Maccoby (2003) lists visioning, risk-taking, passion,
charisma, learning, perseverance, and a sense of humor as traits of narcissists that are
consistent with positive attributes of leadership.
A narcissist draws on the motivations of these five fundamental narcissistic
quality sub-elements to build skills and develop strategies. If the narcissist has the
necessary skills and uses the right strategies for the social environment, he or she
achieves a level of narcissistic esteem and feels good (Campbell & Foster, 2007; Morf &
Rhodewalt, 2001; Vazire & Funder, 2006). Thus, the five narcissistic fundamental quality
sub-elements drive narcissistic behaviors to achieve narcissistic esteem and act as a
narcissist’s underlying motivational engine. Each of the five narcissistic fundamental
quality sub-elements can also be a desirable CEO motivation.
Thus, certain firm performance, environmental conditions, or a combination of
firm performance and environmental conditions could result in the board selecting a
strategy which is best addressed with a CEO who behaves in a highly narcissistic manner.
Research suggests that when an individual is placed in a job that aligns with their
personality traits, the person performs better (Hogan & Holland, 2003). For example,
extraversion is more strongly related to individual job performance in sales and
managerial jobs (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Mount et al., 1998). At the CEO level, where
charisma, extraversion, self-absorption, or self-importance may be desirable
characteristics, individuals with higher levels of narcissism may thrive (Robins &
Paulhus, 2001). Further, individuals with higher levels of narcissism are likely to be
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better leaders when their personal goals are aligned with their followers’ goals, as well as
the goals of the organization. When these goals converge, the efforts of the individual
with higher levels of narcissism and the organization are likely to converge productively
when it comes to tasks, effort, and objectives (Hogan & Fico, 2011).
This has led scholars to suggest that there are times when individuals with higher
levels of narcissism can be effective leaders (Glad & Whitmore, 1991; Robins & Paulhus,
2001). For example, in times of crisis and instability, displays of self-confidence and
reassuring rhetoric can calm anxious stakeholders and create a path for the emergence of
a leader with higher levels of narcissism. The leader with a higher level of narcissism
feeds off the uncertainty and draws followers to the promise of being delivered from a
crisis (Padilla et al., 2007; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). Some scholars have gone so far
as to suggest that in extreme times of crisis, leadership that provides motivation and
direction for the organization can be more beneficial than the potential harm caused by a
leader with higher levels of narcissism. These profound times of crisis include war, crises
of national unity, and economic depression. Therefore, in the business context,
individuals with higher levels of narcissism can provide a key unit-building and hopebuilding role (Maccoby, 2007; Post & George, 2004).
Similarly, individuals with higher levels of narcissism may emerge and flourish
when new order needs to be established. Individuals with higher levels of narcissism are
more likely to assert their opinions in group discussions and are confident in their ability
to acquire and exercise power (Brunell et al., 2008). They are also quick to make
decisions, are willing to take risks, have a vision, care little about negative consequences,
and have a desire to be in charge (Maccoby, 2000). However, individuals with higher
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levels of narcissism may also be unable to maintain the necessary stability once the
organization establishes new order. While leaders with higher levels of narcissism may
thrive in chaotic times, they may seem out of place during more tranquil times (Maccoby,
2000). Thus, a temporary or short-term need may be better suited for a leader with higher
levels of narcissism.
3.3 Hypothesis Development
3.3.1 Firm performance
3.3.1.1 Poor firm performance requires a turnaround
Firm financial performance is often measured in terms of profits, return on assets,
return on investment, and total shareholder return, as well as product market
performance, including sales and market share (Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson,
2009). Low firm performance typically calls for some type of change (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984). Indeed, low firm performance has been linked to subsequent
organizational change (Haveman, 1992), including strategic re-orientation (Tushman &
Rosenkopf, 1996) and CEO succession (Friedman & Singh, 1989). To improve firm
performance, boards may seek to hire a CEO that brings a different set of knowledge,
skills, abilities, and other characteristics to the firm (Friedman & Singh, 1989) and to
provide the new CEO with a mandate for change.
When the board gives a new CEO a mandate to change the organization, the CEO
is motivated to achieve said mandate, particularly at the start of his or her tenure
(Fukutomi, 1991). CEOs can be very confident, and at times, somewhat overconfident
(Goel & Thakor, 2008). When a confident CEO takes office, they have the belief that the
changes they make will take effect and make a difference on performance (Judge et al.,
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2006). Also, when financial incentives are aligned with strategic objectives, CEOs
behave in a manner which helps achieve financial objectives, thereby resulting in
increased performance (Hou, Priem, & Goranova, 2014; Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, &
Carpenter, 2010). Even if the CEO acts in self-interest, if the CEO’s preferences and
actions are aligned with the board’s, the net result will be actions that are consistent with
both the CEO’s and the board’s desires (Nyberg et al., 2010). Tools the new CEO can use
to create change include strategic reorientation (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996), change in
the top management team (Barron et al., 2011), innovation (Christensen, 2016), and risktaking (Sharpe, 1964; Wright, Kroll, Krug, & Pettus, 2007).
Individuals with higher levels of narcissism exhibit several characteristics that
could lead boards to believe hiring a CEO with higher levels of narcissism would
improve firm performance. The evidence suggests that CEOs with higher levels of
narcissism would be valuable to entrepreneurial endeavors or companies that need
innovation, as individuals with higher levels of narcissism possess larger entrepreneurial
orientations and are more likely to pursue a bold vision (Galvin et al., 2010; Wales, Patel,
& Lumpkin, 2013). Recent evidence also suggests that CEOs with higher levels of
narcissism have a positive effect on stock price and earnings per share (Olsen et al.,
2014). In addition, CEOs with higher levels of narcissism spend more money on
corporate social responsibility (Petrenko et al., 2015), and CEOs with higher levels of
narcissism have been linked to strategic sensationalism (Ouimet, 2010). Additionally, the
attributes of hope, optimism, and resilience have been linked to individual performance
and are also linked to narcissism (Peterson, Walumbwa, Byron, & Myrowitz, 2008).
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With this list of potential positive outcomes, a CEO with higher levels of
narcissism may be believed to have the ability to improve firm performance through
change innovation, risk-taking, and sending positive market signals. Yet narcissism is
also associated with negative outcomes, such as performance volatility, increased
accounting and audit fees, and damaged personal relationships (Chatterjee & Hambrick,
2007; Grijalva & Harms, 2014; Judd, Olsen, & Stekelberg, 2015). However, when the
benefits outweigh the costs, a board may still select a narcissist. I will discuss the
tradeoffs with the potential negative outcomes of narcissism in hypotheses four and five.
I now explore change, innovation, risk-taking, and sending positive market signals in
detail.
3.3.1.2 Change
A board may select a CEO with higher levels of narcissism when the board
believes change is necessary. Creating change requires a leader who can be persuasive
(Beyer & Browning, 1999). The narcissistic traits of dominance, high-self efficacy,
extroversion, self-confidence, and an ability to make quick decisions can create a strong
change leadership persona (Conger, 1999). Such a persona can be especially desirable
when the change required is more important than any potential damage to personal
relationships, such as when a top management team needs reconfiguration (Barron et al.,
2011). From an agency theory perspective, the CEO with higher levels of narcissism
becomes the proxy for change within the firm because the principal cannot see within the
day-to-day operations of the firm. Indeed, there is evidence narcissism is also positively
correlated with implementing change, managing individual performance, better
presentation skills, and more effective work skills, all traits associated with leadership
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(Hogan & Fico, 2011). The visionary and charismatic nature of highly narcissistic leaders
makes them more adept at motivating an organization to change (Galvin et al., 2010;
Grijalva & Harms, 2014). Together with a competitive nature and a desire to look good
(Campbell, 1999; Raskin & Hall, 1979), a narcissistic leader with a mandate for change
will make changes to the organizational strategy and operations.
3.3.1.3 Innovation
One benefit of a CEO with higher levels of narcissism which can have positive
effects both short-term and long-term is innovation. In the case of innovation, the board
may hire a CEO with higher levels of narcissism because the board is willing to take a
risk in order to hire someone who might know how to innovate. Such a tactic is seen
when boards hire outsiders to create strategic reorientation (Lant et al., 1992). This may
also be the case with innovation. The board may not know how to innovate or convey
innovation throughout the organization, and CEOs with higher levels of narcissism can
be good at innovation. CEOs with higher levels of narcissism can have a bold vision,
which vision is linked to innovation through transformational leadership (Galvin et al.,
2010). Similarly, CEOs with higher levels of narcissism are overconfident, and
overconfidence has been linked to increased research and development spending; such
increased research and development spending can also result in innovation (Galasso &
Simcoe, 2011). Finally, Miller, Kets de Vries, and Toulouse (1982) linked locus of
control to innovation, and individuals with higher levels of narcissism have been linked
to high self-efficacy (Brookes, 2015).
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3.3.1.4 Risk-taking
When boards desire an agent to take risks, hiring a CEO with higher levels of
narcissism can meet those requirements. A key tension in the principal-agent relationship
is that of risk-taking. In order to achieve growth, some level of risk must be taken
(Sharpe, 1964; Wright et al., 2007). Following the agency theory assumption that the
agent is self-interested and motivated to keep their job, the agent traditionally wants to
minimize risk. In order to increase the likelihood that the agent will seek higher risk
opportunities, the principal can either increase the rewards associated with risk-taking
(e.g., stock options) or increase the amount of monitoring and corrective feedback
provided to the agent. However, monitoring can be problematic because of its costs and
difficulty (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, if a board desires
riskier strategies, it needs to either motivate an agent to take risks or identify an agent that
naturally wants to take risks.
Individuals with higher levels of narcissism are inclined toward greater risktaking and are more responsive than others when it comes to risk-taking incentives
(Krenn, 2013). The overconfidence of such an individual encourages them to take on
risky challenges and pursue the end result vigorously, particularly if the end result is
lucrative (Dworkis, 2013; Macenczak, Campbell, Henley, & Campbell, 2016). Indeed,
individuals with higher levels of narcissism take bold risks and are relentless in pursuit of
their goals (Maccoby, 2000; Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). In
certain circumstances, individuals with higher levels of narcissism may even be willing to
bend rules to get what they want (Behary, 2013). In this way, individuals with higher
levels of narcissism challenge the traditional view of agents as more risk-averse than their

75

principals. When a board needs a risky decision within a short time frame, a CEO
candidate with higher levels of narcissism may be a good fit.
Hiring a CEO with higher levels of narcissism also mitigates board liability in the
event that the CEO fails to achieve the desired results. In a risk-taking situation, the board
can be held accountable for poor firm performance. For example, when there is
disclosure fraud, investors can sue directors directly (Brochet & Srinivasan, 2014). If
financial performance is low, board members could be voted off the board or replaced by
activist investors. Therefore, it is in the board’s best interest to defer blame upon failure
and create a scapegoat (Boeker, 1992)—in essence, shifting accountability to the agent.
In this way, if the agent fails, the board can dismiss the agent. In the case of a CEO with
higher levels of narcissism, his or her narcissistic behaviors become visible reasons the
board can use to publicly justify shifting blame to the scapegoat. This allows the board to
take a short-term risk with the possibility of deflecting accountability in the face of
failure.
3.3.1.5 Sending positive signals to the market
A CEO with higher levels of narcissism could fulfill the board’s needs in
situations where charisma, extraversion, self-absorption, or self-importance are important
(Robins & Paulhus, 2001). This situation could apply when the firm needs to send
positive messages to the market through the CEO’s public image. Public image of the
CEO has been linked to firm performance in several ways (Cragun et al., 2016); thus, the
characteristics of CEO candidates make a difference in CEO selection. For example,
factors as seemingly inconsequential as hair color, as well as those more substantial items
such as the perceived ability to bring change (i.e., outsider status), have affected boards’
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selection decisions (Karaevli & Zajac, 2012; Takeda, Helms, & Romanova, 2006).
Individuals with higher levels of narcissism are good at marketing their ideas (Goncalo et
al., 2010) and appear more likeable quickly (Oltmanns et al., 2004). Such individuals also
like to look and feel good (Rose & Campbell, 2004). Thus, the individual with higher
levels of narcissism who is self-motivated to look good and is in the public eye is
motivated to bring about a positive public image and portray positive signals to the
market. In summary, higher levels of narcissism have been linked to change, innovation,
risk-taking, and portraying confidence to the market. Therefore, CEOs with higher levels
of narcissism could be attractive to boards which are currently experiencing poor firm
performance and are implementing a turnaround strategy.
Hypothesis 1: Firm performance is negatively related to the level of narcissism of
the selected CEO, such that lower levels of firm performance are related to higher
levels of narcissism in the selected CEO.
3.3.2 Environmental dynamism
While there have been several links between positive firm outcomes of narcissism
(Galvin et al., 2010; Olsen et al., 2014; Olsen & Stekelberg, 2016), there have also been
several links identified between narcissism and negative outcomes, such as interpersonal
relationships with low trust and high conflict and firm performance instability (Chatterjee
& Hambrick, 2007; Watson et al., 1984). The links between narcissism and poor
interpersonal relationships and performance volatility focus on long-term evaluations.
Narcissists can be very likeable in the short run (Oltmanns et al., 2004), and there is
evidence emerging of positive financial performance associated with narcissism (Olsen et
al., 2014). Thus, the environment and time frame within which a board desires to enjoy
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the benefits of a CEO with narcissistic tendencies matters, particularly in circumstances
when short and quick decisions are required.
3.3.2.1 Firm performance instability
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) found that a CEO’s level of narcissism predicts
the size of acquisitions and the volatility of return on assets and total shareholder returns.
While they found no direct evidence of a positive or negative relationship with firm
performance, volatility can be considered undesirable (Amit & Wernerfelt, 1990). One
potential reason for this volatility stems from the idea that individuals with higher levels
of narcissism are impulsive because they are both aggressive and lack the ability to delay
gratification (Vazire & Funder, 2006). Individuals with higher levels of narcissism have
inflated self-views and tend to think they are better at making decisions than others. Thus,
they rarely learn from their mistakes (Campbell et al., 2004, 2000). Although individuals
with higher levels of narcissism come across as enthusiastic and personable, they also
overstate their individual performance, and when pressed for details, they defend their
answers and assertions aggressively (Back et al., 2010; Brunell et al., 2008; Nevicka, de
Hoogh, et al., 2011).
3.3.2.2 Short-term perspective
A short-term perspective can be more advantageous to a firm than a long-term
strategic perspective if long-term relationships are not needed or short-term strategic
needs outweigh the ability to wait for potential long-term payoffs (Barney, Ketchen, &
Wright, 2011; Helfat & Martin, 2015; Peteraf & Barney, 2003). For example, Fudenberg,
Holmstrom, & Milgrom (1990) found that long-term relationships are only necessary
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when information is asymmetrical and there are no delayed financial incentives. Also,
leadership can be focused on the short-term if it is transitional (Farquhar, 1995).
Narcissism has been linked to a decreased ability to maintain relationships
(Grijalva & Harms, 2014). Individuals with higher levels of narcissism typically have low
intimacy striving, are generally blind to others’ perspectives, and lack empathy (Carroll,
1987; Watson et al., 1984), which results in a general lack of consideration for others
(Resick et al., 2009). Also, individuals with higher levels of narcissism rarely forgive
others (Eaton et al., 2006; Strelan, 2007) and can seek revenge (Brown, 2004). Further,
since individuals with higher levels of narcissism can be hypersensitive to criticism
(Barry et al., 2009; Reidy et al., 2008), they tend to intellectually inhibit their
subordinates (Glad, 2002; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). This pattern of difficulty
maintaining relationships interferes with positive interactions between the individual with
higher levels of narcissism as a leader and his or her subordinates (Graen & Uhl-Bien,
1995).
However, the tendency of individuals with higher levels of narcissism to have
poor relationships may matter less at the top of an organization (Galvin et al., 2010;
Waldman & Ramírez, 2001), resulting in a debate as to whether narcissism always results
in poor perceptions of the supervisor. For example, Judge et al. (2006) found a significant
positive relationship between narcissism and supervisor-related effectiveness. Perhaps at
varying levels of the organization, perceptions are different. At the top of an organization,
there may be less need for direct interaction between the CEO and the top management
team, or the CEO and the lower levels in the organization, when compared to the need for
direct interaction between leaders and their subordinates at lower levels in an
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organization. This debate aligns with the thinking of Kets de Vries et al. (1985) in what is
considered the seminal work on leadership and narcissism, in which they theorized that
leaders with higher levels of narcissism can be self-deceptive but can also be
constructive.
From a strategic perspective, a short-term perspective may be more advantageous
when the performance time frame is either short-term or part of a tournament situation
wherein winning the tournament will knock competitors out of the competition
(Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2013; Garrett & Gopalakrishna, 2010). In such
cases, the need for short-term performance could be fulfilled by an individual with higher
levels of narcissism. Such an individual’s drive for status and power, coupled with his or
her need to control without feeling guilty (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), creates a strong
motivation for short-term results without worrying about long-term consequences.
The traditional theoretical strategic perspective maintains that extended firm
performance is due to strategies that focus on long-term goals, rather than short-term
gains (Barney, 1991; Poujol & Tanner, 2010). However, there is a growing perspective
that short-term advantages can lead to long-term firm performance (Barney et al., 2011;
Peteraf & Barney, 2003), particularly if the firm is able to adapt rapidly to environmental
conditions (Helfat & Martin, 2015). Indeed, from this alternate perspective, strategy is
merely a series of short-term decisions (Mitchell, 1991; Narasimhan & Zhang, 2000;
Robinson, Fornell, & Sullivan, 1992). Therefore, when the environment rewards the first
mover/entrant, short-term strategic thinking can be advantageous. A dynamic
environment may have the conditions necessary to reward quicker short-term decisions.
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3.3.2.3 Environmental dynamism
Environmental dynamism (i.e., uncertainty and turbulence in the market) creates
ambiguity and increases risk (Dess & Beard, 1984). Simerly and Li (2000: 38) state, “as
environmental dynamism increases, it will result in actors’ increased inability to assess
accurately both the present and the future state of the environment.” Such ambiguity in
the state of the environment limits the ability of market actors to determine the potential
impact of decision-making on current and future business activities and limits viable
alternatives which managers can pursue (Milliken, 1987). Thus, high environmental
dynamism creates a situation wherein a firm needs a CEO that can effectively lead and
make decisions in adverse situations.
To remedy the difficulty of high environmental dynamism, boards can select
CEOs who have a vision, are innovative, make decisions quickly, and are risk-tolerant.
Vision can help an organization transcend turbulence by providing strategic direction and
helping the organization adapt to change (Fitzgerald, 1987; Tushman & O’Reilly III,
1996). Managers must be able to develop creative and innovative strategies to deal with
unforeseen challenges (D’Aveni, 1994; Thompson, 1967). Further, when contextual
change is fundamental and discontinuous, reorientations that make significant
organizational or strategic changes or that require entirely novel solutions to beat out
competitors’ operations and strategies often prove more beneficial for a firm’s
competitive advantage than local adaptations from within the current set of available
actions (Levinthal, 2000, 1997; Sørensen & Stuart, 2000). Also, firms can create
additional barriers to imitation by creating more competitive uncertainty through the use
of novel and creative strategies (Grimm & Smith, 1997; Hamel & Prahalad, 1996, 1998).
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Thus, innovation is not only a way to survive the uncertainty and turbulence, but it is also
a formidable tool for destabilizing the competition.
Market unpredictability results in few market signals that managers can reliably
interpret, and therefore requires that managers make quick decisions on future business
with limited information (Mason, 2007; Milliken, 1987). Agency theory supports the
notion that a board would select a CEO that is risk-tolerant in such a dynamic
environment. As boards pursue riskier strategies, they need agents who are willing to take
on more risk (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Taking on more risk is something a CEO with
higher levels of narcissism would be capable of doing, as highly narcissistic individuals
have higher self-efficacy and self-esteem (Rose & Campbell, 2004). These traits are
associated with locus of control and neuroticism (Judge, Locke, Durham, & Kluger,
1998), and CEOs with a high internal locus of control are more likely to take on riskier
strategies (Miller et al., 1982). Thus, a turbulent environment warrants the selection of a
CEO who can set direction and take decisive action (see Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993
for an exception), and a board of directors is more likely to select an individual with the
personality attributes associated with narcissism when the firm is in a dynamic
environment (see Figure 3.1).
Hypothesis 2: Environmental dynamism is positively related to the level of
narcissism of the selected CEO, such that in environments with higher levels of
dynamism, CEOs are selected with higher levels of narcissism.
3.3.3 Environmental munificence
Environmental munificence is “the scarcity or abundance of critical resources
needed by (one or more) firms operating within an environment” (Castrogiovanni, 1991,
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p. 542). Environments high in munificence have more resources to utilize; thus,
environments with high versus low munificence can be substantially different
(Rajagopalan, Rasheed, & Datta, 1993). In particular, environments low in munificence
place increased importance on effective resource management, as resources may not be
accessible when needed. Therefore, skills in selecting and/or developing resources are
increasingly important to firm success in a low munificent environment. However, in
environments with more resources to utilize (high munificence), there is reduced risk
with regard to poor decision-making. The increased level of resources allows for
resources to be diverted in order to overcome or mitigate a poor decision, and because
more resources are available for future investment, the consequences of a failed decision
are diminished. Since environments vary in their degree of munificence, and because
these conditions affect the potential value of a firm’s resources and capabilities, value
creation based on resource management is contingent (at least partially) on a firm’s
external environment (e.g., Castrogiovanni, 1991).
In addition, environmental munificence is positively related to new strategy
implementation (Brittain et al., 1981; Lieberson & Connor, 2017; Tushman & Anderson,
1986). When resources are abundant, it is easier for firms to survive, and therefore, firms
become able to extend effort to obtain goals other than mere survival (Castrogiovanni,
1991). For example, Brittain and Freeman (1981) found that with increased munificence,
organizational diversity also increased. They postulated this was possible because
survival was achievable under alternative goals, strategies, and/or organizational
structures. Therefore, munificence increases the diversity of organizations, as well as the
likelihood of achieving grandiose goals (Brittain et al., 1981). With higher munificence, a
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CEO with higher levels of narcissism has more resources to accomplish their grandiose
goals and innovative ideas; therefore, the CEO candidate with higher levels of narcissism
would be a more attractive candidate to the board. In order to lead a firm in such a
resource-rich environment, the board needs a leader who is innovative, willing to be
competitive (even at the risk of alienating other industry members), and willing to
challenge or bypass traditional norms. Such traits allow for rapid development of new
market opportunities.
On the other hand, there are various reasons a board might prefer a less
narcissistic CEO during times of high munificence. Less narcissistic leaders may be less
charismatic and less innovative, resulting in a more pragmatic and potentially systematic
approach to growth (Ren, Xie, & Krabbendam, 2009). In times of high munificence,
while non-traditional strategies and products will be more successful, boards also
understand the importance of strategic focus, and they may want the CEO to focus more
resources on a core strategy. In addition, even though medium risk efforts could be
successful, when the environment changes from high munificence to low munificence,
those gains could be lost (Erickson & Jacoby, 2003). It is also more likely for traditional
leaders in a high munificence environment to take more risks situationally (Klein, 1990).
However, in situations of abundance, if the market contracts, firms that have not
taken aggressive actions may lose crucial opportunities. In essence, endeavors that do not
achieve grandiose objectives will only achieve competitive parity, and in the face of
growth, firms are judged relative to their competitors. Therefore, those that perform
better are rewarded at a faster rate, while those that have grown fast, but not as fast as
their competitors, will fall behind the competition, despite the speed of their initial
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growth. Therefore, boards who make more aggressive moves will be rewarded with more
long-term financial and performance gains (Klein, 1990).
Hypothesis 3: Environmental munificence is positively related to the level of
narcissism of the selected CEO, such that environments with high levels of
munificence are related to the selection of CEOs with higher levels of narcissism.
3.3.4 Interactions of environmental dynamism and munificence with firm performance
In Hypothesis 1, I predict that firm performance is negatively related to the
selection of CEOs with higher levels of narcissism. In Hypothesis 2, I predict that market
dynamism increases the likelihood of a more narcissistic CEO selection. Additionally,
good firm performance is associated with less change (Boeker, 1997b), less CEO
turnover (Osborn et al., 1981), and insider succession (Brady & Helmich, 1984; Friedman
& Saul, 1991). Insider succession is also associated with less change (Barron et al., 2011;
Lant et al., 1992). This suggests that firms that are performing well believe they possess
the leadership recipe for success, meaning their current CEO or an internally developed
CEO will have the best characteristics for the job. Therefore, even in a dynamic time,
companies that are performing well would still be more likely to believe they have the
strategy, leadership, resources, and capability to execute the strategy to succeed (i.e., the
recipe for continued success).
Another perspective to consider is the time order of events. When considering the
time order of events of CEO selection, it must be recognized that a firm has ongoing
operations and performance outcomes, even when a CEO exit occurs. A CEO exit can be
voluntary or involuntary. An involuntary exit is usually associated with CEO dismissal
for poor performance (Cragun et al., 2016). At the point the CEO decides he or she will
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leave voluntarily or the board decides to forcefully remove the CEO, a CEO selection
process begins. With the exception of the use of interim CEOs, the successor CEO takes
office within days of the former CEO’s exit. Although the formal announcement of the
departure of the exiting CEO and the entrance of the new CEO may happen within a short
time frame, much planning and decision-making is conducted by the board. Such
planning can happen many months before exit and selection. Therefore, from a time order
of events perspective, the performance situation is considered before the CEO successor
selection and many times before the sitting CEO exits. One exception to this situation
may be when the previous CEO initiated too much change. In this situation, the board
may not provide the CEO with a mandate for change (Bowman, 1980; Fiegenbaum &
Thomas, 1988).
Consider two differing CEO succession scenarios from a time order of events
perspective: one with poor firm performance and one without. Poor firm performance is
associated with CEO dismissal and outsider CEO selection, indicating a desire for a
strategic shift (Boeker, 1992; Dalton & Kesner, 1985). Therefore, a board that desires
strategic shift would be more likely to consider someone with different or extreme
personality traits because they are looking for someone who thinks differently and will
challenge the status quo. When one applies the environmental situation (e.g.,
environmental dynamism) to the decision-making criteria, the board may further examine
which traits are best suited to address the environmental conditions. In the case of
environmental dynamism, higher levels of dynamism suggest the hiring of a CEO with
higher levels of narcissism. Thus, the combination of poor firm performance and
dynamism increases the likelihood of selecting a CEO with higher levels of narcissism.
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On the other hand, if a firm is performing well, succession is more closely linked
with retirement or unexpected succession, such as the CEO being recruited to a different
firm, death or illness. In the good firm performance scenario, the board would not
consider a CEO with a differing or extreme set of behaviors because they are already
satisfied with their current firm performance. The next step would be to consider the
environment. However, when firm performance is strong, the likelihood of selecting a
CEO who will create change decreases, thus decreasing the likelihood of selecting an
individual with higher levels of narcissism. Therefore, because firm performance
precedes consideration of environmental circumstances, good firm performance would
attenuate the weight of any environmental factors considerations.
Hypothesis 4: Environmental dynamism attenuates the negative relationship
between firm performance and the level of narcissism of the selected CEO, such
that when environmental dynamism is low and firm performance is low, there is a
weaker negative relationship between firm performance and the selection of a
CEO with higher levels of narcissism.
In Hypothesis 1, I predict firm performance is negatively related to the level of
narcissism of the selected CEO. In Hypothesis 3, I predict that market munificence
increases the likelihood of selecting a CEO with higher levels of narcissism. As discussed
in Hypothesis 4, following a temporal perspective, when a firm is performing well, there
is a reduced need for change. They already feel they have a recipe for success, thus
decreasing the need for change.
Hypothesis 5: Environmental munificence attenuates the negative relationship
between firm performance and the level of narcissism of the selected CEO, such
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that when environmental munificence is low and firm performance is low, there is
a weaker negative relationship between firm performance and the selection of a
CEO with higher levels of narcissism.
3.3.5 Level of narcissism of the newly selected CEO model
These five hypotheses build the following model for predicting the level of
narcissism of newly-selected CEOs: firm performance is negatively associated with the
level of narcissism of newly-selected CEOs; environmental dynamism and munificence
are positively associated with the level of narcissism of newly-selected CEOs; and, in the
presence of either environmental dynamism or munificence, the negative relationship
between firm performance and the level of narcissism of a newly-selected CEO is
attenuated (see Figure 3.2).
3.4 Methods
3.4.1 Sample
The data used in this study were obtained from multiple sources. Publicly
available data was gathered from Compustat, GMI, Execucomp, EDGAR, and Factiva.
This includes proxy statements, annual reports, press releases, and Wall Street Journal
articles. This study also uses data gathered through the 2016 Annual Survey of Chief
Human Resource Officers conducted by the University of South Carolina’s Center for
Executive Succession. The survey was administered in the 2nd quarter of 2016. Invitations
to participate in the survey were emailed to individuals who held the most senior HR role
in their firms (e.g., Chief Human Resource Officers) in 773 companies. All of the 2016
Fortune 500 companies were included, as well as members of the Human Resource
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Professional Association. A total of 148 usable responses were received (a 19% response
rate).
To be included in the analysis, each firm had to be publicly traded and
headquartered in the United States. In addition, each firm was required to provide at least
5 years of data prior to the CEO ascension. I used five years in order to capture a longer
term perspective on the company’s performance and the potential industry effect on CEO
dismissal (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015), since CEO succession is less sensitive to short-term
performance (one or two years) than to long-term performance (Boeker, 1992;
Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Gao et al., 2017). In addition, the CEO had to
have at least two years of tenure and could not be the first CEO of the firm. Two years of
tenure were required to make sure that the annual reports used in the measure of
narcissism included only results within the tenure of the CEO being studied. Private
companies do not disclose sufficient data to calculate firm performance. CEOs of
corporations registered in the US which are subsidiaries of non-US companies do not fit
the definition of the CEO we are studying. It is also insufficient to merely have the title of
CEO; the CEO must also be the highest-ranking employee in the organization. CEOs who
report to a higher-level authority other than the board of directors do not fit this
definition. Therefore, the final sample consisted of 73 usable observations.
3.4.2 Measures
3.4.2.1 CEO narcissism
The CEOs’ level of narcissism was measured in 2 ways: subjectively (observednarcissism), through a modified version of the narcissistic personality inventory (NPI)
scale (Raskin & Hall, 1979; Raskin & Terry, 1988), and unobtrusively (unobtrusive-
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narcissism), through a measure created by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), which
includes a set of four unobtrusive measures. The intent of the study was to create a
composite measure of narcissism using both methods. However, due to reliability issues,
it was not possible to combine the measures, and I rely solely on observed narcissism. I
now explain each measure and how I came to this decision.
3.4.2.2 Observed-narcissism
The NPI is the most-widely used measure of narcissism (Ames, Rose, &
Anderson, 2006). Raskin and Hall (1979) developed the NPI to measure individual
differences in narcissism in non-clinical populations. They began with 220 items and
ultimately reduced the survey to 80 items (The NPI-80). Raskin and Hall (1981)
performed a construct validity study of the 80 items and further reduced them to 54 items,
later reducing the number even further to 40 (i.e., the NPI-40). In addition to the NPI-40,
a 21 item (NPI-21), a 16 item (NPI-16), and a 13 item (NPI-13) survey have been
developed and validated (Gentile et al., 2013; Svindseth, Nøttestad, Wallin, Roaldset, &
Dahl, 2008). The NPI has been validated for forced choice pair and Likert style responses
and has been validated for both self-report and third-party reporting (Boldero, Bell, &
Davies, 2015). I use a seven-point Likert scale, following Resick et al. (2009). In this
study, I use the NPI-13 (Gentile et al., 2013) and drop three of the questions. The three
items that I dropped were “I like to look at my body,” “I like to display my body,” and “I
like to look at myself in the mirror.” The reason these three items were dropped is that
these questions stood out as disrespectful and inappropriate to ask seasoned executives,
and I was unable to generate alternative wording which was more appropriate.
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One of the challenges in studying narcissism at the executive level is the
reluctance of executives to be honest when completing self-report questionnaires. One
way to improve results is to use direct third-party observation. Third-party ratings have
been shown to provide higher operational validities of personality traits when compared
to self-reports (Oh, Wang, & Mount, 2011) and have less inflation of responses than selfreports (Van Iddekinge, Raymark, & Roth, 2005) because third-party observers can have
unfiltered perspectives on the target’s personality traits (Connelly & Hülsheger, 2012).
Hence, because the most senior HR individual answered the questions about the CEO in
the survey, the items were reworded to be observer-based, rather than self-report (see
Appendix B for the full list of questions). To create observed-narcissism, I created an
average of the 10 sub-items.
3.4.2.3 Unobtrusive-narcissism
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) spurred a new wave of narcissism research in the
strategic management literature by introducing a new unobtrusive measure of narcissism.
I call this measure unobtrusive-narcissism. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) created the
measure to overcome the difficulty associated with convincing executives to fill out selfreport measures (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006). Their original measure had five items.
The first item was the prominence of the CEO’s photograph in the firm’s annual
report. It was scored based on the amount of space dedicated to the photograph as
compared to the page size, along with whether or not the CEO was pictured alone. The
amount of space represents the CEO’s desire to be the center of attention, admire him or
herself, and represents his or her sense of grandiosity. The picture was scored four if the
CEO’s picture was larger than half of the page vertically or horizontally and was pictured
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alone. The picture was scored three if the CEO’s picture was smaller than half of the page
vertically or horizontally and was pictured alone. The picture was scored two if the CEO
was pictured with others, regardless of size. The picture was scored one if there was no
picture in the annual report. The picture was scored zero if there was no annual report.
For example, this would occur when the company solely had a 10-k.
The second item was the CEO’s prominence in the firm’s press releases. The third
item was the CEO’s use of first-person singular pronouns in interviews with the Wall
Street Journal. The fourth item was the CEO’s cash compensation divided by that of the
second-highest paid executive in the firm. The fifth item was the CEO’s non-cash
compensation divided by that of the second-highest-paid executive in the firm.
In 2011, Chatterjee and Hambrick modified their measure and dropped the
measure of personal pronoun use during interviews, due to lack of reliability in their
sample. Additionally, the text analysis of personal pronoun use by the CEO during
interviews as a measure of narcissism has been challenged as unreliable (Carey et al.,
2015). Therefore, I do not use the measure of personal pronoun use. To create the
unobtrusive measure of narcissism, I used the average z-score of each sub-item.
3.4.2.4 Reliability of the subjective and unobtrusive measures of narcissism
The Cronbach’s Alpha of the 10 items from the subjective measure of narcissism
was 0.81, which is above the recommended 0.70 for demonstrating adequate reliability
(Cronbach, 1951). The reliability of the four measures of unobtrusive narcissism was .28,
below the level of recommended reliability (Cronbach, 1951). This was not unexpected
after reviewing the pairwise Pearson correlations (Table 3.1), which range from .04 to
.13, with the exception of the correlation between base and bonus pay differential, which
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was .46. Additionally, the correlations of the four unobtrusive measures of narcissism
were not in line with the results of Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007; 2011). Therefore, due
to reliability issues, I solely use the subjective measure of narcissism.
3.4.2.5 Firm performance
Firm performance is operationalized as the average Tobin’s Q value of the five
years prior to the CEO succession (Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009). Tobin’s Q represents the
ratio of the market value of the firm’s assets to the replacement costs of its assets. I
selected Tobin’s Q because it is widely used in the strategy literature and is a marketbased performance measure that emphasizes financial performance of firms which have
differing levels of resources available to them (Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988). From
WRDS I used the following data to calculate Tobin’s Q [(csho* prcc_f)+(pstkl)+(lctact+dltt)]/at— which is, [(Common Shares Outstanding * ‘Price Close - Annual - Fiscal’)
+ (Preferred Stock Liquidating Value) + (‘Current Liabilities - Total’ - ‘Current Assets Total’ + Debt Long Term Total)] / Assets Total. To allow a robustness check, I also
measured the five-year average of the firm’s return on assets adjusted by the industry
median value, following the procedures laid out by Wiersema and Zhang (2011).
3.4.2.6 Environmental dynamism
Environmental dynamism is operationalized by regressing the average revenue for
each two digit SIC industry code over the five years prior to succession and then dividing
the standard error by the average revenue for each two digit SIC code, following Keats
and Hitt (1988). Clarke (1989) provides support for the use of two-digit industry analysis.
His findings suggest that three-digit or four-digit SIC groupings do not capture firm
similarity any better than the two-digit identification with respect to sales changes, profit
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margins, or stock returns. This method of calculating dynamism assures that the indicator
does not primarily reflect steady growth or predictable cyclicality and instead focuses on
volatility and discontinuities (Aldrich, 1979; Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988).
3.4.2.7 Environmental munificence
Environmental munificence is operationalized by regressing the average revenue
for each two-digit SIC industry code over the five years prior to succession and then
dividing the beta coefficient by the average revenue for each two-digit SIC code,
following Keats and Hitt (1988). This method of calculating munificence assures that it
reflects growth and accounts for the environmental resources which support it (Aldrich,
1979; Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988).
3.4.2.8 Control variables
I gathered from publicly available data sources and include control variables that
previous literature identifies as related to or influencing CEO selection outcomes, CEO
succession outcomes, or measures of narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Intintoli,
Zhang, & Davidson, 2014; Petrenko et al., 2015).
First, board tenure is operationalized as the average years of experience of the
board at the time of the successor CEO’s ascension. Boards with differing levels of
experience can be more skilled at selecting a CEO (Shen & Cannella, 2002). Therefore,
boards with longer tenures may be more adept at identifying and selecting a CEO with
higher levels of narcissism. Also, a board with more experience may be better at
identifying the strategic needs of the firm (Kosnik, 1987) and likely ideal characteristics
for a CEO successor.

94

Second, total directorships held by board is operationalized as the number of
different board director positions held by the board in the last five years. Total
directorships represent both the experience level of the board and power of the board as
compared to the CEO (Ferris & Jagannathan, 2001). A board with more members has
greater access to a wide variety of board member experiences. Additionally, the more
board directorships the board has, the more ties the board members have with other
companies, and when those other companies influence the focal company, the board has
more power (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). Weak boards have less ability to select the
CEO they desire (Boeker, 1992; Zajac & Westphal, 1996), thus affecting the ability of
the board to select a CEO with more or fewer narcissistic behaviors.
Third, CEO age at ascension is operationalized as the age of the CEO at the time
of the CEO’s ascension into office. Younger boards are attracted to younger CEOs, and
age is associated with innovation (Davidson et al., 2006). Therefore, a board could be
biased in selecting a younger CEO, due to the CEO’s assumed innovation capabilities or
merely because the makeup of the board is of a younger age itself. Since innovation is
associated with narcissism (Galvin et al., 2010), age may affect the board’s decision.
Fourth, CEO origin is operationalized as a dummy code of zero if the CEO came
from inside the firm and as one if the CEO came from outside the firm. CEO origin is
associated with the manner in which the CEO thinks (Lant et al., 1992). Outsider CEOs
are associated with a new way of thinking (Karaevli, 2007). Therefore, boards that are
looking for innovation may be biased in selecting outsider CEOs. Since innovation is
associated with narcissism (Galvin et al., 2010), CEO origin may affect the board’s
decision.
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Fifth, whether the CEO was the heir apparent (CEO was heir) is operationalized
as a dummy code of one if the CEO’s titles were president or COO prior to ascending to
CEO and if the CEO were at least five years younger than their predecessor. Otherwise, it
was coded as a zero (Cannella & Shen, 2001). Heir apparent status is associated with
CEO power and the ability to affect change in the organization post-ascension (Bigley &
Wiersema, 2002). CEOs who were the heir apparent have more power and are more able
to affect change post-ascension than those CEOs who were not the heir apparent.
Therefore, boards may be biased in selecting heir apparent CEOs when attempting to
affect change and innovation.
Sixth, board size is operationalized as the total number of sitting board members
at the time of CEO ascension. Larger boards can hamper innovation (Raheja, 2005).
Therefore, a larger board may be less supportive of the strategic need to hire a CEO that
improves innovation, and subsequently may negatively influence the selection of a CEO
with higher levels of narcissism.
Seventh, company size is operationalized as the total number of employees at the
time of CEO ascension. Companies which are of larger size have been shown to have
greater inertia and resistance to change (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996). Therefore, boards
of larger companies may be less inclined than boards of smaller companies to select a
CEO with higher levels of narcissism, due to a desire to maintain the status quo. In
addition, company size is associated with greater CEO pay, and narcissism is associated
with higher pay (O’Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell, & Chatman, 2014). In essence, narcissists
may be attracted to larger companies in order to increase their pay.
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3.4.3 Analysis
In this study, I use ordinary least squares multiple regression to examine the
relationship between variables and to find a model of best fit. Researchers modeling CEO
succession/selection have used ordinary least squares regression (e.g., Zajac & Westphal,
1996). In post-hoc analysis, I use logistic regression (in addition to ordinary least squares
regression) to predict the selection of a CEO with higher levels of narcissism (Iacobucci,
Posavac, Kardes, Schneider, & Popovich, 2015).
3.5 Results
Table 3.2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations. Many of the
correlations for main effects are small and statistically insignificant. The correlation
between narcissism and environmental dynamism is .04 and not statistically significant.
The correlation between narcissism and environmental munificence is -0.08 and is not
statistically significant. The correlation between Tobin’s Q and narcissism is 0.09 and is
not statistically significant. Also, the correlation between industry adjusted return on
assets is 0.00. These correlations suggest an inconclusive linear relationship between any
one variable and narcissism.
Table 3.3 reports the results of the multivariate tests. Model 1 contains only the
control variables. None of the control variables except for predecessor tenure were
statistically significant, which suggests there is little variance explained of narcissism by
the control variables. In Hypothesis 1, I predict firm performance is negatively related to
the level of narcissism of the selected CEO. In regards to my prediction in Hypothesis 1, I
find no statistical evidence to support the prediction (see Model 2). In Hypothesis 2, I
predict environmental dynamism is positively related to the level of narcissism of the
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selected CEO. In regards to my prediction in Hypothesis 2, I find no statistical evidence
to support the prediction (see Model 3). In Hypothesis 3, I predict environmental
munificence is positively related to the level of narcissism of the selected CEO. In
regards to my prediction in Hypothesis 3, I find no statistical evidence to support the
prediction (see Model 4). In Hypothesis 4, I predict environmental dynamism attenuates
the negative relationship between firm performance and the level of narcissism of the
selected CEO. In regards to my prediction in Hypothesis 4, I find no statistical evidence
to support the prediction (see Model 5). In Hypothesis 5, I predict environmental
munificence attenuates the negative relationship between firm performance and the level
of narcissism of the selected CEO. In regards to my prediction in Hypothesis 5, I find no
statistical evidence to support the prediction (see Model 6).
3.6 Post-hoc Analysis
Post-hoc analysis was conducted using logistic regression but did not yield any
meaningful results. Narcissism was measured on a continuum. However, narcissism is
more noticeable when the behavior is more pronounced (Raskin & Hall, 1981, 1979), and
therefore, I am most interested in the extremes of narcissism. When the extremes of a
variable are being investigated, it can be appropriate to examine the variable from a
dichotomous perspective (Iacobucci et al., 2015). I dichotomize narcissism by splitting
the variable at 4 to capture two groups: a group that was 4 and above and a second group
that was 4 and below. The first group (n = 61; scores of 1-3.9) represents extremely low
narcissism up through low levels of narcissism, creating a low narcissism group. The
second group (n = 12; scores of 4-7) represents neither high nor low narcissism through
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extremely high narcissism, creating the high narcissism group. After dichotomizing
narcissism, I then use a logit regression to attempt to predict high or low narcissism.
The results (see Table 3.4) indicate a statistically significant relationship between
two variables and narcissism. The first variable is firm performance as measured by
Tobin’s Q. The relationship is positive and significant. This is contrary to Hypothesis 1,
which predicts a negative relationship between firm performance and the level of the
CEO’s narcissism. As a measure of robustness, I also included industry adjusted return
on assets. The correlation between industry adjusted return on assets and Tobin’s Q is .60
(see Table 3.2). This correlation of .60 indicates that we should see a similar result
between both Tobin’s Q and the level of the CEO’s narcissism and industry adjusted
return on assets and the level of the CEO’s narcissism. However, the relationship
between industry adjusted return on assets is statistically significant and negative.
Although the results of the relationship between industry adjusted return on assets
the level of the CEO’s narcissism is in line with the prediction of Hypothesis 1—a
negative relationship between performance and the level of the CEO’s narcissism—it is
in the opposite direction of the results of the Tobin’s Q relationship. Therefore, in the
logit regression, the two measures of firm performance indicate different directions
between the relationship with the CEO’s level of narcissism. Since I have no theoretical
reason for why the two measures of performance would have a differing relationship with
the CEO’s level of narcissism, I cannot interpret the contradictory findings. One possible
explanation is simple spuriousness. Between the ex-ante and post-hoc analysis, I built and
analyzed over 60 models. Therefore, with a p value of .95, we would expect to see around
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one in every twenty predictions statistically significant, or approximately 3 of the models
(Liu, 2013). Therefore, the significance may simply be spurious.
A median and mean split was considered, but splitting at mean (3.08) or median
(3) on a 7-point scale means that the dichotomized grouping of high narcissism would
actually include scores rated as low narcissism. Therefore, a mean or median split is not
justified. Another method of splitting the data involves looking at the tails of the
distribution (Preacher, MacCallum, Rucker, & Nicewander, 2005); therefore, I split the
data and only looked at responses in the top and bottom quartile of the data. Such
examination also yielded non-significant statistical results.
Although I found insufficient reliability to justify the use of the unobtrusive
measure of narcissism, in post-hoc analysis, I also ran the same series of ordinary least
squares regression and still used the unobtrusive measure of narcissism because of its
common use in the strategy literature. This method also failed to return statistically
significant results for any of my hypotheses (see Table 3.5).
3.7 Discussion
I find no evidence that boards select CEOs with higher levels of narcissism during
times of low performance, high environmental dynamism, high environmental
munificence, the interaction of performance and environmental dynamism, or the
interaction of performance and environmental munificence. This study raises as many
questions and implications as it resolves on the issue of the selection of CEOs with higher
levels of narcissism. I now address this study’s implications for theory, methods, practice,
limitations, and future research.
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3.7.1 Implications for theory
Although not supported with empirical evidence, from the lens of agency theory,
this study advances the notion that there are situations when a board may select a CEO
candidate with higher levels of narcissism to reduce agency costs. The traditional
assumption in this theory is to assume that the agent is more risk-averse than the
principal. However, in the case of narcissism, since narcissists are more risk-tolerant than
the general population (Campbell et al., 2004), it is possible that a narcissist may not only
be more risk-tolerant than the principal, but he or she may also have predictable behavior.
By linking the environmental conditions of dynamism and munificence to the selection of
a more risk-tolerant CEO, this study attempts to challenge the assumption that boards
choose CEOs who are more risk-averse than the board. It’s possible, as in the case of
narcissism, that certain behavioral traits of CEOs affect the assumed risk appetites of the
principal and agent in the principal-agent relationship.
Many scholars have suggested there are optimal conditions for an individual with
higher levels of narcissism (Glad & Whitmore, 1991; Robins & Paulhus, 2001). King
(2007), in a business context, suggests that in times of crisis, such as lawsuits, layoffs,
bankruptcy, or violence, a leader with higher levels of narcissism can be very effective
because of their authoritarian style, charisma, and willingness to make decisions. Post
and George (2004) suggest that within political context crises such as war, a national
unity crisis, and/or economic depression, individuals with higher levels of narcissism can
play a key hope-building role. However, no conditions have been tested or evidence
generated that suggest certain conditions (e.g., times of crisis) are optimal for a leader
with higher levels of narcissism. Aligning with previous suggestions, this study examines
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firm performance and the environmental conditions that might lead to optimal conditions.
Yet this study finds no evidence, and therefore leaves its questions unanswered, due to a
lack of evidence to support its theoretical assertions.
3.7.2 Implications for methods
With an unobtrusive measure of the CEO’s level of narcissism, Chatterjee and
Hambrick (2007) initiated a growing wave of research on the level of a CEO’s
narcissism. Subsequent researchers have used the unobtrusive measure to link narcissism
to increased audit fees, risk (Judd et al., 2015), and fraud (Rijsenbilt & Commandeur,
2013) among others. Despite growing use, this study suggests the unobtrusive measure of
narcissism is not robust across varying samples and contexts. This study used both the
unobtrusive measure as well as the NPI. The NPI has been a standard measure of
narcissism for decades. After comparing this study’s results of the NPI to the unobtrusive
measure of narcissism, there was not a significant correlation (r of .11). If the unobtrusive
measure measured narcissism accurately, we would expect to have a significant and
meaningful correlation between the unobtrusive measure and the NPI.
The original validation of the unobtrusive measure involved a theoretical
argument, a statistical argument using confirmatory factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha,
and the results generated when five securities analysts rated 40 of the CEOs on
narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). However, this original measure was validated
within a narrow industry context which looked only at computer software and hardware
companies. Further, many scholars cite but do not follow the complete unobtrusive
measure procedure. For instance, the use of personal pronouns as well as the count of
CEO mentions in press releases is not often used by scholars when using the unobtrusive
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measure (e.g.; Olsen et al., 2014). Therefore, only three of the original five measures
(picture size, cash compensation, and non-cash compensation) are used in most studies
citing the unobtrusive measure. Perhaps what is being measured is something close to but
not quite narcissism, and therefore does not address the broad range of behaviors inherent
in narcissism. For example, assuming that firm size is generally correlated with CEO
wage differentials (Agarwal, 1981), the implication would be that the unobtrusive
measure of narcissism might actually be measuring firm size, rather than narcissism.
3.7.3 Implications for practice
Defining narcissism as good or bad may limit our perceptions of it as a
personality trait. Instead, it may be more informative to consider under which conditions
an individual with higher levels of narcissism is valuable (Campbell & Foster, 2007).
This study challenges the commonly-accepted notion that many executives are
narcissistic (Adrian Furnham, 2017; Maccoby, 2000), and that the most successful CEOs
exhibit narcissistic traits (e.g., Steve Jobs). While plausible that all executives have some
level of narcissism, our sample indicates that only 5% could be considered highly
narcissistic, with an additional 11% that could be considered as having mid-to-high levels
of narcissism. This leaves 84% of the sample scoring below or at the midpoint of the NPI
scale. This also challenges the notion that a public persona is the same as private
behavior. In the case of narcissism, many judgments for and against those who may be
narcissistic may be false. Nevertheless, despite the small percentage of those with high
levels of narcissism, 5% is not trivial and warrants further study.
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3.7.4 Limitations
This study only examined narcissism. As a result, no comparisons can be made to
other attributes, such as Machiavellianism or subclinical psychopathy, which, along with
narcissism, are often called the dark triad (Furnham et al., 2013). Also, no other positive
characteristics were measured, such as extraversion or self-confidence. This makes it
hard to distinguish which alternative traits provide the basis of selection by the board.
Future studies could look at an array of characteristics to identify or rule out other
contributing factors.
One major assumption of the study is that narcissism is a personality trait that
does not change over time. Therefore, although the data on narcissism was gathered in
2016, it was applied to the CEO selection event of each participating CEO, some of
whose selections occurred 10 to 20 years earlier. Therefore, it is possible that the
circumstances and behaviors of recent CEO selections do not apply to those from over a
decade ago. However, in our analysis, I did run a model that controlled for date of
ascension and found it did not affect the results.
This study highlights the problems in accurately measuring narcissism. The
design of this study was to use two measurements of narcissism: an observed measure of
narcissism following the NPI-13 (Gentile et al., 2013) and an unobtrusive measure of
narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011). The advantage of this approach would
be a triangulation on the real construct of narcissism. However, despite its wide
acceptance, the Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007; 2011) measure showed many
weaknesses. First, there was no internal reliability. Second, there was no significant or
meaningful correlation with the unobtrusive measure of narcissism. Third, the
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correlations of the unobtrusive measure of narcissism were not in line with previously
published correlations between the unobtrusive measure. There is not enough evidence to
contradict the usage of the measure in other studies, but it does provide enough evidence
to support an investigation and more robust investigation into the nature of the measure
of these two common measures of narcissism. If they are both measuring the same
construct of narcissism, there should be some level of agreement between the two
measures.
Range restriction may have been an issue in this study. Range restriction refers to
when the responses fall within a narrow band, thus reducing the correlation with other
variables. With a mean of 3.085, median of 3.000, and a standard deviation of .99 on a
seven-point scale, 84% of the responses fell in the low part of the range. There are two
possibilities for why this data was range restricted. Perhaps the Chief Human Resource
Officers who filled out the NPI survey were reluctant to fully identify the level of
narcissism of the CEO, resulting in halo bias. A second possibility is that the Chief
Human Resource Officers who filled out the survey may have been considering the CEO
as compared to other CEOs, rather than all people. From that perspective, using the scale
would not result in a fair comparison. It is possible that executives overall have a higher
level of narcissism. However, when comparing the levels of narcissism between CEOs,
the CHROs may have compared them with only the most narcissistic CEOs.
The sample size of this study may be an issue (Maxwell, 2004). A study that is
underpowered has difficulty detecting small effect sizes because underpowered studies
become more susceptible to sampling error (Schmidt, 1996) or misinterpretation of nonsignificant tests (Schmidt, 1992; 1996). According to post-hoc power and sample size

105

calculations, with a sample size of 87 and detecting correlations of .15, the power of the
study is 29%. Getting the power to a level of 80% at the .15 level would require a sample
size of 350. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) found significant effects as low as .11 on a
sample size of 105 firms. However, other literature has significant effect sizes between .8
and .15 (e.g., Olsen et al., 2014). Thus, if the sample were in line with Chatterjee and
Hambrick, it could have identified significant effects.
It is also possible that executives, including CEOs, are learning to manage their
narcissistic tendencies and therefore are not identifiable through observational
measurements. In a study of 138 leaders in a Fortune 100 company, Owens et al. (2015)
found that narcissism and humility, although related, are not opposite sides of a linear
spectrum. They described an interaction effect—when narcissistic leaders were also
perceived as humble, they were rated as being more effective. The implications of these
findings are that leaders who are narcissistic can mitigate the negative effects of
narcissism by behaving in a humble manner. In the context of CEOs of major
corporations, it is possible that many of them have had years of mentoring and seasoning
to learn which behavior is most advantageous for leadership positions, including
behaving in a humbler manner so as to avoid negative unintended consequences of
narcissism.
3.8 Conclusion
I found no empirical evidence to suggest that in times of poor performance, high
environmental dynamism, or high environmental munificence, boards are more likely to
hire a CEO with higher levels of narcissism. Additionally, I found no evidence to suggest
that when performance is high, it moderates the positive effects of environmental
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dynamism and munificence on the selection of a CEO with higher levels of narcissism.
The underlying logic supporting the case to test these hypotheses asserts that because
CEOs with higher levels of narcissism can have a bold vision, take risks, drive change,
and be innovative, they would be attractive to boards dealing with poor performance,
environmental dynamism, or environmental munificence. However, if the firm is
performing well, CEOs with higher levels of narcissism would be less appealing to the
board, despite the environmental circumstances. However, using third-party behavioral
observations from the NPI, I find no evidence (either in the original or post-hoc analysis)
suggesting that firm performance, environmental dynamism, environmental munificence,
or their interactions are associated with a board’s selection of a CEO with higher levels of
narcissism.
Therefore, the question of whether there are optimal conditions for a CEO with
higher levels of narcissism remains unanswered. To gain insight into the answer to this
question will require either a new, more accurate unobtrusive measure of narcissism or a
more robust sample. Until more conclusive evidence is found, boards will need to be
vigilant in understanding their strategic needs and what CEO personality traits will best
fill those strategic needs. In particular, narcissism, like many other personality traits, is
inherently camouflaged, thus requiring additional vigilance to identify and evaluate.
However, as a result of this study, we are perhaps slightly more aware of the positive or
negative effects of selection of a CEO with higher levels of narcissism or what causes
boards to select CEOs with higher levels of narcissism.
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TABLE 3.1
Narcissism Item Correlations
n

Mean

SD

1

2

3

1

CEO picture code (size)

115

2.51

1.08

2

CEO to next executive cash ratio

114

1.96

.57

.13

3

CEO to next executive noncash ratio

114

2.50

.93

.07

.46*

4

CEO name to words ratio

106

0.69

.60

.04

.11

.11

5

Observed-narcissism

97

3.15

1.00

-.02

.14

.12

*p<.05
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4

.01

TABLE 3.2
Correlation and Descriptive Statistics
Mean
1

Observed-narcissism

2

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

109

3.09

.99

Environmental dynamism

.12

.14

.04

3

Environmental munificence

.04

.04

-.08

.22

4

Firm performance

1.72

.76

.09

-.07

.17

5

Industry adjusted return on assets

.04

.06

-.04

-.33*

-.21

6

Board tenure

27.38

22.82

.18

.01

-.11

-.08

-.05

7

Total directorships held by board

29.63

13.92

-.09

.00

.02

.05

.06

8

CEO age at ascension

50.96

5.08

.15

.07

-.11

-.27*

.02

.22*

.09

9

CEO origin

.21

.41

.26*

-.01

.04

.08

-.02

.13

.02

.15

10

CEO was heir

.42

.50

-.19

.11

.02

.15

.01

-.16

-.09

-.35*

-.44*

11

Board size

10.55

2.27

-.07

-.06

-.19

-.03

.20

.10

.63*

.07

-.05

.05

12

Firm size

54.96

71.56

-.11

-.01

.11

.09

-.03

.02

.47*

.08

.00

.00

n = 73; *p<.05

11

.60*

-.15

.38*

TABLE 3.31
Regression Main and Moderated Effects on Narcissistic CEO Selection
Variables
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Industry adjusted return on assets
Board tenure
Total directorships held by board
CEO age at ascension
CEO origin
CEO was heir
Board size
Firm size
Firm performance
Environmental dynamism
Environmental munificence
Environmental dynamism x Firm
performance
Environmental munificence x
Firm performance
Constant
R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
F Statistic
Degrees of freedom

CEO
Narcissism,
Model 1
-.06
(.15)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.05
(.03)
-.01
(.03)
.00
(.01)
-.00
(.00)

1.22*
.12
.00
.09
1.04
64

(.13)

CEO
Narcissism,
Model 2
-.30
(.19)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.03
(.03)
-.02
(.03)
.00
(.01)
-.00
(.00)
.14
(.07)

1.29*
.16
.04
.09
1.36
63

(.14)

CEO
Narcissism,
Model 3
-.31
(.21)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.03
(.03)
-.02
(.03)
.00
(.01)
-.00
(.00)
.14
(.08)
-.01
(.03)

1.29*
.16
.03
.09
1.21
62

(.15)

CEO
Narcissism,
Model 4
-.39
(.22)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.03
(.03)
-.02
(.03)
.00
(.01)
-.00
(.00)
.17*
(.08)
.00
(.03)
-.32
(.26)

1.40*
.18
.04
.09
1.24
61

(.17)

CEO
Narcissism,
Model 5
-.42
(.22)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.03
(.03)
-.02
(.03)
.00
(.01)
-.00
(.00)
-.07
(.34)
-.09
(.13)
-.34
(.27)
-.13
(.18)

1.25*
.19
.03
.09
1.18
60

(.27)

CEO
Narcissism,
Model 6
-.38
(.23)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.03
(.04)
-.01
(.03)
.00
(.01)
-.00
(.00)
-.25
(.44)
-.11
(.13)
-.34 (1.10)
-.15
(.18)
.90

(1.40)

1.12*

(.33)

.20
.02
.09
1.11
59

n = 73; *p<.05

1

Models 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were run without controls. None of them resulted in a significant relationship between the dependent and independent variable.

TABLE 3.4
Post-hoc Logistic Regression Predicting Narcissistic CEO Selection
Variables
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Industry adjusted return on assets
Board tenure
Total directorships held by board
CEO age at ascension
CEO origin
CEO was heir
Board size
Firm size
Firm performance
Environmental dynamism
Environmental munificence
Environmental dynamism x Firm
performance
Environmental munificence x
Firm performance
Constant
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.

n = 73; *p<.05

CEO
Observednarcissism,
Model 1
-9.67
(5.76)
.01
(.02)
.03
(.04)
.01
(.08)
1.56
(.86)
.45
(.94)
-.19
(.22)
-.00
(.01)

.22
-28.75
75.50

(4.33)

CEO
Observednarcissism,
Model 2
-17.49* (7.86)
.02
(.02)
.04
(.04)
.06
(.08)
1.33
(.89)
.27
(1.00)
-.22
(.24)
-.00
(.01)
1.21*
(.60)

-2.60
-26.61
73.21

(5.10)

CEO
Observednarcissism,
Model 3
-16.55* (7.83)
.02
(.02)
.04
(.04)
.06
(.09)
1.33
(.90)
.22
(1.01)
-.21
(.25)
-.00
(.01)
1.25*
(.62)
2.52
(2.15)

-3.40
-25.95
73.89

(5.26)

CEO
Observednarcissism,
Model 4
-12.87
(8.37)
.02
(.02)
.04
(.04)
.06
(.09)
1.33
(.91)
.22
(1.02)
-.12
(.25)
-.01
(.01)
1.19
(.63)
1.20
(2.45)
15.34 (12.96)

-5.48
-25.20
74.40

(5.46)

CEO
Observednarcissism,
Model 5
-13.01
(8.60)
.03
(.02)
.05
(.04)
.05
(.10)
1.38
(.97)
.71
(1.06)
-.22
(.28)
-.00
(.01)
1.83*
(.79)
15.64 (11.02)
15.55 (14.00)
-8.71
(6.82)

-5.61
-23.93
73.87

(5.96)

CEO
ObservedNarcissism,
Model 6
-13.15
(8.40)
.03
(.02)
.05
(.04)
.05
(.10)
1.35
(.98)
.71
(1.07)
-.20
(.28)
-.00
(.01)
2.08*
(.99)
14.35 (11.38)
31.03 (38.24)
-7.88
(7.05)
-9.30

(20.96)

-6.46
-23.84
75.68

(6.31)

TABLE 3.5
Post-hoc Ordinary Least Squares Regression Predicting Narcissistic CEO Selection Using the Unobtrusive Measure of
Narcissism
Variables
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Industry adjusted return on assets
Board tenure
Total directorships held by board
CEO age at ascension
CEO origin
CEO was heir
Board size
Firm size
Firm performance
Environmental dynamism
Environmental munificence
Environmental dynamism x Firm
performance
Environmental munificence x
Firm performance

CEO
Unobtrusivenarcissism,
Model 1
1.96
-(1.35)
.01
(.00)
.01
-(.01)
-.01
-(.02)
-.32
-(.23)
-.20
-(.20)
-.09
-(.05)
.00
(.00)

Constant

.13

R2
Adjusted R2
Standard Error
F Statistic
Degrees of freedom

.15
-.00
.60
.98
44

n = 53; *p<.05

(2.38)

CEO
Unobtrusivenarcissism,
Model 2
1.11 -(1.91)
.01
(.00)
.01
-(.01)
-.01
-(.02)
-.35
-(.24)
-.21
-(.20)
-.08
-(.05)
.00
(.00)
.38
-(.61)

-.29
.16
-.02
.61
.91
43

(2.36)

CEO
Unobtrusivenarcissism,
Model 3
.59
-(2.12)
.01
(.00)
.01
-(.01)
-.01
-(.02)
-.36
-(.24)
-.20
-(.20)
-.08
-(.06)
.00
(.00)
.45
-(.62)
-.16
-(.27)

-.74
.17
-.03
.61
.84
42

(2.36)

CEO
Unobtrusivenarcissism,
Model 4
.37
-(2.12)
.01
(.00)
.01
-(.01)
-.01
-(.02)
-.34
-(.24)
-.21
-(.20)
-.10
-(.06)
.00
(.00)
.52
-(.62)
-.12
-(.28)
-2.30
-(2.13)

-.96
.19
-.03
.61
.87
41

(2.36)

CEO
Unobtrusivenarcissism,
Model 5
.09
-(2.19)
.01
(.00)
.01
-(.01)
-.01
-(.02)
-.36
-(.24)
-.19
-(.21)
-.10
-(.06)
.00
(.00)
-1.12
-(2.68)
-.72
-(.99)
-2.56
-(2.18)
-.88
-(1.40)

-2.98
.20
-.03
.61
.82
40

(2.75)

CEO
Unobtrusivenarcissism,
Model 6
-.08
-(2.22)
.01
(.00)
.01
-(.01)
-.01
-(.02)
-.39
-(.25)
-.21
-(.21)
-.10
-(.06)
.00
(.00)
.24
-(3.55)
-.58
-(1.02)
-7.48
-(8.60)
-.64
-(1.47)
-6.56

-(11.08)

2.15

(2.98)

.20
-.03
.62
.77
39

Interpersonal Skills
(e.g., social confidence
and charm)

Fundamental Narcissistic Qualities
1) Agentic vs communal concerns
2) Approach orientation
3) Desire for self-esteem
4) Entitlement
5) Inflated self-views

Intrapsychic Skills
(e.g., fantasies of power
and self-serving bias)

Narcissism

Interpersonal
Strategies
(e.g., self-promotion and
game-playing)

FIGURE 3.1
The Extended Agency Model
Recreated from Campbell and Foster (2007)
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Narcissistic Esteem

Environmental
H2(+)
Dynamism
D
Firm Performance

H1(-)

H4(-)
Dynamism

Level of CEO
Observed-narcissism

H5(-)
Environmental
Munificence

H3(+)

FIGURE 3.2
Level of Narcissism of the Newly-selected CEO Model
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CHAPTER 4
HOW CEOS WITH HIGHER LEVELS OF NARCISSISM AFFECT THE CEO SUCCESSION
PROCESS
4.1 Introduction
The development of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) successor pool and
management of the CEO succession process (i.e., preparation for and implementation of a
change in CEO) is an important responsibility of the sitting CEO and the board of
directors (board) because the successor CEO’s personality, behavior, and decisions can
determine long-term strategic consequences (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick,
2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Recently, narcissism—a multifaceted personality trait
that combines grandiosity, attention-seeking, an unrealistically inflated self-view, a need
for that self-view to be continuously reinforced through self-regulation, and a general
lack of regard for others (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)—has been of
increasing interest to scholars and the public at large (e.g., Chamorro-Premuzic, 2016;
Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017). This self-serving personality trait has been associated with
several high-profile CEOs (e.g., Steve Jobs, Kenneth Lay) and has been linked to both
positive organizational outcomes, such as increased earnings per share, and negative
organizational outcomes, such as performance volatility (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007;
Drucker, 1994; Foster & Brennan, 2011; Isaacson, 2013; Olsen et al., 2014).
Due to these contrasting outcomes, while some have hailed narcissism as an
essential part of executive leadership and innovation (Maccoby, 2000; 2003), others have
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labeled it an evil to be avoided (Ronson, 2011). Still, I could find no empirical research
that helps us understand how a CEO with higher levels of narcissism affects the
development of the CEO succession candidate pool within the CEO succession process.
Understanding how a CEO with higher levels of narcissism affects the CEO
succession candidate pool and CEO succession processes would help us understand when
and if a CEO with higher levels of narcissism leads to desirable CEO succession
outcomes. The careful management of the CEO succession process, the competitiveness
of the CEO succession process, the identification of CEO successor candidates, and the
level of board involvement can all affect the quality of the CEO succession pool and
CEO succession process (Cragun et al., 2016). If a CEO behaves in a way driven
primarily by narcissistic motives while leading the CEO succession process, the CEO
could undermine the desires of the board (Dalton et al., 2007). Therefore, I investigate
how CEOs with higher levels of narcissism behave while leading the CEO succession
process, with the assumption that the sitting CEO plays a meaningful role in the
development of the internal CEO successor pipeline and pool.
To do this investigation, I build a theoretical framework that connects narcissism
with the amount of CEO involvement in the internal CEO successor development
process, the competitiveness of the CEO succession process, the number of internal CEO
successor candidates, and the level of board involvement in the development of the CEO
successor pool and CEO succession process. I develop the underlying arguments by
considering both the extant theoretical and empirical outcomes of research on CEOs with
higher levels of narcissism (e.g., bold vision, innovation, performance volatility;
Deutschman, 2005; Galvin et al., 2010; Olsen et al., 2014), together with how CEO
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personality affects the CEO succession process. Further, I predict CEOs with higher
levels of narcissism will be less involved in the CEO succession process, encourage a
more competitive CEO succession process, be associated with fewer ready-now
candidates, and be associated with more not-ready-now candidates. Finally, I predict that
the board will be less involved in the CEO succession process when the CEO has higher
levels of narcissism, due to either apathy from the board with regards to CEO succession
or the CEO’s manipulation of the board.
This study contributes to both the narcissism and CEO succession literatures in
the following four ways. First, although some evidence suggests that narcissists select
followers who reinforce their self-esteem needs (Padilla et al., 2007), we know little
about how narcissists select their followers, particularly at the executive level. Because
the CEO has influence on the internal succession process and the CEO succession
pipeline, how a narcissist fills the succession pipeline is an important question to address,
as CEO succession plays a crucial role in the future strategic direction of the company
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). How a CEO
with higher levels of narcissism influences the process of selecting and grooming a
successor is of particular interest, due to the inherently personality-driven motives that
may conflict with the firm’s best interest and the best practices of CEO selection.
Second, my model offers theoretical insight into what influences the
implementation or avoidance of certain succession practices within the CEO succession
process. Most of what is known about the CEO succession process is a description of best
practices (Finkelstein et al., 2009). What is not known is why some best practices are
implemented, while others are not (Nyberg et al., 2017); an understanding of which best
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practices are implemented would help us better understand the antecedents and outcomes
of the CEO succession process.
Third, this study examines the consequences of how CEOs with higher levels of
narcissism affect the CEO successor pool. Scholars have discussed how narcissists can
inspire followers (e.g., Grijalva & Harms, 2014), but they have not examined how
narcissists may directly influence their follower pool through succession planning.
Influencing the makeup of the successor pool is one way for a CEO with higher levels of
narcissism to control the CEO succession process in an effort to meet the CEO’s
underlying narcissistic needs. Finally, a deeper understanding of CEOs with higher levels
of narcissism would help us learn how to capitalize on their strengths while mitigating
their weaknesses.
4.2 Theoretical Background
4.2.1 CEO succession
How CEO succession will occur (i.e., the process through which CEO succession
occurs) has received little research attention, especially when compared to other readilyresearched questions, such as will CEO succession occur, who will be selected, and what
are the consequences of CEO succession? (Cragun et al., 2016). Factors that impact
which candidate is selected as CEO continually center around the candidate’s
characteristics, including the candidate pool, their KSAOs, their power and position, and
the candidate’s fit with the board and the firm (see Appendix A). The candidate pool does
indeed affect which candidate is selected CEO; a better internal or external candidate
pool can predict the hiring of an insider or outsider CEO (Mobbs & Raheja, 2012;
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Parrino, 1997; Pissaris et al., 2010). Unfortunately, there is little additional research
regarding the antecedents to candidate pools (Cragun et al., 2016).
4.2.2 The board’s versus the CEO’s succession responsibilities
While the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility of selecting a new
CEO, the identification and development of potential CEO candidates can be led by the
current CEO. There are several reasons for this. First, depending on the level of influence
of the sitting CEO, the CEO’s voice may be the dominant voice on the board of directors.
This could occur when the CEO is also Chairman of the Board, has particularly long
tenure, or owns large amounts of equity in the company. Second, the CEO is positioned
as the most authoritative agent within the organizational structure and is tasked with
running the business on a day-to-day basis. Therefore, the CEO has oversight of and
insight within the organization in order to recognize and develop talent (Finkelstein et al.,
2009). Because of this, the CEO may be even more involved in the development of
young talent and supplemental talent than the board. Supplemental talent includes those
employees not immediately under observation by the board but with the potential of
becoming so in the future. For example, supplemental talent would include employee
talent at lower levels in the organization or talent that is not currently in the CEO
succession pipeline.
In the event that the board is very assertive and aggressive when it comes to
developing internal CEO candidates, the board would need to work in conjunction with
and through the sitting CEO to develop internal CEO successor candidates. Therefore,
even in the case of an assertive board, the CEO would likely have influence on the
process (Schepker et al., 2017b). Lastly, the board simply may not have time or interest
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in developing a CEO successor. In this last example, the CEO would be responsible for
all CEO succession activity by default.
CEO succession research has traditionally followed upper echelons theory
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). However, there has been an increasing proliferation of relevant
research from additional academic disciplines, including finance (e.g., Parrino et al.,
2003) and accounting (e.g., Laux, 2008). This proliferation of research has broadened the
scope of the theory and empirical evidence of CEO succession. A handful of theories that
focus solely on CEO succession exist, but these theories are isolated to a small set of
articles and are not used across CEO succession research. For example, scapegoat theory
suggests that the CEO is dismissed in times of poor performance even if the CEO is not
directly responsible for the poor performance (Boeker, 1992). The circulation of power
theory posits that a CEO’s rise to power and eventual fall follows a natural cycle over
time (Ocasio, 1994). CEO succession research that focuses on the CEO succession
process is only recently gaining attention and the theoretical underpinnings of how CEO
succession occurs have shifted slightly to include decision-making (Schepker et al.,
2017b) and a configurational perspective (Busenbark, Krause, Boivie, & Graffin, 2015).
CEO succession research has identified that sitting CEOs impact the CEO
succession process in various ways. Sitting CEOs with more power have greater
influence on the CEO succession process (Ocasio, 1994). Embeddedness (Allgood &
Farrell, 2000), ownership (Pi & Lowe, 2011), being a founder (Allgood & Farrell, 2000),
and holding additional positions and titles beyond CEO (Davidson et al., 2008) all
provide the CEO with more power. Sitting CEOs favor individuals who are similar to
themselves—for example, a potential successor who has a similar functional background
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(Carpenter & Wade, 2002). Sitting CEOs tend to prefer successors who will extend their
legacy (De Vries, 1988). We also know the CEO has large amounts of influence on who
is on the TMT. If a candidate is the president or COO of the firm (heir apparent), there is
a greater likelihood that they will be selected CEO (Mooney et al., 2014). By controlling
who is on the TMT, the CEO can thereby influence the CEO successor pool. The number,
quality, and availability of candidates also impacts who will be selected CEO, including
the likelihood of whether or not a firm will select an insider or an outsider (Mobbs &
Raheja, 2012; Parrino, 1997; Pissaris et al., 2010). Therefore, the sitting CEO has
meaningful influence on the CEO succession candidate pool.
4.2.3 Candidate pool
Although there are several published studies which discuss how to develop talent
(e.g., Cappelli & Keller, 2014), few studies explore how the CEO develops a successor
and/or what process is followed (Crossland et al., 2014; Mobbs & Raheja, 2012; Zajac,
1990; Zhang, 2006). As of 2014, all such articles were theoretical (e.g., Pissaris et al.,
2010). But since 2014, evidence has emerged which shows that larger internal talent
pools result in greater levels of CEO turnover. Presumably, the reason for increased CEO
turnover is because organizations have more quality successors (Gao et al., 2017). Given
this relationship between a quality candidate pool and the likelihood of CEO succession,
it is in the highly narcissistic CEO’s best interests to create a less-qualified candidate
pool.
4.2.4 Narcissism
The study of narcissism, specifically with reference to the CEO, has barely begun.
With a new unobtrusive measure of the CEO’s level of narcissism, Chatterjee and
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Hambrick (2007) initiated a growing wave of research on executive narcissism. Recent
CEO narcissism research links the CEO’s level of narcissism to risk-taking (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2011), performance volatility (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), and fraud
(Rijsenbilt & Commandeur, 2013). Despite its popularity, the Chatterjee and Hambrick
(2007) measure of narcissism remains a proxy for self-report or third-party behavioral
observation of a highly narcissistic CEO’s behavior; resulting in a notable lack of selfreport and direct third-party behavioral observation. Also, the extant literature’s findings
on the CEO’s level of narcissism are focused on strategic outcomes (e.g., performance;
Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Olsen et al., 2014). The extant literature does not consider
the antecedents to selection of a CEO with higher levels of narcissism, nor does it
consider any intermediary outcomes, such as CEO succession.
4.2.5 Narcissistic motivations
To help understand the motives of individuals with higher levels of narcissism, I
adopt Campbell and Foster’s (2007) extended agency model. The extended agency model
is a composite model of the most accepted theoretical thinking and empirical evidence
within the then-current narcissism literature (Campbell & Foster, 2007). The extended
agency model posits that individuals with higher levels of narcissism have a strong need
to maintain a positive self-image, and that the narcissist thinks and acts in ways to keep
these self-views viable. Since agency theory assumes self-interested motives from the
agent, including the extended agency model as the underlying explanation for the selfinterested behavior of individuals with higher levels of narcissism explains specific
motivations and behaviors from which we can examine and predict narcissistic behavior
beyond merely the assumption of self-interest.
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The extended agency model adopts the premise that behavior is motivated by a
dynamic self-regulatory process (Campbell et al., 2006). Dynamic self-regulatory
processing encompasses the efforts a person uses to construct, maintain, defend, and
enhance their desired self-views (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Vazire & Funder, 2006). In
this context, the self is seen as a network of cognitive-affective processes that is in
constant transaction with the social environment (Mischel & Morf, 2003; Morf &
Horvath, 2007). The primary output of the dynamic self-regulatory processes is
narcissistic esteem, or a sense of self-esteem linked primarily to dominance, rather than
closeness or acceptance, and related to the emotion of pride (Campbell & Foster, 2007).
The dynamic self-regulatory process (see Figure 4.1) which feeds a narcissist’s
narcissistic esteem is comprised of four mutually-reinforcing elements, the fourth of
which is comprised of five sub-elements. The first of the four mutually-reinforcing
elements is a narcissist’s interpersonal skills (e.g., social confidence, charm), which can
be used to garner attention or influence. The second of the four mutually-reinforcing
elements is a narcissist’s intrapsychic self-regulation strategies (e.g., fantasies of power,
self-serving bias), which can be used to justify self-serving behavior or outcomes. The
third of the four mutually-reinforcing elements is a narcissist’s interpersonal strategies
(e.g., self-promotion, game-playing), which can be used to achieve goals or control
others. The fourth of the four mutually-reinforcing elements is a narcissist’s fundamental
qualities, those qualities which describe a narcissist’s underlying motivations (Campbell
et al., 2006; Campbell & Foster, 2007; Campbell & Green, 2008). These four elements
work together to create a narcissist’s self-regulatory system.
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The fourth element of a narcissist’s self-regulation process, a narcissist’s
fundamental qualities, can be further broken down into five sub-elements. These subelements work independently or together to create behavioral outcomes (Campbell &
Foster, 2007). The first of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is an
emphasis on agentic over communal concerns, which states that narcissists seek
abnormally high levels of status, success, power, and dominance (Bradlee & Emmons,
1992); for example, narcissists place more value on getting ahead than getting along
socially. One outcome of this sub-trait is that narcissists often rise to the highest levels of
society (Deluga, 1997; Nevicka, Ten Velden, et al., 2011), including the position of CEO
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).
The second of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is approach
versus avoidance orientation, which means that an individual is motivated more by
reward than punishment, or, in other words, an orientation toward success (Elliot, 2008;
Lewin, 1935; Rose & Campbell, 2004). Therefore, narcissists tend to focus on the
positives, rather than the negatives, of their own decisions because of a heightened
sensitivity to rewards, coupled with a muted sensitivity to punishment (Foster & Trimm,
2008). It is suggested that narcissists seek out a public stage to showcase their capabilities
(Wallace & Baumeister, 2002), and in that public setting, at least at first, they shine and
are recognized by team members and experts as the best leaders (Back et al., 2010;
Nevicka, Ten Velden, et al., 2011; Schnure, 2010). At the CEO level, this can manifest in
strategic sensationalism (e.g., impulsive, attention-grabbing acquisitions) versus strategic
conservatism (i.e., incremental improvements; Ouimet, 2010).
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The third of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is a general
desire for self-esteem. A general desire for self-esteem results in the narcissist desiring to
receive positive attention. When people meet narcissists, they often have very positive
interactions. Upon first acquaintance, narcissists are agreeable, entertaining, and
competent (Paulhus, 1998), as well as attractive and likeable (Oltmanns et al., 2004).
They are often well-dressed, and they tend to use charming facial expressions, selfconfident body movement, and humor, all of which help the narcissist make a positive
first impression (Back et al., 2010). Further, narcissists are usually seen in a positive light
by their peers and superiors (Brunell et al., 2008; Judge et al., 2006). The positive
attention they receive benefits the narcissist. Narcissism is linked to high self-esteem,
greater happiness, and good psychological health (Rose, 2002; Sedikides et al., 2004). In
fact, it has been suggested that it feels good to be a narcissist (Rose & Campbell, 2004).
The fourth of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is a sense of
entitlement. A sense of entitlement results in aggressive, exploitative, and superiority
behaviors (Reidy et al., 2008). That being said, aggressiveness can also be perceived as
assertiveness, a trait which is valued in leaders. In addition, exploitativeness can be
perceived as resourcefulness or cunning in strategic leaders (Reidy et al., 2008). Finally,
superiority behaviors are linked to dominance behaviors, which can also be effective in a
business environment. Each of these behaviors can lead to leadership emergence (Judge
et al., 2006; Ouimet, 2010; Paunonen et al., 2006). Kernberg (1979) was one of the first
scholars to broach the topic of narcissism and leadership by theorizing that narcissists are
more likely to seek and obtain leadership positions. Since his studies, it has been
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observed that narcissists share a number of traits (e.g., self-confidence) with successful
leaders (Hogan & Fico, 2011).
The fifth of the five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements is an inflated
self-view. An inflated self-view can also result in leadership emergence (Ouimet, 2010).
Smith and Foti (1998) conducted a study which found that the leadership attributes of
dominance, self-efficacy, and general intelligence were associated with the general
leadership impression. Narcissists tend to be dominant, have high self-efficacy, and can
be extroverted (Ensari et al., 2011; Judge et al., 2002). Extroverts are often perceived as
intelligent (Christopher & Schlenker, 2000; Roberts, 2002). Further, given the
relationship of narcissism with dominance, self-efficacy, and extraversion, it is
understandable that individuals or groups would perceive narcissists as leaders.
Additionally, Maccoby (2003) lists visioning, risk-taking, passion, charisma, learning,
perseverance, and a sense of humor as traits of narcissists that are consistent with positive
attributes of leadership.
A narcissist draws on these five fundamental narcissistic quality sub-elements to
build skills and develop strategies. If a narcissist has the skills and is using the right
strategies for the social environment, he or she achieves a level of narcissistic esteem and
feels good (Campbell & Foster, 2007; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Vazire & Funder, 2006).
Thus, the five narcissistic fundamental quality sub-elements drive narcissistic behaviors
in order to achieve narcissistic esteem. These sub-elements are a narcissist’s underlying
motivational engine, and each sub-element can be a desirable CEO motivation.
In regards to followership, the evidence suggests three patterns of narcissists’
interactions with others, particularly with those who follow them. A link exists between
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narcissism and a propensity for aggression toward others when being critiqued (Barry et
al., 2009; Reidy et al., 2008), and narcissists are likely to meet their own needs before
they meet the needs of others. In other words, narcissists think of themselves first, with
little concern for the well-being of their followers. Additionally, narcissists are
hypersensitive to criticism; therefore, they tend to intellectually inhibit their subordinates
(Glad, 2002; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). Finally, the attitude of narcissistic leaders
toward those in their entourage is often one of simulated consideration, which takes the
form of manipulation and exploitation of employees (Glad, 2002).
As a result, I expect to see themes of narcissistic behavior as it pertains to the
succession process in the following area. Overall, narcissists will seek to maintain a level
of narcissistic esteem (Grijalva & Harms, 2014). They will construct their social world by
dominating others and controlling decision-making. To do so, they will hire low-status,
younger, and less-experienced top management team (TMT) members. They will also
provide rewards and protection to loyal TMT members. Such a leadership strategy will
result in TMT members with either short or long tenure (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007;
Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, & Gregg, 2002; Zhu & Chen, 2015). These
suggestions align with the notion that narcissists are not nurturing or developmental, lack
empathy, and develop superficial relationships they will willingly discard if the person no
longer serves their purpose (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992; Farwell & Wohlwend Lloyd,
1998; Watson et al., 1984).
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4.3 Hypothesis Development
4.3.1 The involvement of CEOs with higher levels of narcissism in the CEO succession
process
Narcissists are driven individuals who believe they know what is best and will
manipulate a situation to get what they want (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Wallace &
Baumeister, 2002). In a corporation wherein the board selects a narcissistic CEO, the
CEO may gain power over time through manipulation (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001;
Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). Once the CEO gains power, he or she can exert influence
to manipulate the CEO succession process, thereby achieving his or her self-serving goals
(Boeker, 1992; Zajac & Westphal, 1996).
CEO involvement in the CEO succession process can take a variety of forms. On
the one hand, involvement may include activities which influence the candidate selection
process, such as reviewing succession plans, meeting with candidates, and making
development decisions. On the other hand, involvement may include activities that
promote a fair and equitable process, such as following procedures, establishing metrics,
and championing diversity. The underlying assumption for following a defined
succession process is that a well-defined and repeated process increases objective
decision-making and is more likely to bring about an optimal outcome (Schepker et al.,
2017b).
The goals of the CEO with higher levels of narcissism may be very different than
the goals achieved by following the steps/components of an accepted best practice CEO
succession process. For example, a CEO with higher levels of narcissism may have the
goal of selecting from a weak pool of CEO successors, whereas a robust CEO succession
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process would be designed to select from a strong set of successors. In fact, a sitting CEO
with higher levels of narcissism could purposefully fill the CEO successor pool with
weak successors, thereby working in direct opposition to normal succession-planning
objectives.
With regard to the succession planning process, one potential goal of a CEO with
higher levels of narcissism would be to avoid following a formal process. The
fundamental narcissistic motivation of an approach orientation is likely to lead the CEO
to attempt to manage the CEO succession process in his or her own way, rather than
following a prescribed process or a set of best practices. An approach orientation and
mentality is consistent with the narcissistic idea that “rules are for other people to
follow.” Indeed, narcissists often make exceptions to the rules and believe they are above
them (Behary, 2013). Therefore, a CEO with higher levels of narcissism will have little
regard for procedures and rules of fairness. If a narcissistic CEO gives the appearance of
following the process, it is likely only on a superficial level, as a vehicle to meet the
CEO’s narcissistic objectives.
A second goal of a CEO with higher levels of narcissism may be to pick favorite
successor candidates, rather than implementing a formal fair, effective process. For
example, the CEO may pick their favorite successor candidate and add them to the
candidate pool without following a rigorous and objective process for making candidate
pool decisions. The motivation for making such a decision is the narcissist’s inflated selfview and belief that they are better than others at making decisions (Campbell et al.,
2004, 2000). That belief, along with the belief that narcissists think that talent is born, not
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made (Emmons, 1987), would encourage the narcissist to make decisions about
successors based on the CEO’s intuition, rather than a defined process.
A third goal of a CEO with higher levels of narcissism could be to portray an
image of championing talent without actually following the process. The fundamental
narcissistic motivation of a desire for self-esteem (Campbell & Foster, 2007) is likely to
lead the CEO with higher levels of narcissism to try to be the center of attention, thereby
manipulating the CEO succession process into portraying an image of valuing and
developing young talent, rather than developing a competent successor. This would
benefit the CEO with higher levels of narcissism in the following ways: first, it would
allow the CEO to be recognized for championing talent; second, it would effectively
forestall selection of a strong successor who could challenge the CEO’s position; and
third, it would create a dependent relationship between the potential successors and the
CEO.
Therefore, the narcissist motivated by the fundamental narcissistic qualities of
approach orientation, a desire for self-esteem, and inflated self-views could use the
strategies of not following a formal process, picking favorites, and championing young,
yet incapable talent, in order to control the CEO succession process. Consequently, the
highly narcissistic CEO will likely reject objective portions of the process which were
created to inspire thoroughness, equality, and objectivity in favor of using the process for
self-serving interests.
Hypothesis 1: A negative relationship exists between the CEO’s level of
narcissism and the involvement of the CEO in the succession process, such that
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when the CEO has a higher level of narcissism, the CEO is less involved in the
CEO succession process.
4.3.2 CEOs with higher levels of narcissism and CEO succession process
competitiveness
The CEO succession process can range from being competitive to being noncompetitive (or developmental). On one end of the spectrum, a competitive CEO
succession process is centered on pitting competitors (i.e., the potential CEO candidates)
against each other to compete for the CEO position (Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Such a
process becomes even more competitive when the participants in the resulting
tournament know against whom they are competing (Connelly et al., 2013). On the other
end, developmental processes focus on one individual (sometimes associated with an heir
apparent) by prepping her over time to eventually take over the position (Zajac, 1990).
Zajac (1990) highlights the effectiveness of using a developmental process because it
increases retention and improves post succession performance.
A third alternative is a prolonged search, which usually involves an interim CEO
and occurs when no candidate is readily available (Intintoli et al., 2014). Although the
process may be competitive before an heir apparent is selected, once the heir apparent is
selected, the process clearly shows who is favored, and that the heir apparent has gained
the favor of the board (Vancil, 1987).
One method of ensuring a competitive process is by pitting candidates against
each other. For example, in a tournament situation, transparency in the process will lead
to a more competitive process (Connelly et al., 2013). Similarly, CEO successor
candidates may have differing levels of awareness regarding their contention as a
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candidate for the CEO position. Without direct knowledge that they are being considered
for the CEO position, the only information on their candidacy and who else is being
considered comes from situational awareness and understanding of the board’s needs for
the next CEO. However, the process would, of course, be clearer to each potential
candidate if they were explicitly told of their candidacy and their strengths and
weaknesses, as well as any others competing for the position. This level of
communication is sometimes advocated as an effective talent development practice
(Berger & Berger, 2010), particularly by those who advocate that tournaments bring
higher levels of performance (Connelly et al., 2013). Thus, by avoiding the designation of
an heir apparent and letting candidates know who is being considered as successor, the
CEO succession process becomes more competitive.
One fundamental quality of a narcissist is agentic concern (Bradlee & Emmons,
1992). In order to get what the CEO wants out of the CEO succession process, a highly
narcissistic CEO is likely to assert control over the process itself. A developmental CEO
succession process would take control away from the CEO, for a developmental process
is more transparent to the board, due to the fact that the successor candidates’
performance is visible to them. An heir apparent is approved by the board or is at least
visible to the board (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Even if a
successor is not officially designated an heir apparent, a CEO can structure the
organization to signal the capability and confidence the CEO has in the potential
successor. For example, a CEO can structure the company by giving large amounts of
responsibility to the individual they see as the best successor. This is often associated
with giving the potential successor the position of Chief Operating Officer or President

132

(Vancil, 1987). Therefore, even if the Chief Operating Officer or President is not
officially considered the heir apparent by the CEO and the board, holding either of these
positions would send strong signals to the board regarding the qualifications of the
individual when the time came to fill the role of CEO. Given the effect of structure on
signaling heir apparent status, the CEO with higher levels of narcissism would avoid a
structure that includes a Chief Operating Officer or President.
The fundamental narcissistic qualities of agentic concern and a desire for selfesteem compel a highly narcissistic CEO to be assertive in the CEO succession process
and thereby make the process more competitive. By using competitive processes, the
CEO retains more control over the process and can obfuscate any ready-now successors
who could be seen by the board as a legitimate replacement for the CEO.
Hypothesis 2: A positive relationship exists between the CEO’s level of
narcissism and the implementation of a competitive CEO succession process,
such that CEOs with higher narcissism are more likely to implement a competitive
CEO succession process.
4.3.3 CEOs with higher levels of narcissism and the readiness of the CEO candidate
pool
The CEO succession process involves creating a pool of CEO successor
candidates (Pissaris et al., 2010). Typically, this involves selecting and developing groups
of successors at various states of readiness. Many companies attempt to build a pool of
successors who are immediately ready to take the CEO’s position, as well as a second or
third tier of candidates for the future (Wright, Guest, & Paauwe, 2015). The desire for
self-esteem, coupled with the inflated self-view of the narcissist (Campbell & Foster,
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2007), will likely drive the highly narcissistic CEO to involve himself or herself in the
successor selection in a self-serving way, by building a successor pool of candidates that
feed the CEO’s narcissistic esteem but do not threaten the CEO’s position.
Studies suggest that narcissists believe leadership ability is an innate ability,
rather than a result of education, experience, or other developmental factors (Emmons,
1984). In other words, narcissists believe leaders are “born, not made” (Emmons, 1987).
Due to this view, CEOs with higher levels of narcissism are more likely to select
successors based on social skills or personality, rather than leadership competence. This
causes a highly narcissistic CEO to look past the existing senior leadership to the lower
levels of an organization when looking for a successor, finally choosing someone with
the social skills or personality the CEO values.
Narcissists often enter relationships in a superficial way (Carroll, 1987). Consider
how narcissists form romantic relationships. Narcissists prefer partners that make the
narcissist look and feel good (i.e., trophy partners; Campbell, 1999). One typical behavior
of narcissists in romantic relationships is courting new partners while remaining involved
with their current partners (Campbell & Foster, 2002). Following this same pattern of
behavior, a CEO with higher levels of narcissism is likely to select CEO candidate pool
members that reinforce the CEO’s views and make him or her look good. Therefore, a
less-experienced, physically attractive, high-achieving successor pool will make the CEO
with higher levels of narcissism look and feel better than will an older group of more
experienced, less physically attractive leaders. Moreover, the CEO with higher levels of
narcissism will likely continue to search for new talent, rather than remaining loyal to the
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existing successor pool. In this way, the CEO with higher levels of narcissism can portray
an image of constantly seeking, upgrading, and championing talent.
Filling a successor pool with less-experienced candidates can reduce a CEO’s
chances of being challenged by a potential replacement. During times of poor
performance, CEOs are particularly vulnerable to dismissal (Cragun et al., 2016). This is
especially true when there are even more quality candidates available (Mobbs & Raheja,
2012; Parrino, 1997). Thus, driven by agentic concern, it is likely that the CEO with
higher levels of narcissism will limit the number of ready-now successors in the
successor pool. Indeed, it has been suggested that a similar behavior is demonstrated by
the CEO with higher levels of narcissism when staffing the TMT. CEOs with higher
levels of narcissism staff their TMT in such a way that it consists of either a very lowtenured or long-tenured TMT (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017).
One fundamental trait of narcissists is their desire for self-esteem. Narcissists
want followers who will admire them. Therefore, they surround themselves with
individuals who will admire them and give them attention (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017).
Thus, a highly narcissistic CEO will likely pursue less-experienced candidates (e.g.,
lower-level leaders) who will admire the CEO without threatening his or her position, as
less-experienced candidates are incapable of reaching higher-level positions until they
have more experience. Also, selecting less-experienced candidates as their successors
gives highly narcissistic CEOs the opportunity to groom the candidates in the way the
CEO wants. Selecting and paying attention to less-experienced candidates also signals to
more proximal candidates (e.g., senior executives who may be better prepared to become
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CEO successors), that the CEO can subvert their candidacy or replace their job at any
time with less-experienced candidates.
A highly narcissistic CEO will also want to control the succession process by
remaining the center of attention (Emmons, 1987; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991).
One method a CEO can employ to remain at the center of attention is to steer the board to
focus on much less experienced talent, talent that would not immediately threaten the
current CEO. Such an approach can create an impression that the CEO is heavily invested
in the succession process, but in reality, the CEO is not developing his or her closest
successor. Focusing on less-experienced talent also allows the CEO to keep his or her
legacy at center stage. The less experienced the talent that the CEO brings into the
succession pipeline, the more likely they are to admire the CEO. Less experienced talent
can then be labeled as the CEO’s group of high potentials, as trophies rather than
individuals. Therefore, focusing on less-experienced talent can put the CEO on a pedestal
to both the board and the successor pool as someone who champions talent.
Hence, fundamental narcissistic qualities, including a desire for self-esteem and
an inflated self-view, may compel a CEO with higher levels of narcissism to select
successors based on personality, as well as successors that will perpetuate the CEO’s
image of caring about talent, while also minimizing the number of successors that could
actually replace the CEO. The result is likely to be a decrease in the number of readynow successor candidates and an increase in the number of not-ready-now candidates.
Hypothesis 3: A negative relationship exists between a CEO’s level of narcissism
and the number of ready-now successors, such that CEOs with higher levels of
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narcissism are related to candidate pools with fewer numbers of ready-now
successors.
Hypothesis 4: A positive relationship exists between a CEO’s level of narcissism
and the number of successors that are not-ready-now, such that CEOs with higher
levels of narcissism are related to CEO succession candidate pools with higher
numbers of not-ready-now candidates.
4.3.4 CEOs with higher levels of narcissism and board involvement in the CEO
succession process
The board and the CEO both share responsibility for the development of CEO
successor candidates and succession planning, and the degree to which they do share
responsibility varies across firms. Conceptually, board involvement entails how much the
board runs the CEO succession process when compared to the current CEO (Vancil,
1987). A board’s desire to actively participate in CEO succession can range from active
participation to apathy, even until the board is forced to confront a staffing decision
because of an abrupt or unplanned-for succession (Intintoli et al., 2014). In the case of
active participation, the board may value the process and/or see how it helps their
strategic needs. In the case of apathy, the board may not value the process, believing they
can either select a successor at the last minute or identify and recruit talent from outside
the firm. This may be particularly true of boards with a higher percentage of narcissists
that believe that leaders are born, not made (Emmons, 1987). In this situation, the board
that hires a CEO with higher levels of narcissism might not care about having a robust
CEO succession process.
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Narcissists are agentic with a high desire for self-esteem (Campbell & Foster,
2007), and therefore, the CEO with higher levels of narcissism will likely want to control
the CEO succession process and will desire minimal involvement of the board. From an
agentic perspective, the CEO will want neither a candidate that will easily replace the
CEO, nor a board that will challenge the CEO’s preferences for the successor pool. The
self-serving interest of a highly narcissistic CEO has the potential to interfere with the
succession process to the point that even a strong board that desires to participate in the
process could lose control over the CEO succession process. This could result in a
situation in which the CEO with higher levels of narcissism uses the succession process
as a means to feed narcissistic esteem, rather than as a tool to prepare the firm for
succession. Indeed, CEOs with higher levels of narcissism are likely to attempt control of
the CEO succession process to such an extent that they reduce the board’s involvement in
the CEO succession process.
Narcissists use game-playing interpersonal strategies in order to manipulate others
into giving them what they want. They believe they do not have to follow the rules
(Behary, 2013). The highly narcissistic CEO is likely to use a similar game-playing
strategy to control the succession process by hiding the CEO’s real motives and limiting
the involvement of the board. By playing games with the board, the CEO can first, draw
attention away from the importance of the process, second, limit information about the
process, and third, keep the board from interacting with potential candidates. In this way,
the CEO limits the board’s ability to pick successors who can challenge his or her
position.

138

In situations where a board is more inclined to actively participate in the
succession process, there are several strategies a CEO may use to discourage active
involvement. Indeed, narcissists can be master manipulators and develop strategies and
schemes to control their social environment (Campbell & Foster, 2007). For example, a
CEO may use the intrapersonal strategy of pacification and deceit. To do this, he or she
might go through the motions with the board by talking about CEO succession, while
exerting little meaningful or strategic effort into participation.
One manipulation strategy is to draw attention away from the CEO succession
process and thereby diminish its importance. For example, a narcissistic CEO might draw
the board’s attention to operational issues. In this case, the CEO actively discourages the
board from participating in the CEO succession process by convincing the board that
other issues are of a higher priority.
A second manipulation strategy is to act as the gatekeeper of the process and
thereby control the information the board receives. Another fundamental quality of a
narcissist is agentic concern. The narcissist’s need for self-promotion will drive the
narcissist to control the process while carefully achieving the desired results. Part of
controlling the process involves preventing the board from receiving meaningful
information to which the CEO already has access. By doing so, the CEO controls the
information flow, as well as the perceptions of how well, or how poorly, the process is
going.
A third manipulation strategy is to control the process, thereby ensuring that the
board cannot see any candidate capabilities that could potentially outshine those of the
CEO. The highly narcissist CEO does not want the candidates to be able to challenge him
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or her. Through game-playing, highly narcissistic CEOs can control the level of
involvement the board has in the CEO succession process. Hence, a highly narcissistic
CEO will control the perceptions of the CEO succession process, rather than champion its
procedural components, in an effort to stay at the center of attention and develop a loyal
set of followers. Hence, the fundamental narcissistic qualities of agentic concern and a
desire for self-esteem will compel a highly narcissistic CEO to be assertive in the CEO
succession process and thereby limit the board’s involvement.
Hypothesis 5: A negative relationship exists between the CEO's level of
narcissism and board involvement in the CEO succession process, such that when
the CEO has a higher level of narcissism, there is less board involvement in the
CEO succession processes.
4.3.5 Theoretical model
Joining all of the hypotheses together creates the following theoretical model: (1) A
negative relationship between the CEO’s level of narcissism and CEO involvement in the
CEO succession process; (2) A negative relationship between the CEO’s level of
narcissism and the competitiveness of the CEO succession process; (3) A negative
relationship between the CEO’s level of narcissism and the number of ready-now
successors; (4) A positive relationship between the CEO’s level of narcissism and the
board’s level of involvement in the CEO succession process (see Figure 4.2).
4.4 Methods
4.4.1 Data
The data used in this study was obtained from multiple sources. Publicly available
data was gathered from Compustat, GMI, Execucomp, EDGAR, and Factiva. This
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includes proxy statements, annual reports, press releases, and Wall Street Journal articles.
This study also uses data gathered through the 2016 Annual Global Survey of Chief
Human Resource Officers conducted by The University of South Carolina’s Center for
Executive Succession. The survey was administered in the 2nd quarter of 2016. Invitations
to participate in this survey were emailed to individuals who held the most senior HR role
in their firms (e.g., Chief Human Resource Officers) in 773 companies. This distribution
list came from two sources. All of the 2016 Fortune 500 companies were included, as
well as members of a Human Resource professional association. A total of 148 usable
responses were received (a 19% response rate).
To be included in the analysis, each firm had to be publicly traded and
headquartered in the United States. In addition, each firm was required to provide at least
5 years of data prior to the CEO ascension. I used five years in order to capture a longer
term perspective on the company’s performance and the potential industry effect on CEO
dismissal (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015), since CEO succession is less sensitive to short-term
performance (one or two years) than to long-term performance (Boeker, 1992;
Fredrickson et al., 1988; Gao et al., 2017). In addition, the CEO had to have at least two
years of tenure and could not be the first CEO of the firm. Two years of tenure were
required to ensure that the annual reports used in the measure of narcissism represented
activity solely during the CEO’s tenure. Private companies do not disclose sufficient data
to calculate firm performance. CEOs of corporations registered in the US which are
subsidiaries of non-US companies do not fit the definition of the CEO we are studying. It
is also insufficient to merely have the title of CEO; the CEO must also be the highestranking employee in the organization. CEOs who report to a higher-level authority other
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than the board of directors do not fit this definition. Therefore, the final sample consisted
of 73 usable observations.
4.4.2 Measures
4.4.2.1 Observed-narcissism
The CEO’s level of narcissism was measured in 2 ways: subjectively (observednarcissism), through a modified version of the narcissistic personality inventory (NPI)
scale (Raskin & Hall, 1979; Raskin & Terry, 1988), and unobtrusively (unobtrusivenarcissism), through a measure created by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), which
includes a set of four unobtrusive measures. The NPI is the most widely-used measure of
narcissism (Ames et al., 2006). Raskin and Hall (1979) developed the NPI to measure
individual differences in narcissism in non-clinical populations. They started with 220
items and then reduced the survey down to 80 items (The NPI-80). Raskin and Hall
(1981) then performed a construct validity study of the 80 items and reduced them to 54
items, and then further reduced the number to 40 (i.e., the NPI-40). In addition to the
NPI-40, a 21 item (NPI-21), a 16 item (NPI-16), and a 13 item (NPI-13) survey have
been developed and validated (Gentile et al., 2013; Svindseth et al., 2008). The NPI has
been validated for forced choice pair and Likert style responses and has been validated
for both self-report and third-party reporting (Boldero et al., 2015). I use a seven-point
Likert scale, following Resick et al. (2009). In this study, I use the NPI-13 (Gentile et al.,
2013) and drop three of the questions to make the survey more appropriate for
executives. The three items I dropped were “I like to look at my body,” “I like to display
my body,” and “I like to look at myself in the mirror.” These three items are not relevant
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in the business environment, and I was unable to identify any business-relevant
alternative wording.
One of the challenges in studying narcissism at the executive level is the
reluctance of executives to be honest when completing self-report questionnaires. One
way to improve results is to use direct third-party observation. Third-party ratings have
been shown to provide higher operational validities of personality traits when compared
to self-reports (Oh et al., 2011). Third-party reporting also has less inflation of responses
than self-reports (Van Iddekinge et al., 2005) because third-party observers can have
unfiltered perspectives on the target’s personality traits (Connelly & Hülsheger, 2012).
Hence, because the most senior HR individual answered questions about the CEO in the
survey, the items were reworded to be observer-based, rather than self-report (see
Appendix B for the full list of questions).
4.4.2.2 Unobtrusive-narcissism
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) spurred a new wave of narcissism research in the
strategic management literature by introducing a new unobtrusive measure of narcissism.
I call this measure unobtrusive-narcissism. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) created the
measure to overcome the difficulty associated with convincing executives to fill out selfreport measures (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006). Their original measure had five items.
The first item was the prominence of the CEO’s photograph in the firm’s annual
report. It was scored based on the amount of space dedicated to the photograph as
compared to the page size, along with whether or not the CEO was pictured alone. The
amount of space represents the CEO’s desire to be the center of attention, admire him or
herself, and represents his or her sense of grandiosity. The picture was scored four if the
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CEO’s picture was larger than half of the page vertically or horizontally and was pictured
alone. The picture was scored three if the CEO’s picture was smaller than half of the page
vertically or horizontally and was pictured alone. The picture was scored two if the CEO
was pictured with others, regardless of size. The picture was scored one if there was no
picture in the annual report. The picture was scored zero if there was no annual report.
For example, this would occur when the company solely had a 10-k.
The second item was the CEO’s prominence in the firm’s press releases. The third
item was the CEO’s use of first-person singular pronouns in interviews with the Wall
Street Journal. The fourth item was the CEO’s cash compensation divided by that of the
second-highest paid executive in the firm. The fifth item was the CEO’s non-cash
compensation divided by that of the second-highest-paid executive in the firm.
In 2011, Chatterjee and Hambrick modified their measure and dropped the
measure of personal pronoun use during interviews, due to lack of reliability in their
sample. Additionally, the text analysis of personal pronoun use by the CEO during
interviews as a measure of narcissism has been challenged as unreliable (Carey et al.,
2015). Therefore, I do not use the measure of personal pronoun use. To create the
unobtrusive measure of narcissism, I used the average z-score of each sub-item.
4.4.2.3 Reliability of observed-narcissism and unobtrusive-narcissism
The Cronbach’s Alpha of the 10 items from observed-narcissism was 0.81, which
is above the recommended 0.70 for demonstrating adequate reliability (Cronbach, 1951).
The reliability for unobtrusive-narcissism was Alpha = .28, below the level of
recommended reliability (Cronbach, 1951). This was not unexpected after reviewing the
pairwise Pearson correlations (Table 4.1), which range from .04 to .13, with the exception
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of the correlation between the base and bonus pay differential, which was .46.
Additionally, the correlations of the four components of unobtrusive-narcissism were not
in line with the results of Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007; 2011). Therefore, due to
reliability issues, I solely use observed-narcissism.
4.4.2.4 Succession process involvement
Succession process involvement is operationalized through a survey instrument.
There are six components of CEO involvement in the succession process: making CEO
succession a priority, taking ownership of the process, reviewing succession plans,
meeting with candidates, maintaining objectivity in the CEO succession process, and
promoting equal opportunity. All the items were obtained from the 2016 CES CHRO
survey (see Appendix B, Q12), using a 5-point Likert scale and averaged into a
composite scale. The reliability was 0.88, which is above the recommended 0.70 for
demonstrating adequate reliability (Cronbach, 1951). An example question is “to what
extent do you agree the CEO makes succession a priority?” Making CEO succession a
priority would indicate the CEO is involved in the CEO succession process.
4.5.2.5 Succession process competitiveness
Process competitiveness is operationalized using the extent to which successor
candidates know they are successor candidates (Q22 of the 2016 CES CHRO survey; 5point Likert scale) and the extent to which successor candidates know who the other
successor candidates are (Q22 of the 2016 CES CHRO survey; 5-point Likert scale). The
items were averaged into a composite scale. The reliability of the scale was 0.82, which is
above the recommended 0.70 for demonstrating adequate reliability (Cronbach, 1951).
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4.4.2.6 Candidate pool readiness: ready-now vs. not-ready-now
CEO successor candidate pool readiness is operationalized using the number of
ready-now and not-ready-now candidates. Ready-now successors are measured on the
2016 CES CHRO survey (see Q14) as the number of executives who are considered
potential immediate successors to the CEO. Respondents were given the option of 1, 2-3,
4-6, 7-8, and 9 or more potential candidates. Ready-now candidates is treated as a
continuous variable of 1 to 5, representing the size of the candidate pool ready to be CEO
in 0 to 6 months. The value of 1 corresponds to 1 candidate. The value of 2 corresponds
to 2-3 candidates. The value of 3 corresponds to 4-6 candidates. The value of 4
corresponds to 7-8 candidates. The value of 5 corresponds to 9 or more candidates.
Not-ready-now candidates are those considered not immediately able to succeed
the CEO. Not-ready-now candidates is calculated as a continuous variable representing
the size of the not-ready-now candidate pool. It is a sum of the three categories of notready-now candidates: six months to 12 months, 12 to 24 months, and greater than 24
months. The value of 1 corresponds to 1 candidate. The value of 2 corresponds to 2-3
candidates. The value of 3 corresponds to 4-6 candidates. The value of 4 corresponds to
7-8 candidates. The value of 5 corresponds to 9 or more candidates.
In post-hoc analysis, I consider two additional measures of candidate readiness.
First, I consider the availability of ready-now candidates (Replacement Confidence),
following question 19 (see Q19): “If your CEO were to step down or leave today, how
confident are you that his/her permanent successor would immediately (i.e., within a few
weeks) be an internal direct report (i.e., immediate promotion without an "interim"
CEO)?” (see Appendix B). Then I consider the availability of candidates (Permanent
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Successor) following question 20: “If your CEO were to step down or leave today, how
long do you think it would take to have a permanent successor in place?” (see Appendix
B).
4.4.2.7 Board involvement
Board involvement is operationalized through a survey instrument. There are six
components of board involvement in the succession process: making CEO succession a
priority, taking ownership of the process, reviewing succession plans, meeting with
candidates, maintaining objectivity in the CEO succession process, and promoting equal
opportunity. All the items were obtained from the 2016 CES CHRO survey (see
Appendix B, Q13), using a 5-point Likert scale. The items were averaged into a
composite scale. The reliability of the scale was 0.87, which is above the recommended
0.70 for demonstrating adequate reliability (Cronbach, 1951). An example question is “to
what extent do you agree the board makes succession a priority?” Making CEO
succession a priority would indicate the board is involved in the CEO succession process.
4.4.2.8 Control variables
From publicly available data sources and the CHRO 2016 survey, I gathered and
included control variables that previous literature suggests might predict CEO succession
outcomes (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Intintoli et al., 2014; Petrenko et al., 2015).
First, CEO age is operationalized as the age of the CEO in 2016. CEO age is
associated with creativity and innovation (Davidson et al., 2006). Also, CEOs that are
closer to retirement are more motivated to leave a legacy (De Vries, 1988). That legacy
could be manifested in the CEO’s participation in the CEO succession process.
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Therefore, the age of the CEO could impact the behavior of the CEO towards CEO
succession.
Second, CEO origin is operationalized as a dummy code of zero if the CEO came
from inside the firm and as a one if the CEO came from outside the firm. CEO origin is
associated with the manner in which the CEO thinks (Lant et al., 1992). Outsider CEOs
are associated with a new way of thinking (Karaevli, 2007). Therefore, the origin may
determine the way the CEO thinks and subsequently impact how the CEO leads the CEO
succession process. For example, a CEO from a different company may have a differing
perspective regarding the importance of succession and development or the practices
required for effectiveness.
Third, a CEO was considered heir apparent (heir apparent) if the CEO had been
the heir apparent (CEO was heir). This is operationalized as a dummy code of one if the
CEO’s title was president or COO prior to ascending to CEO while at least five years
younger than their predecessor; otherwise, it was coded as a zero (Cannella & Shen,
2001). Heir apparent status is associated with CEO power and the ability to affect change
in the organization post ascension. CEOs who were the heir apparent have more power
and are therefore more able to affect change post-ascension than those CEOs who were
not the heir apparent (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002). Thus, heir apparent CEOs may have
more influence on how they lead and change the CEO succession process than those who
were not the heir apparent.
Fourth, CEO tenure is operationalized as the years the predecessor held the position
of CEO. Predecessor tenure is also associated with CEO power (Nyberg et al., 2010) and
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could therefore affect to what extent the CEO has control over the succession process
when compared to board influence (Schepker et al., 2017b).
Fifth, CEO duality is operationalized as a dummy code of one if the predecessor
CEO also held the title of Chairman of the Board. Duality is associated with increased
power, therefore CEOs who also were chairman of the board may have a larger influence
on the characteristics of the CEO succession process (Finkelstein, 1992). This may be
particularly true if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board, as the board has ultimate
responsibility for selecting the CEO.
Sixth, board size is operationalized as the total number of sitting board members at
the time of CEO ascension. Larger boards can hamper innovation (Raheja, 2005) and
have larger amounts of power (Kosnik, 1987). Therefore, a larger board may have a
greater influence on CEO succession and provide less support for a CEO’s attempts at
changing the internal portions of the process. Further, a more experienced board may
provide more guidance and thus control the CEO succession process (Shen & Cannella,
2002).
Seventh, firm performance is operationalized as the average Tobin’s Q value over
the last five years (Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009). Tobin’s Q represents the ratio of the
market value of the firm’s assets to the replacement costs of its assets. I selected Tobin’s
Q, as it is widely used in the strategy literature and is a market-based performance
measure that emphasizes financial performance of firms with differing levels of resources
available to them (Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988). To allow for a robustness check, I
also measured the five-year median industry adjusted return on assets, following the
procedures laid out by Wiersema and Zhang (2011).
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Eighth, firm size is operationalized as the total number of employees at time zero.
Companies which are of larger size have been shown to experience more inertia and
resistance to change (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996). Therefore, the inertia of larger
companies may hinder CEO control of the CEO succession process.
4.5 Analytical Strategy
In this study, I use multiple regression, following Cohen et al. (2013), to examine
the relationship between variables and to find a model of best fit. Researchers modeling
CEO succession have used ordinary least squares multiple regression (e.g., Zajac &
Westphal, 1996). Also, scholars researching the outcomes of the narcissistic personality
trait on business outcomes have used ordinary least squares multiple regression (e.g.,
Zhang, Ou, Tsui, & Hui, 2017). I analyze the results by first regressing narcissism on
only the control variables, then adding the independent variable in the regression and
looking for evidence that the independent variable is statistically significant.
4.6 Results
Table 4.2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations. Many of the
correlations for main effects are small and statistically insignificant. The correlation
between the CEO’s level of narcissism and the CEO’s level of involvement in the
succession process is -.46 and is statistically significant (p < .05). The correlation
between the CEO’s level of narcissism and the competitiveness of the CEO succession
process is -.08 and is not statistically significant. The correlation between the CEO’s
level of narcissism and the number of ready-now successors is -.05 and is not statistically
significant. The correlation between the CEO’s level of narcissism and the number of
not-ready-now successors is -.10 and is not statistically significant. The correlation
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between the CEO’s level of narcissism and the board’s level of involvement in the CEO
succession process is -.27 and is statistically significant (p < .05).
Table 4.3 reports the results of the baseline models and multivariate tests. Models
1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 contain only the control variables for Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
respectfully. Model 3 contains only the control variables for Hypothesis 2. None of the
control variables are statistically significant in predicting succession process
competitiveness. Model 5 contains only the control variables for Hypothesis 3. None of
the control variables are statistically significant in predicting the number of ready-now
successors. Model 7 contains only the control variables for Hypothesis 4. None of the
control variables are statistically significant in predicting the number of not-ready-now
candidates. Model 9 contains only the control variables for Hypothesis 5. None of the
control variables are statistically significant in predicting board involvement in the CEO
succession process.
In Model 1, none of the control variables are statistically significant in predicting
succession process involvement. In Hypothesis 1, I predict a negative relationship exists
between the CEO’s level of narcissism and level of involvement in the succession
process. In support of my prediction, I find narcissism (-7.01, p < .05) has a negative and
statistically significant relationship with succession process involvement (see Model 2).
This indicates that higher levels of CEO narcissism are related to lower levels of
involvement from the CEO in CEO succession planning. In Hypothesis 2, I predict a
negative relationship exists between the CEO’s level of narcissism and the
competitiveness of the CEO succession process. Further, I find no statistical evidence to
support the prediction (see Model 4), failing to support Hypothesis 2. In Hypothesis 3, I
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predict a negative relationship exists between the CEO’s level of narcissism and the
number of ready-now successors. In regards to Hypothesis 3, I find no statistical evidence
to support the prediction (see Model 6). In Hypothesis 4, I predict a positive relationship
exists between the CEO’s level of narcissism and the number of successors that are not
ready-now. In regards to Hypothesis 4, I find no statistical evidence to support the
prediction (see Model 8). In Hypothesis 5, I predict a negative relationship exists between
the CEO’s level of narcissism and the board’s level of involvement in the CEO
succession process. In support of my prediction, I find CEO narcissism (-4.42, p < .05)
has a negative and statistically significant relationship with board involvement in the
CEO selection process (see Model 10). This indicates that the board has less involvement
in the CEO succession process in companies that have CEOs with higher levels of
narcissism.
4.6.1 Post-hoc analysis
In post-hoc analysis, I investigate two other measures of candidate readiness
which may be affected by the level of narcissism of the CEO. Specifically, I examine
Replacement Confidence and Permanent Successor. Replacement Confidence represents
the company’s level of confidence that they can replace the CEO in a short period of time
with an internal successor. Replacement Confidence is operationalized as the confidence
percentage the survey respondent notes, regarding his or her belief that the CEO’s
permanent successor would immediately (i.e., within a few weeks) be promoted from
within (see Q19 in Appendix B). The value of 0 represents 0% confidence. At the other
end of the spectrum, the value of 10 represents 100% confidence.
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Permanent successor represents the length of time it would take to find a
permanent replacement for the CEO. Permanent Successor is operationalized as the
amount of time the survey respondent believes it would take to put a permanent CEO
successor in place (see Q20 in Appendix B). It is treated as a continuous variable. A
value of 1 represents less than one week. A value of 2 represents one to two weeks. A
value of 3 represents a value of one month. A value of 4 represents one to three months.
A value of 5 represents a value of three to six months. A value of 6 represents a value of
more than six months.
In alignment with Hypotheses 3 and 4, I expect that CEOs with higher levels of
narcissism would fill their CEO succession pipeline with fewer ready-now candidates.
Therefore, I expect a negative relationship between narcissism and both Replacement
Confidence and Permanent Successor. Table 4.4 shows the results of the analysis. I use
the same controls I used for Hypotheses 1 through 5. Model 1 contains just the control
variables. Model 2 adds narcissism as a predictor variable of Replacement Confidence.
Narcissism is not a statistically significant predictor of Replacement Confidence. Model 3
contains just the control variables. Model 4 adds narcissism as a predictor variable of
Permanent Successor. Narcissism is not a statistically significant predictor of Permanent
Successor. Thus, in post-hoc analysis with the additional variables of Replacement
Confidence and Permanent Successor, I find no additional evidence to suggest that the
level of the CEO’s narcissism affects the readiness of the CEO succession candidate pool.
4.7 Discussion Section
This study investigates the impact of CEOs with higher levels of narcissism on the
CEO succession process. Specifically, it investigates how the level of narcissism of the
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CEO impacts the CEO’s involvement in the CEO succession process, the competitiveness
of the process, the availability of successors, and the participation from the board. The
positive results of Hypotheses 1 and 5 provide evidence that CEOs with higher levels of
narcissism are less involved in the CEO succession process and that the board is less
involved in the CEO succession process when the CEO has higher levels of narcissism.
However, the insignificant statistical results regarding the competitiveness of the process
and the number of ready-now versus not-ready-now candidates raises the question of
whether narcissism has any effect on these CEO succession process components.
Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship between the CEO's level of narcissism
and the implementation of a competitive CEO succession process, such that CEOs with
higher narcissism are more likely to implement a competitive succession process, but
analysis resulted in statistically insignificant results. Still, increased clarity regarding this
hypothesis would be valuable, as it would link a specific personality trait to the effects of
the CEO on the CEO succession process, and there is evidence that narcissists try to
control their followers (Sedikides et al., 2002), including staffing the TMT in a specific
way (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017). However, these control mechanisms appear not to take
root within the selection of future CEO candidates. Three things may address the gap
between what we understand about how narcissists control their followers and the results
of this study. First, the CEO may be hired into an organization with a board which
routinely follows strong CEO succession practices (Schepker et al., 2017b). Second, the
openness of whom is being considered as a CEO successor candidate and the extent to
which the candidates are aware of each other may be a function of the stage of
development of the candidates (Pissaris et al., 2010). For example, if the pool is well-
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developed, mature individuals may be more aware of their candidacy than those within an
undeveloped or small candidate pool. Third, the competitiveness of the process may
simply not matter to a highly narcissistic CEO.
The lack of statistical evidence suggesting that the level of narcissism of the CEO
affects either the number of ready-now candidates or the number of candidates not readynow was unexpected. Research on followership states that leaders and followers can form
a symbiotic relationship, within which followers select leaders who have an expected set
of characteristics, and leaders prefer followers with a certain set of characteristics. Within
this relationship, each meets the psychological needs of the other (Uhl-Bien, Riggio,
Lowe, & Carsten, 2014). Additionally, current theory regarding the narcissist’s world
construct indicates that narcissists need followers to build their self-esteem (Chatterjee &
Pollock, 2017).
Three things may address the reason there are no statistically significant results.
First, narcissists may be inheriting a pipeline and pool of successors that they cannot fully
control. For example, when a CEO takes office, he or she inherits all of the candidates in
the pipeline and pool. To change the pool makeup takes effort and time, as individuals
can only be changed one at a time (Schneider, 1987).
Second, highly narcissistic CEOs may not be able to fill the pipeline according to
their succession desires. Several constraints, such as the job market and firm-specific
knowledge required for the job, may limit the CEO’s ability to change the makeup of the
candidate pool without hurting performance. Since performance is also a motivator for
CEOs with higher levels of narcissism (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992), the performance
capability of the employee may weigh heavier in the CEO’s staffing decisions than the
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CEO’s need to be admired. Further, the evidence that CEOs with higher levels of
narcissism spend less time in the CEO succession process may indicate that CEOs with
higher levels of narcissism pay little attention to their successor pool.
4.7.1 Theoretical implications
It has been lamented that there is no underlying theory of succession (Nyberg et al.,
2017). However, progress is being made. For example, Schepker et al. (2017b)
investigate the CEO succession process through an information-processing and decisionmaking lens in order to explain the board’s actions and participation in the CEO
succession process. Schepker et al. (2017b) find that the succession process is primarily
run by the board and generally includes the following components: “defining roles and
responsibilities, defining the firm’s future strategy, outlining the capabilities needed in a
future CEO, identifying CEO candidates who meet the role profile, developing
candidates to be ready to assume the position, selecting the successor, and ultimately
transitioning the role” (Schepker et al., 2017b: 37). Shifting the discussion from the
effects of the CEO to the effects of the board of directors is appropriate, but such a focus
misses the impact of the CEO in the initial stages of developing the candidate pool.
Tournament theory is the notion that tournaments are conceptualized as contests in
which actors compete for a prize that is awarded based on relative rank, designed to
incent an optimal level of effort (Becker & Huselid, 1992; Lazear, 1999). Tournament
theory advocates that the larger the gain and the more competitive the tournament, the
better the results (Connelly et al., 2013). In the CEO succession process, it is uncertain if
the competitiveness of the opportunity actually helps or hurts the organization overall.
Cannella and Shen (2001) maintained that retention of CEO candidates is a problem, and
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that heirs from within the firm are less likely to leave the firm. Turnover of CEO
candidates results in high costs and brings into question the overall value of a more
competitive process. As a result, it could potentially put human capital theory at odds
with tournament theory.
The idea of a talent pool has been around for a while (e.g., Chambers, Foulon,
Handfield-Jones, Hankin, & Michaels, 1998). However, the recent notion of human
capital pipelines has started to gain research momentum. Human capital pipelines have
been introduced as “repeated interorganizational hiring, and a practice firms use to
differentially acquire and accumulate human capital and mitigate human capital risk”
(Brymer, Molloy, & Gilbert, 2014: 483). CEO succession research typically looks at
predicting insider vs. outsider succession. For example, while Schepker et al. (2017b)
examined CEO succession as a process, they limited their investigation to the process as
it was immediately proximal to the board selection of a new CEO, rather than including
the pipeline that fills the CEO candidate pool. There is an opportunity to look at CEO
succession from a pipeline perspective and thereby answer questions regarding where
CEO candidates come from, what their early experiences are, and which networks get
them noticed to the extent that they are added to the ready-now or not-ready-now
candidate pools.
Seeking to understand how CEOs with higher levels of narcissism manipulate the
succession process gives us insight into the moderators of the process in terms of CEO
personality. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) identifies the natural tension
between the board and the CEO and admits that the power balance affects how CEO
succession decisions are made. For example, there is tension between the board and the
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CEO in managing the CEO succession process, and in circumstances like duality
(Davidson, Ning, Rakowski, & Elsaid, 2008) or a founding CEO (Allgood & Farrell,
2000) the CEO inevitably has more power and influence over when and how CEO
succession occurs. Monitoring in agency theory centers around the extent to which a
principal is monitored by behaviors and actions, rather than solely outcomes (Eisenhardt,
1989). Looking deeper into how the board monitors the CEO succession process when
the CEO has higher levels of narcissism could help us identify additional ways in which
the board monitors and controls the CEO. Also, when behavior is predictable, it can
eliminate the need for monitoring, and narcissism is a fairly predictable behavior. This
study highlights the importance of examining how a CEO’s personality is related to both
CEO and board involvement in the CEO succession process, as narcissism is related to
both.
4.7.2 Practical implications
There are several practical implications for boards, CEOs, and leaders of the
talent development process (e.g., the CHRO or a business unit lead). Boards may need to
be more vigilant in monitoring the succession process when their CEO exhibits higher
levels of narcissism. This paper provides evidence that CEOs who have higher levels of
narcissism put less emphasis on succession planning. I do not interpret this finding to
mean that the CEO is not holding meetings or conducting succession planning activities,
but rather to indicate that CEOs with higher levels of narcissism may not be giving
succession planning the attention it needs in order to provide the firm with its future
talent needs. This may be particularly true at lower levels in the organization, as the
board has limited visibility into these levels of the organization (Schepker et al., 2017b),
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and the CEO has more opportunity to behave opportunistically where the board can’t
monitor the real quality of the succession process (Eisenhardt, 1989). As a result, the
board may need to pay more attention to general succession practices, particularly lower
in the organization and in areas that do not feed the CEO succession pipeline directly.
CEOs may need to carefully reflect on their own attitudes toward succession
planning. CEOs can have a variety of attitudes in this regard. CEOs may believe
succession planning is essential to the future of the firm, or they may believe succession
planning is an administrative waste of time. With the combined evidence from this study
that CEOs who are highly narcissistic spend less time on succession planning, it seems
likely that CEOs will surround themselves with less-than-ideal followers (Chatterjee &
Pollock, 2017). Thus, CEOs who are highly narcissistic need to be self-aware that their
personality may bias them in a way that would hurt future firm performance. Although
narcissists are not known for self-reflection, they do tend to act in their own self-interest.
Therefore, an understanding of how succession planning can positively affect the short
and long-term performance of a company could sway a narcissist to spend more time
developing the talent pipeline. After all, it is in the best interest of the CEO to ensure
current and future performance. This is particularly true when long-term incentives are
considered, which make up a large portion of CEO compensation packages (Devers,
Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007).
Outside of CEO succession and the immediate succession plan for the TMT, the
succession process can be led by either functional leaders, such as the CHRO, or
operational leaders, such as a unit head. In many large corporations, leadership positions
work together to deliver a succession process, and utilization of the process actively
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develops future talent (Cappelli, 2011). If these leaders are aware of the CEO’s potential
bias, due to the CEO’s higher level of narcissism, leaders of the succession process can
mitigate the potential long-term consequences by putting more of their own effort and
resources into the succession process or emphasizing to the CEO that a more effective
succession process is in the CEO’s best interest.
4.7.3 Limitations and future directions
4.7.3.1 Measure of narcissism
This study highlights the problems in accurately measuring narcissism. The
design of this study was to use two measurements of narcissism: an observed measure of
narcissism following the NPI-13 (Gentile et al., 2013) and an unobtrusive measure of
narcissism following Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007, 2011). The advantage of two
measures would be to triangulate in on a robust construct of narcissism. However, despite
its wide acceptance, the Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007; 2011) measure exhibited many
weaknesses.
First, there was no internal reliability. Second, there was no statistically
significant or meaningful correlation between the observed and the unobtrusive measure
of narcissism. Third, the correlations of the unobtrusive measure of narcissism were not
in line with previously published correlations between the unobtrusive measure
components. That being said, there is not enough evidence from this study to contradict
the usage of the measure in other studies. However, it does provide enough evidence to
suggest further investigation. If both the observed and unobserved measure of narcissism
are measuring the same construct of narcissism, there should be some level of agreement
between the two measures. This paper does not find such a level of agreement.
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4.8.3.2 Availability of candidate data
Availability of candidate data may be a problem with regards to the numbers of
the ready-now versus not-ready-now candidates, as the number of candidates may have
less to do with volume than the characteristics of those candidates. For example, a small
number of candidates that are particularly adept at meeting the requirements for the
CEO’s narcissistic esteem might be a substitute for a larger number of candidates that are
less adept at meeting the CEO’s narcissistic esteem needs. Also, the highly narcissistic
CEO may use the possibility of CEO candidacy as an incentive to entice CEO successor
candidates to treat the CEO with more deference and respect (Behary, 2013). How each
potential successor reacts to that incentive could affect how the CEO attempts to
influence the CEO successor candidate pool. If we knew more about the characteristics
and qualifications of the successors or had better measurements of their readiness, maybe
we could tease this concept out better.
Longitudinal studies are becoming increasingly necessary to fully address
predictions and generalizability of study findings (Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010), and
this study does not address the issue of time. A highly narcissistic CEO may, in fact,
work to change the candidate mix within the CEO succession pool, but do so over a
period of time. If this were the case, one would expect to see a shift of candidates aligned
with the hypothesis over time (e.g., immediate pool getting smaller, not-ready-now pool
getting bigger), or it may suggest that highly narcissistic CEOs want to have more
followers that are dependent on him or her.
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4.7.4 Future directions
During periods of poor performance or environmental uncertainty, boards hire
CEOs that have different characteristics than their previous CEO, or they hire outsiders to
shift strategy and/or improve performance (Karaevli, 2007; Karaevli & Zajac, 2013;
Zhang, 2008). The vast majority of previously-studied CEO characteristics focus on
tenure, functional background, or industry experience (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Chen
& Hambrick, 2012; Martinson, 2012; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). As a result,
personality, a key component of leadership style, has been left understudied (see Hiller &
Hambrick, 2005 for an exception). The lack of research regarding whether CEOs prefer
successor CEOs with similar personality traits is of particular interest when it comes to
narcissism. Do highly narcissistic CEOs prefer highly narcissistic successors? In addition,
if the sitting CEO is narcissistic, during times of uncertainty and/or poor performance,
does the board select a successor who is also narcissistic? Does the board select a
successor who is in the current candidate pool, someone within the company but not in
the candidate pool, or does the board go to the outside?
Another area that has been left relatively unstudied is the CEO candidate’s level
of narcissism as compared to that of the board and of the CEO. It has been found that
narcissists prefer narcissists and tend to see narcissism as a healthy personality trait
(Keith Campbell, Bosson, Goheen, Lakey, & Kernis, 2007; Konrath, Meier, & Bushman,
2014). Therefore, a highly narcissistic CEO may prefer another highly narcissistic
candidate. The same situation may occur within the board of directors. A board with
higher levels of narcissism may prefer a CEO with higher levels of narcissism. For this
study, I did not study the levels of narcissism of the board of directors or the CEO
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candidates. However, if that data were gathered, we could test the hypothesis that
narcissists prefer narcissists in the CEO succession process by looking at the CEO, the
candidate pool, and the board to see if narcissism plays any role in selection.
4.8 Conclusion
This study seeks to understand what impact a CEO with higher levels of
narcissism has on the CEO succession process. I find empirical evidence that CEOs with
higher levels of narcissism are less involved in the succession process. I also found that in
firms where the CEO has higher levels of narcissism, the board is less involved in the
CEO succession process. However, I failed to find any statistically significant evidence
suggesting that when a CEO has higher levels of narcissism, the process is more
competitive and/or the size of the ready-now or not ready-now candidate pool is affected.
The implications of these findings are that CEOs with higher levels of narcissism need to
approach the succession process more sincerely. The study fails to explain in detail the
consequences of that lack of participation, nor does it answer questions relating to how a
highly narcissistic CEO would approach the candidate pool and process. Since boards in
firms with CEOs who are less narcissistic also participate less in the succession process,
firms that have CEOs with higher levels of narcissism are at risk for more volatile and
poor-performing CEO succession processes. Boards should be aware of the impact of the
CEO’s level of narcissism on the CEO succession process and how the CEO filters
information from the board. Going forward, we need to keep pursuing these questions to
fully understand the long-term consequences of CEOs with higher levels of narcissism.
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TABLE 4.1
Narcissism Item Correlations
n

Mean

SD

1

2

3

1

CEO picture code (size)

115

2.51

1.08

2

114

1.96

.57

.13

114

2.50

.93

.07

.46*

4

CEO to next executive
cash ratio
CEO to next executive
noncash ratio
CEO name to words ratio

106

.69

.60

.04

.11

.11

5

Observed-narcissism

97

3.15

1.00

-0.02

.14

.12

3

*p<.05
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4

.01

TABLE 4.2
Correlation and Descriptive Statistics
Mean

SD

1

2

1

Succession process involvement

4.17

0.81

2

Succession process
competitiveness
Candidate pool readiness (now)

2.82

1.01

0.25*

0.78

0.77

0.22

0.29*

6.10

4.49

0.28*

0.07

5

Candidate pool readiness (not
now)
Board involvement

9.77

3.00

0.40*

0.38*

6

Observed-narcissism

3.13

1.04

-0.46*

7

CEO age

57.75

4.60

-0.02

8

CEO origin

0.26

0.44

9

CEO was heir apparent

0.38

10

CEO tenure

11

CEO duality

12

Board size

13

Firm performance

14

Firm size

3
4
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n = 73; *p<.05.

3

4

5

6

8

0.43*
-0.01

0.15

-0.05

-0.10

-0.27*

0.27*

-0.03

0.01

0.01

0.24*

-0.12

0.05

-0.08

-0.20

0.04

0.27*

0.49

0.13

-0.08

0.04

0.05

0.03

-0.23

6.53

3.87

-0.01

0.19

0.09

0.12

0.04

0.64

0.48

0.05

0.12

0.16

0.20

10.22

2.16

0.27*

0.23

0.13

0.17

1.85

0.98

0.12

0.12

0.01

0.09

59.28

73.86

0.28*

0.22

0.24*

0.26*

-0.08

7

0.04
-0.39*

-0.47*

0.18

0.30**

-0.03

0.06

0.13

0.16

-0.02

0.30*

-0.10

0.10

-0.22

-0.02

0.06

0.13

0.05

0.17

-0.17

0.03

-0.02

TABLE 4.2
Correlation and Descriptive Statistics Continued
Mean

SD

9

10

11

12

10

CEO tenure

59.77

5.46

-0.08

11

CEO duality

.52

.50

0.12

0.32*

12

Board size

9.78

5.77

0.20

0.22

13

Firm performance

.98

.05

-0.06

0.09

-0.11

0.02

14

Firm size

54.96

71.56

-0.04

0.09

0.18

0.43*

n = 73; *p<.05

13

0.33*

-0.07
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TABLE 4.3
Regression Table of the Effects of Narcissism on CEO Involvement in the Succession Process, Competitiveness of the CEO
Succession Process, Number of Ready-now Successors, Number of Not Ready-now Successors, and Board Involvement in the
CEO Succession Process
Succession Process
Involvement
Model 1
Observednarcissism
CEO age
CEO origin
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CEO was heir
apparent
CEO tenure
CEO duality
Board size
Firm performance
Firm size
Constant
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std.
F Statistic
N = 73; * p < .05

.00
(.02)
-.09
(.25)
.14
(.25)
-.01
(.03)
-.02
(.22)
.06
(.05)
.12
(.10)
0.00
(.00)
3.31*
(1.41)
.15
.04
.79
(df = 64)
1.37
(df = 8;64)

Model 2
-7.01*
(1.99)
.01
(.02)
.06
(.23)
.10
(.23)
-.01
(.02)
.07
(.20)
.05
(.05)
.12
(.09)
.00
(.00)
10.53*
(2.43)
.29
.18
.73
(df = 63)
2.80*
(df=9;63)

Succession Process
Competitiveness
Model 3
.05
(.03)
.21
(.31)
.09
(.31)
.02
(.03)
-.02
(.27)
.06
(.07)
.09
(.12)
.00
(.00)
-1.17
(1.75)
.15
.05
.98
(df = 64)
1.45
(df = 8;64)

Model 4
-3.13
(2.68)
0.06
(.03)
.28
(.31)
.07
(.31)
.02
(.03)
.02
(.27)
.06
(.07)
.09
(.12)
.00
(.00)
2.06
(3.27)
.17
.05
.98
(df = 63)
1.45
(df=9;63)

Candidate Pool
Ready-now Successors
Model 5
-.01
(.02)
-.14
(.24)
-.03
(.24)
.01
(.03)
.21
(.22)
-.01
(.05)
.04
(.10)
0.00
(.00)
1.29
(1.39)
.09
-.03
.78
(df = 64)
.75
(df = 8;64)

Model 6
-.18
(2.15)
-.01
(.02)
-.14
(.25)
-.03
(.25)
.01
(.03)
.22
(.22)
-.01
(.05)
.04
(.10)
.00
(.00)
1.48
(2.63)
.09
-.04
.79
(df =63)
.66
(df=9;63)

Candidate Pool
Not-ready-now
Successors
Model 7
Model 8
-5.25
(12.07)
-.08
-.07
(.13)
(.14)
-2.49
-2.38
(1.37)
(1.40)
-.78
-.81
(1.37)
(1.38)
.06
.06
(.15)
(.15)
1.73
1.80
(1.22)
(1.24)
-.09
-.09
(.29)
(.29)
.66
.66
(.54)
(.54)
0.01
0.01
(.01)
(.01)
8.99
14.41
(7.82)
(14.71)
.16
.16
.05
.04
4.37
4.40
(df = 64)
(df = 63)
1.48
1.32
(df = 8;64) (df=9;63)

Board Involvement
Model 9
.00
(.02)
-.17
(.23)
-.09
(.23)
.01
(.03)
-.15
(.21)
.09
(.05)
.04
(.09)
.00
(.00)
3.01*
(1.33)
.12
.01
.74
(df = 64)
1.09
(df = 8;64)

Model 10
-4.42*
(1.98)
.01
(.02)
-.08
(.23)
-.12
(.23)
.01
(.02)
-.09
(.20)
0.09
(.05)
.04
(.09)
.00
(.00)
7.56*
(2.41)
.19
.07
.72
(df = 63)
1.59
(df=9;63)

TABLE 4.4
Post-hoc Analysis: Regression Table of the Effects of Narcissism on Replacement
Confidence and Permanent Successor

Narcissism
CEO age
CEO origin
CEO was heir apparent
CEO tenure
CEO duality
Board size
Firm performance
Firm size
Constant
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std.
F Statistic

Replacement
Confidence
Model 1
Model 2
8.12
(4.66)
0.18
-.06
(.11)
(.05)
-1.70
.51
(1.13)
(.54)
-.28
-.06
(1.13)
(.53)
0.19
-.13*
(.12)
(.06)
.70
-.85
(1.00)
(.48)
-.07
.05
(.24)
(.11)
.32
-.17
(.44)
(.21)
.02*
-.01*
(.01)
(.00)
-5.69
-.56
(6.45)
(5.68)
.26
.32
.16
.22
3.61
1.70
(df = 64)
(df = 63)
2.77*
3.28*
(df = 8;64) (df=9;63)

N = 73; * p < .05
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Permanent
Successor
Model 3
Model 4
8.12
(4.66)
-.05
-.06
(.05)
(.05)
0.69
.51
(.54)
(.54)
-.10
-.06
(.54)
(.53)
-.12*
-.13*
(.06)
(.06)
-.74
-.85
(.48)
(.48)
.04
.05
(.12)
(.11)
-.17
-.17
(.21)
(.21)
-.01*
-.01*
(.00)
(.00)
7.80*
-.56
(3.09)
(5.68)
.29
.32
.20
.22
1.73
1.70
(df = 64)
(df = 63)
3.21*
3.28*
(df=8;64)
(df=9;63)

Interpersonal Skills
(e.g., social confidence
and charm)

Fundamental Narcissistic Qualities
1) Agentic vs communal concerns
2) Approach orientation
3) Desire for self-esteem
4) Entitlement
5) Inflated self-views

Intrapsychic Skills
(e.g., fantasies of power
and self-serving bias)

Narcissism

Interpersonal
Strategies
(e.g., self-promotion and
game-playing)

FIGURE 4.1
The Extended Agency Model
Recreated from Campbell and Foster (2007)
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Narcissistic Esteem

H1(-)

H2(+)

CEO’s level of
observed-narcissism

CEO’s level of
involvement in the CEO
succession process

Competitiveness of the
CEO succession process

H3(-)
Number of ready-now
CEO successors
H4(+)
Number of not-ready-now
CEO successors
H5(-)
Board’s level of
involvement in the CEO
succession process

FIGURE 4.2
Model of CEO’s Level of Narcissism and its Effects on the CEO Succession
Processes
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Summary and Conclusions
This research sought to address two main questions. First, what would motivate a
board to hire a CEO with higher levels of narcissism? Second, how does a CEO with
higher levels of narcissism influence the CEO succession process? To answer these
questions, I conducted a literature review and two empirical studies. In the literature
review, I found little evidence that addressed these questions. In the two empirical
studies, I found statistically significant evidence in two of ten hypotheses. That evidence
suggests that CEOs with higher levels of narcissism are less involved in the CEO
succession process, and that in firms where the CEO has higher levels of narcissism, the
board is less involved in the CEO succession process. For a summary of all hypotheses
and their results, see Table 5.1.
The implications of these findings are that CEOs with higher levels of narcissism
approach the succession process differently than their less narcissistic peers. These
studies fail to explain in detail the consequences of that lack of participation, and
therefore, many answers to questions about how CEOs with higher levels of narcissism
approach the candidate pool and process remain unanswered. Since boards in firms with
CEOs who are less narcissistic also participate less in the CEO succession process, firms
that have CEOs with higher levels of narcissism are at risk for more volatile and poorperforming CEO succession processes. Going forward, we need to investigate these
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questions more deeply to fully understand the long-term consequences of CEOs with
higher levels of narcissism.
From a theoretical perspective, these studies advance our understanding of how
decision-making theory impacts CEO succession by helping us understand that
narcissism can influence a CEO to manipulate information provided to the board of
directors (for additional theoretical implications, see Table 5.2). From a methodological
perspective, this study did not find consistent reliability between two commonly-used
methods of measuring narcissism, the NPI (Raskin & Hall, 1981) and Chatterjee and
Hambrick’s (2007) unobtrusive measure of narcissism. Such a result suggests that our
current methods of measuring narcissism require refinement. From a practical
perspective, boards need to maintain vigilance in the succession process and be aware of
the potential manipulations of information and process by CEOs with higher levels of
narcissism. If the board decides to hire a CEO with higher levels of narcissism, the board
needs to initiate mitigating processes to ensure the proper flow of information and
oversight of CEO successor development and the CEO succession process (for a
summary of practical implications, see Table 5.3). Going forward, we would benefit from
a broader study of CEO personality and how it affects CEO succession, as well as an
extended study of how individual board member personalities influence CEO succession
(for a summary of future directions, see Table 5.4).
The study of narcissism at the executive level needs to continue, as narcissism
continues to be a personality trait sought after in our leaders for its potential positive
consequences, despite its potentially catastrophic outcomes (e.g., the Enron collapse).
Only through continued study can we learn how to capitalize on the positive outcomes of
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narcissism while mitigating the negative outcomes. Ultimately, from a practical
perspective, boards need to be deeply involved in their selection of a CEO, in order to
assure that the risks of hiring a highly narcissistic CEO do not come to fruition.
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TABLE 5.1
Summary of Hypotheses
Num

Hypothesis

Sig

1.1

Firm performance is negatively related to the level of narcissism of the selected CEO, such No
that lower levels of firm performance are related to higher levels of narcissism in the
selected CEO.

1.2

Environmental dynamism is positively related to the level of narcissism of the selected
CEO, such that in environments with higher levels of dynamism, CEOs are selected
who have higher levels of narcissism.

No

1.3

Environmental munificence is positively related to the level of narcissism of the selected
CEO, such that environments with high levels of munificence are related to the selection
of CEOs with higher levels of narcissism.

No

1.4

Environmental dynamism attenuates the negative relationship between firm performance
and the level of narcissism of the selected CEO, such that when environmental
dynamism is low and firm performance is low, there is a weaker negative relationship
between firm performance and the selection of a CEO with higher levels of narcissism.

No

1.5

Environmental munificence attenuates the negative relationship between firm performance
and the level of narcissism of the selected CEO, such that when environmental
munificence is low and firm performance is low, there is a weaker negative relationship
between firm performance and the selection of a CEO with higher levels of narcissism.

No

2.1

A negative relationship exists between the CEO’s level of narcissism and the involvement
of the CEO in the succession process, such that when the CEO has a higher level of
narcissism, the CEO is less involved in the CEO succession process.

Yes

2.2

A positive relationship exists between the CEO's level of narcissism and the
implementation of a competitive CEO succession process, such that CEOs with higher
narcissism are more likely to implement a competitive CEO succession process.

No

2.3

A negative relationship exists between the CEO’s level of narcissism and the number of
ready-now successors, such that CEOs with higher levels of narcissism are related to
candidate pools with fewer numbers of ready-now successors.

No

2.4

A positive relationship exists between the CEOs level of narcissism and the number of
successors that are not ready-now, such that CEOs with higher levels of narcissism are
related to CEO succession candidate pools with higher numbers of not-ready-now
candidates.

No

2.5

A negative relationship exists between the CEO's level of narcissism and board
involvement in the CEO succession process, such that when the CEO has a higher level
of narcissism, there is less board involvement in the CEO succession processes.

Yes

Num = Hypothesis Number; Sig = Statistically Significant

174

TABLE 5.2
Summary of Theoretical Implications
Theory

Implication

Agency
Theory

Boards may hire CEOs higher in narcissism with the express objective
of reducing agency costs while encouraging risk-taking behavior,
due to the predictability of narcissists.

Narcissism

In times of crisis, higher levels of narcissism in executive leadership
are beneficial to firms. Narcissists may be beneficial to a firm.

Tournament
Theory

Tournament theory advocates improved performance from
competition; however, the consequences of poor retention and lack
of development may indicate that competition is bad for human
capital resource development.

Decision
Making
Theory

Since information flow is important to good succession planning,
narcissistic CEOs may disrupt that information flow.

Human
Capital
Pipelines

The CEO talent pipeline needs to be investigated at deeper levels than
the first and second tier of CEO successors.

Followership

This study provides evidence that CEOs with higher levels of
narcissism do intervene in the succession process to impact
individuals close to them.
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TABLE 5.3
Summary of Implications for Practice
Number

Implication

1

Need to withhold judgement on the negatives or positives of narcissism.

2

Need for boards to monitor the succession process vigilantly, due to the
potential obfuscation of information by the CEO.

3

CEO needs to be self-reflective regarding how he or she approaches
succession to see if his or her personality traits are significantly
biasing himself or herself.

4

Board and functional leaders need to be aware of potential CEO bias.
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TABLE 5.4
Summary of Future Directions
Number

Implication

1

Study narcissism along with other personality traits at the same time.

2

Develop a more robust measure of narcissism.

3

Study narcissism over time.

4

Look at additional firm characteristics that may signal or drive when a
board selects a CEO with higher levels of narcissism.

5

Investigate how boards with higher levels of narcissism may impact the
selection of CEOs with higher levels of narcissism.
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CEO SUCCESSION TOPICS
IDENTIFIED BY CRAGUN ET AL. (2016)
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APPENDIX B
SURVEY INSTRUMENTS
Question 1:
Over the course of an average fiscal year, what percent of your time would you say you spend in each of
the following roles?
______ Strategic Advisor to the Executive Team (activities focused specifically on the formulation
and implementation of the firm's strategy):
______ Counselor/confidante/coach to the Executive Team (activities focused on counseling or
coaching executive team members or resolving interpersonal or political conflicts among team members):
______ Liaison to the Board of Directors (preparation for Board meetings, phone calls with
Board members, attendance at Board meetings):
______ Talent Strategist/Architect (activities focused on building and identifying the human capital
critical to the present and future of the firm):
______ Leader of the HR Function (working with HR team members regarding the development,
design and delivery of HR services):
______ Workforce Sensor (activities focused on identifying workforce engagement/morale issues
or concerns and building employee engagement):
______ Representative of the Firm (activities with external stakeholders, such as government
agencies, investor groups, proxy advisory firms, professional societies, etc.):
______ Other-Please Specify
Question 2:
Of the time you spend working with the Board of Directors (or its equivalent), how much time is spent on:
______ Executive Pay Issues:
______ CEO Succession Issues:
______ CEO Performance Issues:
______ Other Senior Executive talent/succession issues:
______ Other Senior Executive performance issues:
______ Ethics/Compliance/Governance Issues:
______ Risk Management:
______ Activist Investors:
______ Other-Please Specify
Question 3:
Your Role as Chief Human Resource Officer (Continued): To whom do you directly report?
❍ Chief Executive Officer
❍ Chief Operations Officer
❍ Chief Administrative Officer
❍ Chief Financial Officer
❍ General Counsel
❍ Other (please specify) ____________________
Question 4:
What, if any, non-HR functions report to you?
Question 5:
What functional areas have you worked in outside of HR?
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Question 6:
What are your CEO's top 2 or 3 priorities for you as the CHRO?
Question 7:
In what areas do you (the CHRO) provide strategic counsel to the CEO?
Question 8:
If your role was vacated today, to what extent do you think the role would be filled by an insider?
❍ Highly likely an outsider
❍ Likely an outsider
❍ Neither one or the other
❍ Likely an insider
❍ Highly likely an insider
Question 9:
Are you a potential successor to the CEO?
❍ Yes
❍ No, I should not be
❍ No, I should be
❍ I don't know
Question 10:
On how many boards do you serve?
Number of boards
Company, public or private
Professional society, university, non-profit, etc.
Question 11:
How many hours (quarterly) do you spend serving on these boards?
Number of quarterly hours
Company, public or private
Professional society, university, non-profit, etc.

Makes succession a priority
Takes ownership of the succession process
Regularly reviews succession plans
Regularly meets with succession candidates
Maintains objectivity in evaluating candidates
Creates equal opportunity for successors to meet with
the Board, rather than focus on favorites

200

Strongly
agree

Agree

Neutral

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Question 12:
To what extent do you agree with the following statements in regards to the CEO's involvement in the CEO
succession process? The CEO...

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

Makes succession a priority
Takes ownership of the succession process
Regularly reviews succession plans
Regularly meets with succession candidates
Maintains objectivity in evaluating candidates
Creates equal opportunity for successors to meet with
the Board, rather than focus on favorites

Strongly
agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Question 13:
To what extent do you agree with the following statements in regards to the Board's (or
its equivalent's) involvement in the CEO succession process? The Board...

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

Question 14:
Approximately how many insiders are currently considered potential successors to your current CEO in the
following time frames?
0
1
2-3
4-6
7-8 9 or more
Immediately
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Not immediately, but within 6 months
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Not within 6 months, but within 6-24 months
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Greater than 24 months
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Question 15:
Approximately how many EXTERNAL candidates are you currently monitoring as potential successors to
the CEO?
External
0
❍
1
❍
2–3
❍
4–6
❍
7–8
❍
9 or more
❍
Question 16:
What percentage of your internal CEO succession candidate pool is considered diverse?
Percent female
Percent racially diverse
Immediate successors (0-3 years)
Longer term successors (3-5 years)
Question 17:
To what extent does the diversity level of your internal CEO succession candidate pool compare to your
diversity goals?
❍ Falls extremely short
❍ Falls short
❍ Meets
❍ Exceeds
❍ Far exceeds
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Question 18:
To what extent does the current diversity level of your internal CEO succession candidate pool compare to
the pool 5 years ago?
❍ Greatly decreased
❍ Decreased
❍ Same
❍ Increased
❍ Greatly increased
Question 19:
If your CEO were to step down or leave today, how confident are you that his/her permanent successor
would immediately (i.e., within a few weeks) be an internal direct report (i.e., immediate promotion
without an "interim" CEO)?
❍ 0%
❍ 10%
❍ 20%
❍ 30%
❍ 40%
❍ 50%
❍ 60%
❍ 70%
❍ 80%
❍ 90%
❍ 100%
Question 20:
If your CEO were to step down or leave today, how long do you think it would take to have a permanent
successor in place?
❍ Less than one week
❍ One to two weeks
❍ One month
❍ 1 -3 months
❍ 3 - 6 months
❍ 6 months or more
Question 21:
How did the current CEO get promoted into the CEO role?
❍ Internal
❍ Direct external hire
❍ Indirect external hire (hired with the expectation of later promotion)
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Question 22:
To what extent are successor candidates to the CEO aware they are candidates to succeed the CEO, and to
what extent are they aware who the other successor candidates are?
Aware who the other
Aware they are a successor
successor candidates
candidate 1 = Not at all 2 = Slightly are 1 = Not at all 2 =
3 = Somewhat 4 = Moderately 5 =
Slightly 3 = Somewhat
Extremely
4 = Moderately 5 =
Extremely
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4 5
Interim successor in an emergency
❍
❍
❍
❍ ❍
❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍
(not just a delegate)
Those ready in 0-2 years
❍
❍
❍
❍ ❍
❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍
Those ready in 2-5 years
❍
❍
❍
❍ ❍
❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍
Those ready in 5 + years (i.e., high
❍
❍
❍
❍ ❍
❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍
potentials)
Question 23:
To what extent does the CEO or the Board (or its equivalent) advocate that the CEO succession process
focus on identifying and developing a single successor (i.e., heir apparent) versus multiple, competing,
successors?
Only
Mostly
Mostly
Only
Does not
advocates a
advocates a
advocates
advocates
advocate one
single
single
multiple,
multiple,
approach over
successor
successor
competing,
competing,
the other
approach
approach
successors
successors
CEO
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Board
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Question 24:
What percentage of Board (or its equivalent) meetings do CEO successor candidates or you (CHRO)
attend?
Board meeting attendance
CEO successor candidates
You (CHRO)

Executive leadership team positions are filled following a
formal succession planning process
Our company has a strong tradition of succession planning
Leadership positions below the executive leadership team are
filled following a formal succession planning process
Our succession planning practices are benchmarked by other
companies
Succession planning is part of our culture

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍
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Strongly
Agree

❍

Agree

Neutral

❍

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Question 25:
To what extent do you agree with the following statements in regards to succession planning?

Question 26:
Given the history of succession planning at your company, how has the current CEO impacted its emphasis
and effectiveness?
❍ Decreased emphasis and effectiveness
❍ Decreased emphasis
❍ Maintained
❍ Increased emphasis
❍ Increased emphasis and effectiveness
Question 27:
The Board and CEO Succession: To what extent is the agenda for Board (or its equivalent) meetings set
by the CEO vs. the Board?
❍ CEO: 0%; Board: 100%
❍ CEO: 10%; Board: 90%
❍ CEO: 20%; Board: 80%
❍ CEO: 30%; Board: 70%
❍ CEO: 40%; Board: 60%
❍ CEO: 50%; Board: 50%
❍ CEO: 60%; Board: 40%
❍ CEO: 70%; Board: 30%
❍ CEO: 80%; Board: 20%
❍ CEO: 90%; Board: 10%
❍ CEO: 100%; Board: 0%
Question 28:
When it comes to the reality of choosing the CEO's successor, how much influence will the CEO have vs.
the Board (or its equivalent).
❍ CEO: 0%; Board: 100%
❍ CEO: 10%; Board: 90%
❍ CEO: 20%; Board: 80%
❍ CEO: 30%; Board: 70%
❍ CEO: 40%; Board: 60%
❍ CEO: 50%; Board: 50%
❍ CEO: 60%; Board: 40%
❍ CEO: 70%; Board: 30%
❍ CEO: 80%; Board: 20%
❍ CEO: 90%; Board: 10%
❍ CEO: 100%; Board: 0%
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Question 29:
To your knowledge, does your Board (or its equivalent) do each of the following with regard to CEO
Succession?
Don't
Yes
No
Know
Conducts 5+ year business strategy and global industry sector
❍
❍
❍
analysis
Develops clear role profile for CEO aligned to 5+ year enterprise
❍
❍
❍
business strategy analysis
Develops clear role profiles for direct reports to the CEO aligned
❍
❍
❍
with 5+ year enterprise business strategy
Has scheduled conversations with CEO regarding time for
❍
❍
❍
succession
Develops a well-defined CEO succession process
❍
❍
❍
Has a clearly defined ownership for CEO succession processes
❍
❍
❍
Has formal tools for talent assessment of CEO pipeline candidates
❍
❍
❍
Considers restructuring organization to create building block roles
❍
❍
❍
and key experiences for potential successors
Includes discussion of CEO succession in Board minutes
❍
❍
❍
Designs exposure to the Board for CEO talent pipeline
❍
❍
❍
Has feedback processes on performance and development to
❍
❍
❍
candidates
Reviews formal development plans for CEO candidates
❍
❍
❍
Conducts ongoing assessment of readiness of internal candidates and
❍
❍
❍
depth of talent pipeline
Regularly explores the external market for potential CEO successors ❍
❍
❍
Question 30:
How many Board (or its equivalent) members would be involved in hiring for each of the following CSuite roles:
None
One
a Few
Half Most
All
Chief Operating Officer / President
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Chief Financial Officer
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Chief Human Resource Officer
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Chief Marketing Officer
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Chief Information Officer
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Chief Legal Officer
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Business Unit Leader
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
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❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

Ultimate
decision

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

Heavy
influence

Input to
decision

Chief Operating Officer / President
Chief Financial Officer
Chief Human Resource Officer
Chief Marketing Officer
Chief Information Officer
Chief Legal Officer
Business Unit Leader

Interview
for
approval

None

Courtesy
interview

Question 31:
How would you describe the Board's (or its equivalent's) involvement in the hiring process for each of the
following C-Suite roles?

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

Question 32:
CEO Succession in The Last Five Years:
Did your company change CEOs in the last five years?
❍ Yes
❍ No
Question 33:
CEO Succession in The Last Five Years:
***Skip questions that do not apply***

Sourcing candidates
Screening candidates
Candidate assessment
Developing a final candidate slate

❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍

Extremely
involved

Very
involved

Moderately
involved

Slightly
involved

Not at all
involved

Don't know

Question 34:
To what extent was a third party involved in the selection of the CURRENT CEO, if the CEO was an
INSIDER?

❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍

Question 36:
Did the exiting CEO stay on the Board (or Board equivalent) after leaving office?
❍ No
❍ Yes Until the following annual meeting
❍ Yes 1 year
❍ Yes 2 years
❍ Yes 3 years
❍ Yes 4 years or longer
Question 37:
CEO Succession In The Last Five Years, COO/President Role:
Was the CEO appointed COO/President as development or
testing to potentially later become the CEO?
Was there a PLANNED time period for the CEO to hold the
COO/President role as development or testing?
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Yes

No

❍

❍

❍

❍

Extremely
involved

Slightly
involved
❍
❍
❍
❍

Very
involved

❍
❍
❍
❍

Moderately
involved

Sourcing candidates
Screening candidates
Candidate assessment
Developing a final candidate slate

Not at all
involved

Don't know

Question 35:
To what extent was a third party involved in the selection of the CURRENT CEO, if the CEO was an
OUTSIDER?

❍
❍
❍
❍

Question 38:
How long was the PLANNED time period for the CEO to hold the COO/President role as development or
testing?
Question 39:
Relative to the PLANNED time period for the CEO to hold the COO/President role as development or
testing, was the actual time period shorter, exactly the same, or longer?
❍ Shorter
❍ Exactly the same
❍ Longer
Question 40:
If not the same, why not?
Question 41:
During the ACTUAL time period the CEO held the COO/President role as development or testing, what
were the biggest challenges?
Question 42:
CEO Succession In The Last Five Years, Before Taking Office:
Was there a PLANNED time period between the CEO being formally selected CEO and actually taking
office?
❍ Yes
❍ No
Question 43:
How long was the PLANNED time period between the CEO being formally selected CEO and actually
taking office?
Question 44:
Relative to the PLANNED time period between the CEO being formally selected CEO and actually taking
office, was the ACTUAL period shorter, exactly the same, or longer?
❍ Shorter
❍ Exactly the same
❍ Longer
Question 45:
If not the same, why not?
Question 46:
During the ACTUAL time period between the CEO being formally selected CEO and taking office, what
were the biggest challenges?
Question 47:
Do you have a policy regarding executives serving on for-profit outside boards? On how many for-profit
boards are they allowed to serve?
How many for-profit boards are allowed?
0
1
2
3 or more
No policy
CEO
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Executives below the CEO
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
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Question 48:
What percentage of your potential CEO successors currently serve on outside boards?
For-profit board
Non-profit board
Those ready in 0-2 years
Those ready in 2-5 years
Those ready in 5 + years

Rarely

Sometimes

Frequently

Most
frequently

The nature of how the job was structured made it difficult for one to
succeed
The person turned out to not have the necessary skills to succeed in the
job
The scale of the job was much bigger than the individual’s previous job,
and the individual could not scale up adequately
The person’s skill mix did not fit well with that of the rest of the
executive leadership team
The individual's personality (ego, selfishness, narcissism, etc.) did not fit
well with the executive leadership team
The individual was unable to develop the necessary relationships to
succeed in the role
The individual engaged in a financial code of conduct violation
The individual engaged in a sexual code of conduct violation
The individual engaged in some other integrity code of conduct violation
Other (please specify)

Never

Question 49:
Based on your experiences with senior INTERNAL C-suite hires that failed, please rate how frequently
each was a cause of that failure:

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍

Question 50:
Based on your experiences with senior EXTERNAL C-suite hires that failed, please rate how frequently
each was a cause of that failure:
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Most
frequently

Frequently

Rarely

Sometimes

Never
The nature of how the job was structured made it difficult for one to
succeed
The person turned out to not have the necessary skills to succeed in
the job
The scale of the job was much bigger than the individual’s previous
job, and the individual could not scale up adequately
The person’s skill mix did not fit well with that of the rest of the
executive leadership team
The individual's personality (ego, selfishness, narcissism, etc.) did
not fit well with the executive leadership team
The individual was unable to develop the necessary relationships to
succeed in the role
The individual engaged in a financial code of conduct violation
The individual engaged in a sexual code of conduct violation
The individual engaged in some other integrity code of conduct
violation
Other (please specify)
Question 51:
Based on your experience, what is the cost of C-Suite failure?

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍
❍

❍
❍

❍
❍

❍
❍

❍
❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

Internal
hire

External hire

Direct Costs Recruitment, signing bonus, salary, bonus, LTIP, severance,
etc.
Indirect Costs Lost sales, canceled contracts, business disruption, loss in
customer satisfaction etc.
Question 52:
To what extent do you agree with the following statements in regards to the CEO's leadership style? The
CEO... (Entirely disagree = 1, Mostly disagree = 2, Somewhat disagree = 3, Neutral = 4, Somewhat agree =
5, Mostly agree = 6, Entirely agree = 7)

209

Actively seeks feedback, even if it is critical
Downplays his/her authority
Is open to the ideas of others
Is constantly being told how good s/he is by subordinates
Spends time developing his/her leadership capability
Asks politely for people to do things instead of commanding or telling
them to do it
Is willing to learn from others
Acknowledges when others have more knowledge and skills than him- or
herself
Is constantly doing nice things for others
Shows appreciation for the unique contributions of others
Does not show off
Never manipulates others
Takes notice of others’ strengths
Demands to be respected
Often compliments others on their strengths
Admits it when s/he doesn't know how to do something
Is open to the advice of others
Delegates power
Constantly asks for more (salary, bonus, perks, etc.)

1
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

2
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

3
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

4
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

5
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

6
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

7
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍
❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍
❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

Question 53:
CEO's Leadership Style (Continued): To what extent do you agree with the following statements in
regards to the CEO's integral involvement in the following communications practices? The CEO is integral
in...
Strongly
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree
agree
Writing the annual report
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Approving the annual report
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Selecting public relations
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
resources (internal or external)
Approving press releases
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Planning public relations strategy ❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
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❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

Always

Frequently

Seldom

Never
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

Provides useful guidance
Fully supports ELT members
Has chosen an appropriate strategy
Has full confidence in the ELT members
Never seems overly critical in meetings
Seldom oversteps his/her bounds
Has the necessary expertise
Works well with the ELT
Overall, is very effective CEO

Sometimes

Question 54:
Based on your interactions with the Executive Leadership Team (ELT) members regarding the CEO, how
would you describe ELT members’ beliefs about the CEO? The ELT members believe that the CEO...

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

Agree

Strongly
agree

❍
❍

❍
❍

❍
❍

❍
❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

Question 56:
What is your company's philosophy for the Chairman of the Board role?
❍ Using an outside, independent director is best
❍ Using the former CEO of the company is best
❍ Combining it with the CEO role and a limited lead director role is best
❍ Combining it with the CEO role and an empowered lead director role is best
Question 57:
What do you find as the major advantage of this arrangement?
Question 58:
What do you find as the major disadvantage of this arrangement?
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Neutral

❍
❍

Strongly
disagree
Provides useful guidance
Fully supports the CEO
Board members appropriately insert themselves in strategic
decisions
Has full confidence in the current strategy
Has full confidence in the CEO
Never seems overly critical in Board meetings
Seldom oversteps its bounds
Is a useful source of expertise
Has the necessary breadth of expertise
Is diverse in terms of women and minority members
Members work well with one another
Meetings are something to look forward to
Overall, is a very effective Board

Disagree

Question 55:
Based on your interactions with the CEO regarding the Board, how would you describe his/her beliefs
about the Board (or its equivalent)? The CEO believes the Board (or its equivalent) ...

Seldom

Sometimes

Frequently

Always

How much does the ELT disagree about the content of strategic decisions?
How frequently does the ELT have disagreements about ideas?
To what extent are there differences of professional opinion in the ELT?
How often do ELT members disagree with the company’s strategic
decisions?
How much personal friction is there with ELT members?
How much are personality clashes evident with the ELT?
How much tension is there among ELT members?
To what extent are grudges evident among members of the ELT?
ELT members absolutely respect each other’s competence
Every ELT member shows absolute integrity
ELT members expect the complete truth from each other
ELT members count on each other to fully live up to their words

Never

Question 59:
Executive Leadership Team (ELT) Dynamics: Based on your observations of the ELT, how would you
describe their interactions with one another?

❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍

Question 60:
How were you promoted into the CHRO role?
❍ Internal from HR
❍ Internal from outside of HR
❍ Direct external hire
❍ Indirect external hire (hired with the expectation of later promotion)
Question 61:
How did the CFO get promoted into the CFO role?
❍ Internal from within finance
❍ Internal from outside of finance
❍ Direct external hire
❍ Indirect external hire (hired with the expectation of later promotion)
Question 62:
How long have you been in the following:
How long have you
been in your current
CHRO position?

How long have you
been a CHRO?

Time in position:
Question 63:
Age
Question 64:
Sex
❍ Male
❍ Female
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How long have you
been in the HR
profession (round to
nearest year)

Question 65:
Race
❍ White
❍ Black or African American
❍ Asian
❍ Hispanic or Latino
❍ American Indian or Alaska Native
❍ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
❍ Other (please specify) ____________________
Question 66:
Company Information:
How many U.S. employees does your company
have?
How many global employees does your company
have?
What were your 2015 revenues? (in millions of
dollars)
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